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Abstract 
 
This thesis contains three empirical studies on different facets of development economics. 
Two of the chapters specifically focus on Benin, a country that has not often been studied 
in the development literature. The first of these studies is an investigation into the 
sustainability of Beninese Rotating Savings and Credit Associations. Work such as 
Besley et al. (1993) or Anderson et al. (2009) has questioned how such groups can 
overcome the incentives for individuals to default, theorising that the institutional design 
of the groups can play an important role. Using household survey data collected in 2004 
and 2006, chapter 2 presents a first test into many of the theories outlined in the theoretical 
literature. The second study examines primary school attendance rates in Benin. Despite 
almost unparalleled increases in attendance rates since 1990, the country has remained 
virtually ignored in the literature. The study, found in chapter 3, attempts to improve on 
existing related studies by employing a multilevel model in order to account for higher 
level variance in the data. The results help to shed light on the stark regional disparities 
in attendance that continue to exist across Benin’s 77 communes. Finally, chapter 4 uses 
the recently released ICTD-UNU WIDER Government Revenue Dataset in order to 
revisit some recent results on the relationship between tax structures and economic 
growth. Recent work in this field has offered little or no evidence for developing 
countries, yet it is in such countries where the greatest changes in tax structure have not 
only been seen over the past 30 years but will likely be seen in coming years. The study 
examines the impact of revenue neutral changes in tax structure on per capita GDP growth 
rates. Results suggest that previous findings are not applicable to countries at all levels of 
development and as such urge caution with regard to some recent policy advice that is 
based on previous findings. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
This thesis contains three empirical studies, each of which attempts to answer questions 
pertinent to key development issues today. Whilst the topics considered are somewhat 
distinct from one another, commonality can be found in the use of new, or more appropriate 
data, to shed light on existing questions or theories.  
Considering the importance of data, there has recently been an increase in questions over 
the quality of statistics produced by governments, and in turn used by researchers, that have 
often been used to inform policy conclusions in developing countries (e.g. Jerven, 2013; 
Devarajan, 2013). Good quality data is of central importance to development economists; 
without it we might not know where we stand, where to aim, or how to get there.  
Concurrently, the High Level Panel (HLP) of the United Nations (UN) has recently called 
for a ‘data revolution’ in order to improve the quality and accessibility of key metrics that 
measure development progress (UN HLP, 2013). One need only look at the lengthy list of 
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicators as an illustration of the need for good 
quality data on a wide variety of metrics. Indeed, over 200 indicators are proposed for the 
17 goals. 
The three studies contained herein each take different approaches to ensure that the best 
data, or the best use of data, is employed in order to arrive at the reliable empirical 
conclusions. Chapter 2 relies on first-hand household survey data, collected according to a 
random process in Benin in 2004 and 2006; the advantages of random sampling are well 
understood and should lead to a representative sample being drawn from the population. 
The next chapter combines household survey data from the Beninese Demographic and 
Health Surveys (DHS) with administrative data from the Beninese institute for statistics 
(INSAE); the DHS is widely used, understood as representative and its methods are 
transparent and trusted amongst the research community. With regard to the key metric 
measured – primary school enrolment – the DHS data paints a relatively different picture 
to official statistics from, for example UIS (UNESCO Institute for Statistics). The chapter 
includes a discussion of why this might be the case and how to best make sense of the 
disparity. Finally, the fourth chapter makes use of the recently released Government 
Revenue Dataset (GRD), developed at the International Centre for Tax and Development 
(ICTD) and UNU-WIDER. This dataset is the result of work to synthesise official revenue 
statistics from a number of sources such as the IMF, World Bank and OECD. As in chapter 
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3, a discussion highlights the disparities across different sources and seeks to explain how 
the GRD overcomes these to ensure more analytically accurate data is presented. 
With regard to the context of the thesis, two of the three studies present evidence from 
Benin, a country that has been studied in comparatively lesser detail than many of its 
African neighbours, but provides an interesting case study in development. A small 
Francophone West African country of around 11 million inhabitants, Benin is bordered by 
Togo, Burkina Faso, Niger and Nigeria. Benin has seen rapid development since the fall of 
the communist regime in the late 1980’s. Its economy is dominated by the service and 
agricultural sectors, with cotton representing the largest export. The country is, today, ruled 
by a comparatively stable democracy by African standards, and has seen stable growth 
levels in recent years. Yet, Benin is still faced with many challenges: poverty remains high 
and the gains from development have not been evenly shared geographically. Chapter 3 of 
this thesis studies an example of such uneven development in depth; whilst national primary 
school enrolment rates have seen almost unparalleled improvements since 1990, many 
regions have not shared in this progress and still lag behind. Furthermore, national 
completion rates have fallen somewhat, reflecting some of the difficulties that accompany 
such rapid progress. The country has also experienced rapid population growth since 1990, 
with the population having more than doubled in just 20 years. This has meant that even 
stable high growth rates of over 5% in recent years have not been sufficient to reduce 
poverty levels; the most recently available data suggests that over one third of Benin’s 
citizens still live in poverty – the poverty headcount ratio in 2011 was 36.2% (WDI, 2016). 
Furthermore, life expectancy remains low and child mortality high, with around 100 deaths 
per 1000 births, as of 2015.  
1.1 Outline of Chapters & Summary of Thesis 
The first study of this thesis is entitled Enforcement Problems in ROSCAs: An Empirical 
Investigation and is found in chapter 2. This work examines the sustainability of an 
informal savings group, the Rotating Savings and Credit Association (ROSCA), in Benin. 
Despite the marked growth in popularity of microfinance or mobile banking, many of the 
world’s poor still have no choice but to to save with friends, family or colleagues in 
informal arrangements such as ROSCAs. This is particularly relevant in Benin where, 
despite entrenched cultural habits of saving, the vast majority of savings in the country 
were held in ROSCAs or with itinerant bankers (Helms et al., 2005). Indeed, in 2004, just 
10% of the country’s deposits were held within the formal banking system. Often 
individuals use ROSCAs in order to commit to a savings habit or to finance the purchase 
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of a durable good. However, if the group itself should experience default, then this will 
cause a negative income shock for those members who potentially lose their savings. Much 
has been written of the remarkable stability of ROSCAs (inter alios: Besley et al., 1993; 
Anderson et al. 2009) in the face of individual incentives to default, yet the theories outlined 
in the literature that describe this have, until now, gone untested. Using a unique panel 
dataset collected in urban Benin in 2004 and 2006, a group-level analysis tests many of the 
theories outlined in relation to how ROSCAs can be designed in order to influence 
sustainability of the arrangement and as such avoid default. The results highlight that 
Beninese ROSCAs are inherently unstable; in the two years between the surveys, one in 
three of the groups surveyed had experienced a case of non-payment or outright default. 
The analysis suggests that institutional features such as the order in which the collective 
savings is allocated, the ruling structure, the frequency of meetings and the sociocultural 
makeup of the group are all related to the likelihood of a group experiencing enforcement 
problems. 
 
The second study is entitled Exploring Regional and Gender disparities in Beninese 
Primary School Attendance: A multilevel approach and can be found in chapter 3. Benin 
provides an interesting case study with regard to education and development, but has not 
yet been considered in the literature surveying school enrolment. By 1990, an economic 
crisis, coupled with the former socialist regime’s failed attempts at reform had left the 
country with some of the worst primary school enrolment rates in the world: Gross 
enrolment was less than 50% and only one in three girls were attending. Since then, 
however, Benin has seen almost unparalleled progress. Over the next 20 years, gross and 
net enrolment ratios soared and the gender gap was all but eliminated. However, this 
progress has not occurred across the board. Regional disparities still persist today: the latest 
round of the Beninese DHS highlights that net attendance rates in many of Benin’s 77 
communes were close to 90%, but in others, only 20-30% of primary school age children 
were attending. Furthermore, significant differences in primary school attendance still exist 
with regard to gender. For the school year considered, 2005-06, girls were still around 9% 
less likely to attend than boys. Whilst a number of recent studies in the field have 
acknowledged that factors at the household or community level might play a role in 
predicting the likelihood that a child is sent to school, very few explicitly account for this 
in the econometric framework. Combining DHS data with detailed administrative data from 
INSAE, the empirical part uses a multilevel model in order to account for clustering at the 
household and commune level. The results highlight the importance of such higher level 
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factors. In particular, I find that as the distance to school increases, the likelihood that boys 
who worked in the field attended school was lower than for boys who did not work. This 
particular result highlights that in a context where direct costs and benefits of sending 
children to school might not be easily observed or estimated, the opportunity cost still 
appears to be taken into consideration. A random intercepts model highlights that after 
accounting for individual, household and community factors, much of the unexplained 
variance in primary school attendance lies at the household level. A random slopes model 
then pinpoints those communes where increases in household income, or reductions in the 
cost of schooling, might realise the largest future gains in primary school attendance.  
The third study, Tax Structures Economic Growth and Development found in chapter 4, 
makes use of the recently developed ICTD UNU-WIDER Government Revenue Dataset 
(GRD) in order to revisit questions surrounding the effects of tax structure on economic 
growth. This dataset overcomes a number of issues with data from existing sources in order 
to achieve notable gains in analytical accuracy and a more complete series for many 
countries. The study represents a challenge to recent work in the field that suggests that 
consumption and property taxes are more growth-friendly than are income taxes (inter 
alios: Arnold et al., 2011, Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo, 2012). Whilst the results of Pooled 
Mean Group regressions suggest that this is the case for high income countries, this is not 
generalisable; different taxes appear to have heterogeneous effects on economic growth at 
different income levels. This finding in itself is important: recent output from the IMF 
(IMF, 2011; IMF 2015) promotes the view that personal or corporate income taxes are more 
harmful for GDP growth than consumption taxes. However, crucially, these results are 
based on studies that only include OECD, high and some middle - income countries. If 
policy advice is to be provided to developing countries on the effects of tax policy on 
growth, then the knowledge base underpinning this advice should at least be informed by 
results from low or middle income countries. The work presented in chapter 4 represents a 
first step providing evidence in that respect.  The study is also the first to explicitly consider 
the effects on growth rates of replacing trade with domestic consumption taxes, something 
that has become the standard IMF ‘policy prescription’ (IMF 2011) for developing 
countries. Results suggest that there have not always been positive effects of such trade 
liberalisation on economic growth. 
Chapter 5 concludes by providing further discussion of the potential policy implications, 
or avenues for further research that might emerge as a result of the results presented herein.  
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Chapter 2. Enforcement Problems in ROSCAs: An Empirical 
Investigation 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Informal financial institutions such as rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) 
are widespread in the developing world, particularly where individuals have limited access 
to formal credit or savings markets.1 Despite the proliferation of alternatives such as 
microcredit or mobile banking, many people still choose to keep some or all of their savings 
in a ROSCA. For example, when Dupas et al. (2012) offered to remove the cost of opening 
a bank account for rural Kenyans, only 18% actively used the accounts whilst over 40% of 
their sample continued to use a ROSCA. Yet the sustainability of ROSCAs has often 
puzzled economists; the incentives for the self-seeking individual to renege on payments 
either before or after she has received the collective savings often outweigh those to remain 
loyal to the arrangement. There are other disadvantages of saving in a ROSCA compared 
to some alternative means, such as saving in autarky; they require an individual to commit 
to an inflexible savings pattern, they do not provide interest and cannot be legally enforced. 
Numerous studies have shed light on the importance of social connectedness between 
members, who front a kind of social collateral (Besley et al., 1993) to their fellow members 
as security. The threat of social sanctions (in practice: obtaining a reputation for being 
unreliable, or exclusion from the group and future groups in the region) brings with it a 
large cost to default and thus an incentive to remain loyal to one’s peers. At the same time, 
many ROSCAs also serve a social purpose. Members may offer food or drinks to each other 
during meetings, celebrate together on special occasions or share contacts and potential 
business opportunities. Such occurrences not only provide an opportunity to monitor one’s 
peers and to accumulate social capital, but also add a social element to saving money that 
would not occur within a formal bank account.   
  
Studies such as Anderson et al. (2009) or Besley et al. (1993) have analysed the question 
of ROSCA sustainability at the individual level and the conditions (or ROSCA design) 
under which default is more or less likely to occur. However, their predictions have not yet 
been tested empirically. All other existing field surveys of ROSCAs examine membership 
or group characteristics at one point in time. By definition, any groups that had collapsed 
                                                 
1 ROSCAs have also been observed amongst ethnic minorities or immigrant groups in developed countries; 
see for example Bonnett (1981) or Summerfield (1995) 
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due to default or enforcement problems would have been omitted from such studies. As a 
result, we know relatively little about the lifespan of ROSCAs and their ability to deal with 
enforcement problems. However, this is of crucial importance: losing one’s savings if 
another member defaults poses a potentially serious negative income shock to ROSCA 
members. Furthermore, there are examples of formal banks and microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) using the model of a ROSCA in their offerings (Handa and Kirton, 1999; El-Gamal 
et al., 2014); a knowledge of the best structure or sociocultural makeup of ROSCAs might 
aid such institutions in designing their savings products in future.  
 
This study presents a first empirical investigation into the sustainability of ROSCAs over 
time. I use a unique panel dataset of urban ROSCAs collected in Cotonou, Benin. After an 
initial field survey in 2004 where information was gathered on the characteristics of the 
membership and the groups themselves, a second survey round assessed the same groups 
in 2006. The analysis is therefore at the group level. The approach taken, whereby the same 
groups were surveyed twice, represents a significant improvement on the only other study 
(to my knowledge) that has empirically considered the sustainability of ROSCAs. Whilst 
Handa and Kirton’s study (1999) acts as a first check on some of the relevant theories, the 
regressions contained therein suffer from two major problems. The dependent variable 
(whether or not a group has experienced enforcement problems) is based on retrospective 
information, so (i) any groups that have collapsed were, by implication, omitted from the 
study – it is shown below that often groups that have experienced problems collapsed -
therefore the sample is biased toward those groups better equipped to deal with enforcement 
problems. And (ii), the use of retrospective information as the dependent variable leads to 
concerns over endogeneity; it might well have been the case that groups which experienced 
enforcement problems made changes to their institutional design or membership in an 
attempt to avoid such problems again. The present study avoids both issues.  
 
The data paints a picture of inherent instability amongst Beninese ROSCAs – in the two 
years between the surveys, around one in three groups had experienced enforcement 
problems; the majority of these collapsed entirely because of this. Anderson et al. (2009) 
describe two potential causes of enforcement problems – a member who has received the 
pot and ceases to make further payments, and a member who receives an unfavourable rank 
in the allocation and fails to make any payments to the group at all. Using data from the 
2004 wave of the survey, this study seeks to assess how various group characteristics can 
influence the incentives for members to default or miss payments and thus on the likelihood 
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that the group as a whole experienced such an occurrence in the following two years. The 
empirical analysis tests the main theories outlined in the theoretical literature - with regards 
to the effect of the order of pot allocation, group size, frequency of payments, level of social 
capital amongst members and the screening of new members - on the likelihood that a 
group experienced enforcement problems. The results of a Probit analysis finds support for 
the theory that ROSCAs can be designed in order to minimise the likelihood of 
experiencing enforcement problems occurring; groups that fix the allocation of funds based 
on members’ need, as opposed to a random draw, were less likely to experience repayment 
problems, as were groups with written rules and those that met less frequently. The results 
also suggest that those groups led by a sole president, as opposed to a committee of 
members, were also significantly less likely to see problems occur. A number of proxies 
are considered in order to capture the level of social capital existing within groups and a 
number of interesting results are found, that add weight to the notion that social ties are key 
to enforcing ROSCAs. In particular, those groups started amongst family members 
appeared less likely to have experienced enforcement problems than those started amongst 
colleagues or friends. These results echo the findings of, for example, Karlan’s study (2007) 
on social connections within group banks in Peru. A further way in which the risk of 
enforcement problems can be minimised is through the screening of new members. Thus, 
parallels are drawn to the work of, for example, Ghatak (1999), who showed that higher 
repayment rates might be possible where group lenders were able to choose new borrowers. 
The screening role might fall upon the president or ruling committee (or the group may 
collectively decide) and a variety of different screening devices (such as surveying new 
members) can be used. However, the results show no robust evidence that the screening 
functions of a group significantly impact the likelihood that they experience enforcement 
problems. Evidence is also presented that as groups get older or more experienced, the 
effect of the aforementioned features on the likelihood of experiencing enforcement 
problems diminishes, suggesting that repeated interactions in the ROSCA setting can help 
to enforce the bonds of trust and reciprocity amongst members.  
  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the basic 
functioning of a ROSCA and introduces the Beninese sample, providing descriptive 
statistics of the key variables that will be tested in the empirical section. In section 2.3, the 
theory and intuitions shaping the incentives for a member to remain true to the ROSCA are 
discussed in detail. A number of conjectures are formed that are tested empirically in 
section 2.4. Section 2.5 considers some extensions, specifically asking if ROSCAs become 
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less likely to experience enforcement problems following repeated successful cycles of 
interaction. Section 2.6 concludes.  
2.2 The Beninese Context and Descriptive statistics 
2.2.1 Savings in Benin 
 
ROSCAs are prevalent across the developing world, offering a means to save for those with 
limited access to formal alternatives, either due to missing or incomplete markets or 
because of high transaction costs. Helms et al. (2005) note that whilst there is a “deeply 
entrenched tradition” with regards saving in Benin, the majority of deposits are held 
informally, for example in ROSCAs or with itinerant bankers. Gracia (2000) found that 
around 81-89% of Beninese were using ROSCAs in a study carried out in the year 2000 
and Helms et al. (ibid.) suggested that just 10% of deposits at this time were held in the 
formal banking system.  
 
There are a number of reasons why such savings habits and trends exist in Benin, or at least, 
did in the mid-2000s. Firstly, the three state-run banks crashed in the late 1980s and many 
saw their savings frozen for a time. This led to mistrust in the banking system for those 
who remembered the crash (Helms et al., ibid.). Secondly, banking coverage was poor and 
uneven: In 2004, Benin had 9 formal banks with a combined total of just 42 braches.2 
Including NGOs, Savings and Credit Co-operatives and the Caisse Nationale 
d’Epargne (CNE; the savings arm of the Post Office), there were still just 702 legally 
recognized points of service in the country at the time. Yet the majority of the country’s 
formal savings were held in banks: some 83% as of 2004, with the remainder in the CNE 
or MFIs. It is also the case that many individuals enjoy the convenience and flexibility of 
informal savings. Thirdly, banks often impose restrictions on the opening or use of their 
services: for example, of the nine banks present in Benin in 2004, all required depositors to 
maintain a minimum balance, five required formal ID, three imposed an opening fee and a 
further three provided zero interest (Helms et al., ibid). Moreover, the convenience of a 
ROSCA that might meet in one’s locality, cannot usually be matched by having to travel 
to a bank branch which might not be located close by. Related to the mistrust of bankers, 
when individuals know the other members of a ROSCA, then they have peace of mind over 
                                                 
2 However, even when formal alternatives are available, there is evidence that many individuals still choose 
to keep savings in a ROSCA (Gugerty, 2007; Dupas et al., 2012). 
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who holds their deposits until they receive the pot, unlike when saving in a bank.  
2.2.2 ROSCAs in Benin  
 
ROSCAs consist of a group of people, N, who meet regularly to contribute a sum of money 
to a central ‘pot’ which is distributed to each member in turn. A ‘cycle’ is completed once 
every member has received the pot once. Beyond this basic framework, the groups vary 
across many dimensions such as size, the frequency of meetings, the order in which the pot 
is allocated and ruling structure. Their popularity is despite considerable drawbacks – the 
arrangements are less flexible compared to saving alone and no interest is earned on 
savings. If receipt of the ROSCA pot is viewed as a loan (which is a plausible comparison 
for the first half of members to receive it), then the absence of interest rates is further 
pronounced, i.e. in formal credit markets, interest rates are often used as a screening device 
to overcome the problem of adverse selection (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981); this is obviously 
not possible within a ROSCA.3 
 
Often it has been assumed or observed that ROSCAs are used to finance the purchase of a 
durable good (e.g. Besley et al, 1993), though Basu (2011) and Gugerty (2007) show how 
they might also be used as commitment devices for individuals with time-inconsistent 
preferences. As detailed by Dagnelie and LeMay-Boucher (2012), who use the same survey 
as this study, 49% of individuals surveyed in Benin used the pot for investments in their 
business, compared to just 14% who wished to acquire a durable good.4 In terms of the 
motive for joining (i.e. regardless of the intended use of the pot, why an individual chose a 
ROSCA over saving in autarky), the most popular stated in the sample was due to 
commitment and self-control problems when saving by one’s self. 
 
The data for this study was collected during two waves of household surveys in 2004 and 
2006 in Cotonou, Benin.5 Surveys were carried out in two of the poorest areas of the city, 
namely Vossa and Enagnon. No banks, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or other 
formal institutions offered saving facilities in these regions at the time. 497 households 
were selected in the first wave of the survey, according to a random process: 110 in Vossa, 
387 in Enagnon. Within the 497 households, information on 182 active ROSCAs was 
                                                 
3 Of course this disadvantage to the group becomes a significant advantage to those individuals who in effect 
receive an interest-free loan 
4 Other reasons given include for renovations or building a house (18%), school fees (7%) or to cover a debt 
(5%).  
5 The survey methodology is described in Appendix A 
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uncovered (when an individual responded that he or she was a member of a ROSCA, a 
questionnaire on the characteristics of the group was administered). 97 of these ROSCAs 
were surveyed again in 2006. Whilst the enumerators made every effort to track down 
members of all 182 groups in the second wave of the survey, it was not always possible to 
do so: many of the previously surveyed individuals may have left their family home or left 
the area entirely.6 Therefore there is an attrition rate of 46.7%. However, aside from the 
reduced sample size, this only becomes a major issue if attrition is systematic along some 
of the variables of interest. Appendix B shows a test of equivalence of means between those 
groups surveyed in both 2004 and 2006 against those only sampled in the latter wave. The 
results of this show that only four out of the 25 variables (defined below) used in the 
empirical analysis had significantly different values between the groups surveyed in just 
2004 and those surveyed in both waves. Indeed, the majority of variables were, on average, 
of very similar magnitude. As a further check, a Probit regression was run (not shown), 
where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the group was surveyed in both 
waves. It appeared that very few variables of interest were significantly correlated with the 
likelihood of being surveyed again. Thus the likelihood of (not) being surveyed again 
appears to be down to mere coincidence, or at least circumstances not resulting from the 
features of the ROSCA.  
 
The empirical analysis, which is presented below in section 2.4, considers the likelihood of 
a ROSCA experiencing enforcement problems during the 2004-06 period, based on its 
initial characteristics, measured in 2004. Table 2.1 thus presents summary statistics of the 
key characteristics of the ROSCAs in our sample measured in the original 2004 wave of 
the survey. It also includes a test for equivalence of means between groups that did not 
experience enforcement problems between 2004 and 2006 (64) and those that did (33). 
‘Enforcement problems’ denotes a case where a group had experienced at least one case of 
non-payment between 2004 and 2006. The average ROSCA comprised around 33 
members, although this ranged from 4 to 175. Just under half of the groups in this survey 
had remained the same size since inception (42 of 97). In 2004, each group had completed 
an average of over 8 cycles, although at the time of the survey, some had not yet completed 
their first. It appears that the subset of groups that experienced enforcement problems were 
on average significantly smaller, had completed fewer cycles and existed for a shorter time.  
 
                                                 
6 However, there were no cases where the correct individual was located and they refused to be re-surveyed. 
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A key variable that could affect the incentives to default is the order in which the pot is 
allocated; this has duly attracted attention in the literature (see for example, Besley et al., 
1993; Anderson et al., 2009; Basu, 2011). Broadly speaking, this is done according to a 
fixed order, random draw (either at the start of a cycle or repeated at each meeting), or the 
pot is awarded to the highest bidder. Some 32% of the sample had a fixed order, with the 
remainder allocating the pot according to a random draw; no ‘bidding’ ROSCAs were 
observed in Cotonou. Of those groups that allocated the pot according to a fixed process, 
this was determined by i) the seniority of members (5 groups); ii) members in need of the 
money (13); iii) the regularity of attendance (6); iv) the appropriateness of a request (4) and 
v) the number of members (2). The variable Need is a dummy taking the value one if the 
pot was allocated according to criteria (ii). This might represent a situation where a member 
requests a specific rank in the cycle in order to cover some unforeseen expense, or it might 
be the case that members prefer to receive the funds at a certain date to cover regular lumpy 
expenses such as purchasing stock for a business or paying school fees etc. The variable 
Other fixed accounts for those groups setting the order of pot reception according to one of 
the other criteria listed. 
 
 
  
2
0
 
Table 2.1 Summary Statistics and test of equivalence of means between ROSCAs experiencing enforcement problems  
between 2004 and 2006 and those that did not 
 Full Sample No Problems Problems Diff. 
                    
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean 
Experienced enforcement problems 0.340 0.476 0 1      
Membership size 33.175 33.930 4 175 37.46875 5.0239 24.84848 2.238 12.620* 
No. of cycles completed 8.639 21.165 0.15 131 11.183 3.205 3.188 0.435 7.995* 
Duration of existence (months) 67.309 93.594 1 480 79.063 13.399 44.515 9.289 34.547* 
Only President 0.299 0.460 0 1 0.313 0.058 0.273 0.079 0.040 
President/ committee paid 0.227 0.421 0 1 0.266 0.056 0.152 0.063 0.114 
Random 0.680 0.469 0 1 0.703 0.058 0.636 0.085 0.067 
Need 0.134 0.342 0 1 0.172 0.048 0.061 0.042 0.111 
Other Fixed 0.186 0.391 0 1 0.125 0.042 0.303 0.081 0.082** 
Written Rules 0.598 0.493 0 1 0.672 0.059 0.455 0.088 0.217 ** 
Monthly meetings 0.371 0.486 0 1 0.391 0.062 0.333 0.083 -0.057 
Weekly meetings 0.351 0.480 0 1 0.313 0.058 0.424 0.087 0.103 
More severe sanctions on delinquent member 0.536 0.501 0 1 0.875 0.042 0.727 0.079 0.148* 
Pot size (1000's of CFA) 123.288 166.631 0.8 1000 132.470 24.027 105.479 17.461 26.992 
Single ethnicity 0.237 0.428 0 1 0.219 0.052 0.273 0.079 -0.054 
Only men 0.237 0.428 0 1 0.234 0.053 0.242 0.076 -0.008 
Only woman 0.155 0.363 0 1 0.156 0.046 0.152 0.063 0.005 
Survived Past Problems 0.206 0.407 0 1 0.063 0.030 0.485 0.088 -0.422*** 
Started amongst:          
Friends 0.433 0.498 0 1 0.344 0.060 0.606 0.086 -0.262** 
Family 0.082 0.277 0 1 0.094 0.037 0.061 0.042 0.033 
Members of same trade 0.144 0.353 0 1 0.156 0.046 0.121 0.058 0.035 
Neighbours 0.186 0.391 0 1 0.203 0.051 0.152 0.063 0.052 
Members of another group 0.072 0.260 0 1 0.094 0.037 0.030 0.030 0.064 
Other 0.052 0.222 0 1 0.063 0.031 0.030 0.030 0.032 
President/Committee decides 0.650 0.480 0 1 0.641 0.061 0.667 0.083 -0.026 
New members must be known 0.608 0.491 0 1 0.609 0.062 0.606 0.086 0.003 
Survey on new members 0.794 0.407 0 1 0.828 0.048 0.727 0.079 0.101 
Known + Survey 0.464 0.501 0 1 0.500 0.063 0.394 0.087 0.106 
Other conditions? 0.784 0.414 0 1 0.766 0.053 0.818 0.068 -0.053 
 N = 97 N = 64 N = 33  
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A lone president, as opposed to a committee of members, ran 30% of groups. The average 
size of a group run by a president (22) was significantly smaller than that overseen by a 
committee (38). Figure 2.1 highlights that larger groups were, aside from one outlier, more 
often ruled by a committee of members than a sole president. This might well be taken as 
a reflection of the greater workload for a sole president in larger groups. A committee of 
members can help spread the workload of the day-to-day running of the group such as 
organising meetings, screening new members etc. 
 
Figure 2.1 Choice of ROSCA ruling structure by size 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A significantly larger proportion of groups that did not experience enforcement problems 
had written rules (67%), compared to those that did (46%); around 60% of the full sample 
had rules. ROSCAs that had experienced problems pre-2004 appear much more likely to 
see a recurrence between 2004 and 2006 (denoted by the variable experienced past 
problems). Almost half (49%; 16 of 33) of the groups experiencing problems between 2004 
and 2006 had also done so in the past. Of those 16 experiencing a recurrence, 7 were able 
to overcome them and survive. However, of the 17 groups experiencing problems between 
2004 and 2006 for the first time, only 3 were able to survive. This suggests that for some 
groups, enforcement problems are a somewhat regular occurrence but that they have 
devised means to cope with it. 
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Despite the substantial threat of social sanctions on members who miss payments, many 
groups also imposed more traditional forms of punishment on delinquents. During the 
survey, interviewees were asked about the punishments imposed in their ROSCAs, namely 
‘What are the sanctions imposed against a member who fails to pay a contribution?’ A 
number of sanctions were used and the variable More severe sanctions on delinquent 
member represents the fraction of groups imposing at least one of those sanctions deemed 
to be more severe. These included ‘[the delinquent] receives a less favorable rank in the 
next cycle’, ‘[the delinquent] is penalized at the breakdown of cash’, ‘[the delinquent] 
receives his own contributions back but does not receive the pot at his turn’, ‘a fine must 
be paid,’ ‘[the delinquent] does not receive the pot at his turn’, ‘property seized’ or ‘the 
member is excluded’. Conversely, those classified as less severe are ‘no penalty’, ‘the 
person receiving the pot in this period need not contribute to the pot when it is the 
delinquent’s turn to receive the pot’ and [the delinquent] is given a period in which to pay.’ 
The majority of groups imposed ‘more severe sanctions’ upon a delinquent. 
 
The pot size ranges from 800CFA (USD1.50) to 1,000,000CFA (USD1862), with an 
average of 123,000CFA (USD230).7 35% of groups met once per week and 37% of the 
groups met just once a month. One met daily whilst others met every two weeks (8%), 
every ten days (3%), or 2-3 times per week (16%). 
 
Whilst inherently difficult to measure, this study uses a number of proxies in an attempt to 
capture the level of social capital that exists between ROSCA members. Notably, groups 
were asked about the pre-existing social connections, or similarities, that existed at 
inception - the majority were started amongst friends (43%), family (8%) or neighbours 
(19%); around 24% were exclusively for members of the same ethnic group (denoted by 
the variable Single Ethnicity) and around 40% of groups were restricted to either only males 
or only females (denoted by the variables Only men and Only Women). 61 % of those 
groups that experienced enforcement problems between 2004 and 2006 were started 
amongst friends, compared to only 34% of those not experiencing problems. This 
difference is significant at the 5% level. Table 2.1 also summarises the information with 
regards the screening roles performed by ROSCAs in the sample. A majority of groups 
surveyed new members or stipulated that entrants must be known to the current 
membership (61% and 79% respectively); just under half of the sample imposed both 
restrictions and only 6% imposed neither restriction. Either the president or ruling 
                                                 
7 June 2004 exchange rate of 537CFA to US$1 used 
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committee were entrusted with the decision over whether to admit new members in 65% 
of the groups in our sample (denoted by the variable President/Committee decides), with 
the remaining groups deciding as a whole. Individuals were also asked whether there were 
any additional constraints imposed upon people wishing to join. For example, it is often 
stipulated that new members must have a certain occupation. The variable Other 
Conditions signifies that around 78% of groups did impose such constraints.8 60 % of the 
interviewees in the Beninese data stated that, given the choice, they preferred to receive the 
pot towards the end of the cycle, whilst fewer than one in four preferred to receive the pot 
at the beginning 
2.3 Institutional Design and Social Capital 
 
This section provides a discussion of how the incentives to remain true to the ROSCA 
arrangement can be affected by various aspects of the group design, drawing from relevant 
literature where appropriate. I specifically focus on (i) the institutional design of ROSCAs 
(including the screening effort performed on new entrants) and (ii) the level of social capital 
that exists between members. The discussion is used to form conjectures which will be 
tested in section 2.4. Given that the literature on ROSCA design and empirical evidence on 
repayment rates is quite limited, some comparisons are drawn to joint-liability 
microfinance groups, which are comparable in nature but have been studied in relatively 
more detail. 
 
In the absence of a well-designed incentive mechanism, there will be a temptation for the 
utility maximising ROSCA member to take the collective savings and default on further 
payments.9 Besley et al. (1993) formalise this argument to show that in order for a member 
to stick to the agreement, there must be some cost of default, K, that outweighs the benefits.  
 
Specifically, 
 
    𝐾 ≥ (
(𝑁−𝑟)
𝑁
) 𝐵 [
𝑣(1,𝑦)−𝑣(1,𝑐)
𝑦−𝑐
]   [1] 
 
                                                 
8 Common answers were that new members must ‘have an income generating job’ or simply ‘have good 
morals’.  
9 Or, for someone who has been allocated a later rank, the temptation would be to cease making payments 
before they receive the pot.  
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where N is the group size, r is an individuals’ rank, B is the size of the pot (assumed, in this 
case to be used for consumption of a durable good), y an individuals’ income and c 
nondurable consumption.10 The second argument on the right hand side of [1] is thus an 
individuals’ utility given that the durable good is owned.11 This basic framework highlights 
that the incentives to default can be affected by both the costs (K) of doing so, and the 
benefits. The latter can be influenced by size of the pot (B), group size (N) or an individuals’ 
rank (r), which itself is influenced by the means by which ranks are allocated. Whilst not 
modelled explicitly in Besley et al., the costs of default, K, might depend on the availability 
of formal savings alternatives (zero for individuals in the survey regions of Cotonou), the 
availability of other informal savings devices, the potential loss of reputation, or other 
sanctions imposed by groups on delinquent members (e.g. property might be seized, or the 
member might be excluded from joining future informal groups in the area). It is likely that 
the cost of default will be higher where groups are formed amongst those with stronger pre-
existing social connections such as family.  
 
Thus there is significant potential for ROSCAs to be designed in such a way that minimises 
the individual’s incentive to default. A plausible assumption when studying ROSCAs is 
that the same set of incentives will apply to all members and thus the group as a whole. 
One can justify this by arguing that members are relatively homogenous individuals (for 
example having the same trade or coming from the same neighbourhood) who are able to 
commit to the same saving patterns over time. Therefore, an analysis of the characteristics 
of the group itself should prove insightful. 
2.3.1 Institutional Design 
 
The allocation of ranks plays an important role in influencing the incentives to default or 
remain true to the group. As a simple illustration of how these incentives differ according 
to how the pot is allocated, consider a ROSCA with N=10 in its first cycle. Under a fixed 
allocation, the tenth recipient will feel tempted to cease making payments as they are only 
doing just as well as saving alone for ten periods, whilst at the same time risking their 
savings in the hands of other members and possibly following a sub-optimal savings pattern 
                                                 
10 Adapted from page 806 of Besley et al. (1993). 
11 It is not important here that purchase of a durable good was not the sole reason given for joining ROSCAs 
in our sample. We can consider the utility for whatever a person chooses to spend the money on as analogous 
to that gained from being able to purchase a durable good.  
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(Anderson et al., 2009).12 If the fixed allocation is kept constant across cycles, they must 
also wait until the final meeting of the second cycle to receive the pot a second time. Yet 
in a random-order ROSCA, there is a 90% chance that this last-placed individual will 
receive the pot in an earlier round of the next cycle. 
 
A member’s rank, r, is one of the key parameters influencing sustainability in the model of 
Anderson et al. (2009). They illustrate that whilst a majority of members would prefer the 
ranks to be allocated according to a random draw, this will actually tend to increase the 
likelihood of experiencing enforcement problems. This result, however, relies on a 
common assumption in this literature that assumes ROSCAs are primarily used to save for 
the purchase of indivisible durable goods. Thus, receiving the pot earlier in the cycle allows 
individuals to make the desired indivisible expenses sooner than if they had saved alone. 
However, such an assumption does not always hold. Gugerty (2007), using Kenyan data, 
and Dagnelie and LeMay-Boucher (2012), using the same Beninese sample as in this study, 
provide evidence that ROSCAs can be used as commitment devices. Instead of desiring an 
early place in the cycle, members would rather opt for later ranks in order to discipline 
themselves to save. It is worth noting that 60 % of the ROSCA members in our survey 
stated that given the choice, they would prefer to be allocated a later rank and fewer than 
one in four preferred to receive the pot at the beginning. Given this, it is difficult to say 
whether fixed or random ROSCAs are more likely to be sustainable. However, it is notable 
that some fixed order groups allocate ranks by accommodating, to some extent, their 
members’ desires and needs. Such groups might be able to allocate ranks so as to minimise 
problems relating to payment. Specifically, a member facing financial difficulties, such as 
an unexpected income shock, might be allocated the pot at an earlier meeting. Similarly, 
members wishing for a late rank due to some commitment motive could be accommodated. 
Handa and Kirton (1999) note that the presidents in their Jamaican sample also offer similar 
arrangements. 
 
Conjecture 1: Given that a majority of individuals in the sample use ROSCAs as a 
commitment device, it is not expected that the order of pot allocation (random/fixed) will 
play a significant role in the likelihood of experiencing enforcement problems. However, 
fixed order ROSCAs which accommodate their members’ needs may minimise the 
likelihood of problems occurring. 
                                                 
12That said, often individuals might actually prefer to place savings in a ROSCA than to keep the money at 
home: the risks here are also substantial (fire, theft, claims from family members etc.) 
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The supervision of the group is another feature of ROSCA design that has received 
attention. In our Beninese sample, ROSCAs are overseen by either a president or a 
committee of members (ruling committee). The costs of missing payments or defaulting 
(K) can be significantly affected by how effectively the group is monitored or run and by 
how credibly those in charge reveal and enforce the threats of punishment to any potential 
delinquents. Paxton et al. (2000), for example, showed that a strong leader led to higher 
repayment rates of group loans in Burkina Faso. 
 
Anecdotal field evidence from a pilot survey indicated that given a set of similar group 
characteristics, president-led ROSCAs are generally more tightly run than those with a 
ruling committee. Presidents also appeared more involved in informally monitoring the 
activities of their members. This can be partly explained by the fact that a larger share of 
president-led ROSCAs in our sample are remunerated by the group for organising meetings 
and providing supervision. Around half the presidents were paid, but only one in ten 
committees received remuneration for their role. The incentives for the rulers, who are also 
a part of the ROSCA, to carry out their duties with greater diligence might be enhanced by 
the offer of remuneration. Handa and Kirton (1999) found that payments to the leader 
significantly increased the sustainability of ROSCAs, although close to 90% of presidents 
were paid in their Jamaican sample. Furthermore, a number of presidents (8 out of the 29) 
are founding members, whereas this is less frequently the case for ruling committees. 
Founding members are often well respected figures who can act with greater authority. 
They are also more likely to have a good understanding of the actions required to avoid and 
potentially solve problems.  
 
In some fixed order ROSCAs, the decision over the order of pot reception is often used as 
a selection tool, analogous to a credit rating i.e. the first to receive the pot is allocated the 
most credit.13 A new member would likely be allocated a less favourable rank and upon 
successful completion of one or more cycles, his creditworthiness might improve and he 
might be allocated a more advantageous rank in future cycles.14 Groups where either the 
president or the ruling committees can decide on this matter could be less likely to 
                                                 
13 See, for example, Van den Brink and Chavas (1997) and Handa and Kirton (1999). 
14 Biggart (2001) notes that this signal might emerge not only as a result of the new member having had an 
entire cycle to prove himself reliable with regards repayment, but also by socialising with his peers. 
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experience enforcement problems. In line with the preceding argument, presidents do have 
the power to unilaterally decide the order more often than ruling committees.15 
 
Conjecture 2: Groups (i) overseen by a president rather than a committee, (ii) where the 
rulers receive remuneration, or (iii) where they can decide the order of pot allocation, are 
expected to have a lower likelihood of experiencing enforcement problems. 
 
The size of the pot of collective savings, B, is another variable that could influence the 
incentives for a member to make, or cease to make payments. For a given membership size, 
a larger pot provides a greater temptation for a potential delinquent member to default 
(either one who has just received the pot, or one who must make many [large] payments 
before receiving). Besley et al. (1993) postulate that a larger pot will likely create larger 
incentives to default (or rather, it is the ratio of default cost to pot size that matters [
𝐾
𝐵
 from 
equation 1]). One relevant counter argument is that a larger pot might actually provide 
greater incentive for those who are using the ROSCA as a commitment device to save even 
more, as the eventual sum received is greater. 
 
Conjecture 3: A larger pot increases the incentive for any one member to cease 
contributing once (s)he has received it and hence leads to a higher likelihood of the group 
experiencing enforcement problems 
 
The frequency of meetings can also impact upon the likelihood that a group experiences 
enforcement problems. Besley et al. (1993) postulate that, holding membership size 
constant, increasing the duration of the ROSCA can mitigate against the likelihood of 
default. Indeed, Handa and Kirton (1999) present some evidence to this effect; their study 
found that Jamaican ROSCAs meeting once per month were (albeit, only weakly 
significantly) less likely to experience problems than those meeting weekly. Payment 
frequency has also been considered in studies of MFIs. McIntosh (2008) saw increased 
repayment rates of FINCA clients in Uganda that met bi-weekly as opposed to those 
meeting weekly; Field and Pande (2008) argue that more frequent repayment provides 
microfinance clients with a chance to help form the habit of saving and that a rigid 
repayment schedule enabled clients to develop ‘fiscal discipline’, although they found no 
difference in repayment rates between clients on monthly and weekly repayment schedules. 
                                                 
15 The president established the order in 57% of the 30 fixed order groups, the committee in 33% and 10% 
of groups decided as a whole.  
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On the contrary however, Armendariz and Murdoch (2005) and Feigenberg et al. (2013) 
noted higher default where repayment was less frequent in Bangladesh and India 
respectively. Thus it seems that the theory and majority of evidence points to a lower 
frequency of meetings leading to higher repayment rates and a lower likelihood of 
enforcement problems.  
 
Conjecture 4: For a given number of members, ROSCAs that meet less frequently are less 
likely to experience enforcement problems.    
 
In addition to structural features that vary across all groups (such as order of pot reception, 
frequency of meetings, role of the president etc.), there are some that are group-specific. 
For example, whether or not a group has written rules, or if they impose sanctions on 
delinquent members. When the ROSCA has written rules, this might add a sense of 
formality to the functioning of the group. Indeed, if members have agreed to adhere to a set 
of rules outlining, for example, when and where meetings take place, the sanctions against 
a defaulting member, or any of the other features outlined above, then they might have a 
greater sense of their obligations to the group, thus lowering the likelihood that the group 
experiences problems. Whilst evidence in this regard is scant, Wenner’s (1995) study of 25 
group credit programs in Costa Rica suggested that those with a ‘written code’ saw lower 
levels of delinquency, as did Zeller’s study in Madagascar (1998). 
 
Conjecture 5: ROSCAs with written rules are less likely to experience enforcement 
problems.    
 
The various sanctions faced by delinquent members were outlined in section 2.2. To the 
extent that these present a meaningful punishment on potential delinquents, there would 
likely be a lower likelihood of a group experiencing enforcement problems, where more 
severe sanctions were in place.   
 
Conjecture 6: In addition to the threat of social sanctions, those groups imposing other 
sanctions upon delinquent members will be less likely to see enforcement problems.   
 
Whilst many ROSCAs in the sample did not vary in size, some did allow new members to 
join at the start of a new cycle. In this case, there might well be a degree of informational 
asymmetry with regards their reliability. It is therefore in the interests of the group to screen 
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new entrants and in the interests of individuals to signal their reliability. The intuition is 
analogous to the work of Ghatak (1999), who showed that where group lenders were able 
to select new borrowers, they would potentially be able to achieve higher repayment rates. 
Often restrictions are placed upon new members; some groups are composed entirely of 
one ethnicity, one gender or of individuals from one company or trade. It stands to reason 
that where new members are more effectively screened, the group will be able to select 
those that are, ex ante, considered to be more reliable. 
 
Conjecture 7: ROSCAs that effectively screen new entrants are less likely to experience 
enforcement problems.  
2.3.2 Social Capital 
 
Formal credit institutions require that lenders front some form of collateral. However, this 
is not usually the case with ROSCAs. In practice, members might incur fines or have their 
possessions seized if they miss payments, but in the ROSCA context, the idea of social 
sanctions arising from the social capital existing amongst members, are perhaps more 
important.16 Putnam et al. (1993) argue that this can be viewed as a kind of collateral, 
especially in cases where no physical assets are available. Karlan (2007), for example, 
found evidence that strong social connections amongst group members lead to higher 
repayment rates in a group banking scheme in Peru, although Wydick (1999) found little 
evidence of this in Guatemala. 
As such, the fronting of so-called social collateral (Besley et al. 1993) helps to overcome 
the problem of adverse selection by acting as both a screening device on new members and 
an enforcement mechanism amongst existing participants. The loss of reputation arising 
from non-payment can be viewed as a ‘social sanction’; such punishment becomes less 
desirable when higher levels of pre-existing social capital exist between members and it is 
conceivable that individuals would go to great lengths to avoid a bad reputation amongst 
family, neighbours, friends, colleagues or business partners. The importance of social 
sanctions will be greater still in those areas where access to formal credit markets is more 
restricted; if informal institutions that screen entrants purely on reputation are the prevalent 
savings option in a region as is the case for our Beninese sample, then ROSCAs provide an 
attractive solution for individuals wishing to smooth their consumption or commit to save. 
                                                 
16 Putnam et al. (1993:167) define social capital as ‘...features of social organisation such as trust, norms and 
networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions.’ 
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The threat of losing one’s social capital is therefore what could make up the bulk of the 
cost of default, K, in the model above. 
Whilst social capital may be pre-existing amongst members and as such facilitate the 
formation of a ROSCA (they are often started amongst members of the same 
neighbourhood, workplace, family, or religious group), it is also possible that this could be 
accrued over time; trust and reciprocity can emerge as a result of repeated interactions, 
even between strangers. In ROSCAs, interactions between members are not only a result 
of financial motivations – groups often perform an important social function, for example 
meeting together for meals, or members doing business with one another. Such interactions 
can only serve to enhance cohesion amongst the group. 
 
Conjecture 8: Where a higher level of social capital exists amongst members, there is a 
lower likelihood that the ROSCA will experience enforcement problems. 
 
2.3.3 Monitoring and Peer Pressure  
 
Repeated successful interactions in a ROSCA might go some way to circumventing the 
likelihood of enforcement problems in that it provides a signal of trustworthiness, yet there 
is still a need for members to monitor each other. This is especially true for those members 
who have already contributed to, but not yet received, the pot; they are in effect seeking to 
protect their investment. Effective monitoring might lead to earlier and easier detection of 
problems, allowing the group to better deal with a member who is facing difficulties in 
making his or her payment. Monitoring is possible due to the social connectedness of group 
membership: where members interact outwith the ROSCA setting (perhaps as part of the 
same business, neighbourhood or church), they are able to keep an eye on their colleagues. 
However, the ability of members to monitor each other is inherently dependent on 
numerous variables such as group design, size, or the frequency of meetings. Chiteji (2002) 
considers that the ability of members to enforce the arrangement depends upon 
characteristics such as innate ability to police each other (peer monitoring), the value placed 
upon reputation, the awareness of another’s reputation (ex-ante screening, or effort exerted 
to monitor the actions of another) and the existence of pre-existing relationships between 
group members that can be used to extract information with regards their reliability or 
integrity. Chiteji (2002) envisages that very large groups would involve monitoring costs 
outweighing the expected benefits from ROSCA participation and in such cases it would 
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not make sense to form one. Besley et al. (1993) also postulated that default risk could be 
overcome by ex ante reducing group size. 
 
Kandel and Lazear’s (1992) examination of the roles of peer pressure and monitoring 
within partnerships (firms where profits are shared amongst workers) and the insights 
presented are also quite relevant: the fundamental incentives in such firms are analogous 
to those in a ROSCA: a workers’ choice of effort in a partnership affects the level of profit 
received by all other staff, whilst ROSCA participants’ choice of whether or not to make 
their contribution dictates how much (if anything) all the members will receive. They note 
that peer pressure might induce a worker to feel ‘shame’ (the disutility received when one’s 
unsatisfactory efforts are noticed by colleagues), or ‘guilt’ (the disutility experienced by a 
worker whose actions negatively affect the wellbeing of his colleagues). It is likely that in 
ROSCAs, where social connectedness is often high, the latter feeling would only serve to 
reinforce the pressures already felt from the threat of social sanctions. The authors also note 
that peer pressure and monitoring becomes more difficult within larger groups.17 
Furthermore, Kandel and Lazear argue that feelings of guilt might induce loyalty, even 
when actions are unobservable. Given that the most cited reason for ROSCA membership 
in our dataset is that of self-control (Dagnelie and LeMay-Boucher, 2012), one can 
envisage the feeling of guilt as a mechanism that helps to further curb any behaviour that 
might reduce an individuals’ ability to make payments (such as spending on frivolities)18, 
therefore helping to reinforce group stability. Such feelings of guilt are likely to be stronger 
still where social connectedness is higher – i.e. amongst members of (for example) the same 
family, neighbourhood or ethnic group – a feature of many of the ROSCAs observed in 
Benin. 
 
Recent work by Ahlin (2015) considered the role of size in a group lending context. His 
study uncovers a complementarity between group size and the level of social capital 
between members that suggests larger groups can achieve efficient outcomes, given a high 
enough level of local borrower information. Yet it is important to note that the author 
focuses on groups between 1 and 20 members; in our setting where the average ROSCA 
                                                 
17 It can also be argued that peer pressure or monitoring exerted by each individual need not necessarily 
increase in larger groups (thus overcoming the problems cited in Kandel and Lazear (1992) and Chiteji 
(2002)). The mere fact that more people are aware of members’ actions in a very large group may be sufficient 
deterrent against any threat of default. If ROSCAs meet together to make payments, an individuals’ reputation 
may take a much greater hit when it is announced to a larger number of people that he is unreliable. As such, 
the severity of social sanctions may be high in a larger group.  
18 See Bonan et al. (2013) for a fuller discussion of the issues of preferences and frivolous spending amongst 
Beninese households.  
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size is 33 members (and can number well over 100), it is unlikely that local borrower 
information would be of sufficient quality to have the same effect as described in Ahlin 
(2015); i.e. the definition of a ‘large’ group can differ substantially between contexts. 
 
Conjecture 9: Enforcement problems are more likely to occur in larger groups due to 
higher monitoring costs and a lower level of social capital, on average, between members.  
 
2.4 Empirical Strategy and Results  
 
This section tests each of the conjectures outlined above; Probit analysis is used to estimate 
the following model: 
 
Pr(Enforcement Prob = 1)𝑖,04−06 =  𝛼 + 𝛾𝐗𝑖,04 + 𝜃𝐒𝑖,04 + 𝜀𝑖,04                                [2] 
 
where the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the ROSCA, i, 
experienced an enforcement problem between 2004 and 2006. X is a vector of 
characteristics related to the institutional design of the group, S is a vector of characteristics 
that proxy the level of social capital existing amongst members and 𝜀𝑖 is the group-specific 
error term. All of the right hand side variables are measured in 2004, allowing us to examine 
their effect on the likelihood of experiencing enforcement problems during the two years 
that followed. The results of Probit estimations are shown in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. Average 
Marginal Effects (AME) are shown.19 
                                                 
19 Whilst it is often common to calculate and present marginal effects at fixed values of the independent 
variables such as the mean (MEM; i.e. at 𝑥 = ?̅?), this is inappropriate when there are dummy variables 
amongst the regressors, which is the case here. Bartus (2005) highlights that the means of dummy variables 
actually refers to non-existent observations. E.g. in the mean of President is 0.35, but to calculate the marginal 
effect of having 35% of a president is not realistic. I therefore display the average marginal effects (AME) 
for each of the regressors i.e. the average of the marginal effect at each 𝑥 =  𝑥𝑖 . 
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   Table 2.2 Probit estimation  
Dependent Variable =1 if ROSCA experienced enforcement problems between 2004 and 2006 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Membership size -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Number of Cycles 
Completed 
-0.012** -0.016* -0.012** -0.012*** -0.015 -0.012** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.010*** 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Random -0.004 0.112  -0.000 -0.021 -0.019 -0.017 -0.021 -0.016 
 (0.076) (0.075)  (0.075) (0.078) (0.074) (0.072) (0.072) (0.074) 
Need -0.517***  -0.513*** -0.520*** -0.461*** -0.494*** -0.471*** -0.477*** -0.452*** 
 (0.108)  (0.115) (0.109) (0.101) (0.103) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) 
Other Fixed   0.004       
   (0.076)       
President -0.268*** -0.225** -0.268*** -0.288***  -0.268**  -0.271*** -0.260*** 
 (0.092) (0.090) (0.092) (0.107)  (0.106)  (0.085) (0.081) 
Committee       0.265***   
       (0.100)   
Paid    0.030 -0.127 0.239** 0.912***   
    (0.091) (0.080) (0.099) (0.130)   
President*Paid      -0.259**    
      (0.114)    
Committee*Paid       -0.922***   
       (0.133)   
Written Rules -0.245*** -0.265*** -0.245*** -0.245*** -0.164** -0.244*** -0.233*** -0.208*** -0.299*** 
 (0.073) (0.072) (0.073) (0.073) (0.070) (0.071) (0.070) (0.066) (0.077) 
More severe sanctions 
on delinquent member 
       -0.134**  
       (0.066)  
Survived past 
Problems 
0.776*** 0.630*** 0.776*** 0.773*** 0.732*** 0.753*** 0.722*** 0.754*** 0.707*** 
(0.100) (0.061) (0.100) (0.100) (0.086) (0.089) (0.087) (0.104) (0.077) 
Pot size (CFA 000's) 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Pot size 2         -2.66e-06** 
        (1.19e-06) 
Monthly Meetings -0.148** -0.188** -0.148** -0.145** -0.166** -0.162** -0.156** -0.155** -0.223** 
 (0.071) (0.079) (0.071) (0.070) (0.077) (0.071) (0.068) (0.064) (0.066) 
Single Ethnicity 0.047 -0.008 0.047 0.049 0.002 0.034 0.022 0.021 0.045 
 (0.072) (0.080) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.071) (0.070) (0.072) (0.070) 
Only Men -0.248*** -0.224** -0.248*** -0.248*** -0.167* -0.238*** -0.214** -0.263*** -0.183** 
 (0.095) (0.091) (0.095) (0.096) (0.089) (0.091) (0.091) (0.089) (0.089) 
Only Women -0.038 -0.066 -0.038 -0.032 -0.090 -0.018 -0.007 -0.026 0.027 
 (0.084) (0.096) (0.084) (0.085) (0.095) (0.082) (0.080) (0.084) (0.075) 
Pseudo – R2 0.55 0.48 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.62 
Observations 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 
           
      * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Average marginal effects shown. Robust Standard errors in parentheses
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2.4.1 Institutional Design 
 
Conjecture 1: Given that a majority of individuals in the sample use ROSCAs as a 
commitment device, it is not expected that the order of pot allocation (random/fixed) plays 
a significant role in the likelihood of experiencing enforcement problems. However, fixed 
order ROSCAs which accommodate their members’ needs may minimise the likelihood of 
problems occurring. 
 
Columns 1-3 of table 2.2 consider the effects of the order of pot allocation on the likelihood 
of experiencing problems. Random is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if this is decided 
according to a random process.  Need is a dummy taking the value 1 if the allocation of the 
pot was done according to members’ need for the money (discussed above). The reference 
category, in column 1, is a group where the order of pot allocation was fixed according to 
some other criteria such as seniority or regularity of attendance (listed in section 2.2 above). 
It is clear that those groups allocating the pot according to members’ need were 
significantly less likely to have experienced enforcement problems than those allocating 
the pot to another criterion. The results in column 2 suggest that random groups do not 
appear to be any more or less likely to experience enforcement problems than all fixed 
groups, as the coefficient is not statistically significant. Column 3 changes the reference 
category to random, controlling for those groups fixing the order according to some other 
criteria. Again, the results suggest that groups allocating the pot according to Need are less 
likely (than random groups, this time) to have experienced enforcement problems. The 
average marginal effect of around -0.5 suggests that groups allocating the according to 
members’ need were over 50% less likely to have experienced enforcement problems 
compared to those that fixed according to some other process or randomly allocated the 
pot. There appears to be no significant difference in the likelihood of enforcement problems 
between those allocating the pot randomly and any Other fixed process.  
Conjecture 2: Groups (i) overseen by a president rather than a committee, (ii) where the 
rulers receive remuneration, or (iii) where they can decide the order of pot allocation, are 
expected to have a lower likelihood of experiencing enforcement problems. 
 
The variable President is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if a single president oversees 
a group. Thus the reference group is one that is overseen by a committee of members. 
President is negative and statistically significant throughout the estimations presented. The 
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magnitude of the average marginal effects suggests that groups overseen by a president 
alone were between 23 and 27% less likely to experience enforcement problems compared 
to those ruled by a committee.  
 
Also tested is the effect of groups having rulers that were paid for their work. The variable 
paid is a dummy equal to one if the ROSCA was led by a president or committee that was 
paid. When interacted with President (Col. 6), the negative and significant coefficient 
presents evidence that those groups where a president was paid were less likely to have 
experienced enforcement problems than those with an unpaid president. Col. 7 investigates 
the effect of a committee that is paid and a similar result emerges, though the effect is much 
stronger. That is, whilst it appears having a president in itself leads to a lower likelihood of 
enforcement problems, a group with a committee can lower the likelihood to a greater 
extent than those run by a president alone by providing remuneration to the leadership.    
 
I also investigated whether presidents or committees having the power to determine the 
order of pot allocation affected the likelihood of enforcement problems occurring, however 
there was no significant effect.20 Taken hand-in-hand with the above result that those 
groups allocating the funds according to members’ need were least likely to have 
experienced enforcement problems, this suggests that it is often the decision criteria itself, 
and not the decision maker, that can minimise the probability of enforcement problems 
occurring in a ROSCA. 
 
Conjecture 3: A larger pot increases the incentive for any one member to cease 
contributing once (s)he has received it and hence leads to a higher likelihood of the group 
experiencing enforcement problems 
 
In groups where the pot is larger, there should be a higher incentive for any one individual 
to cease contributing due to the larger monetary payoff, denoted B in the model described 
in equation [1] above. However, the estimations suggest limited evidence that the size of 
the pot is related to the probability of enforcement problems occurring. Whilst the variable 
pot size, is statistically significant at the 10% level in column 2 of table 2.2, this result is 
not robust to inclusion of other controls. When the square of pot size is included in column 
9 of table 2.2, there is evidence of a quadratic relationship with the dependent variable. One 
explanation for this result might be that for small values, the pot is either not of high enough 
                                                 
20 Results not shown. 
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value to default, or the group is very small and so monitoring is higher. For larger pot sizes, 
the monitoring effort might also be higher as members seek to protect their investment. 
Thus, I find only limited support for the predictions of the model in Besley et al. (1993) 
that a larger pot would increase the likelihood of default.  
 
Conjecture 4: For a given number of members, ROSCAs that meet less frequently are less 
likely to experience enforcement problems. 
 
Included in all specifications is a variable Monthly Meetings, which is a dummy equal to 
one if the group met just once a month, the reference category being those groups meeting 
more regularly.21 Across all specifications in table 2.2, it appears that those groups meeting 
monthly were indeed less likely to have experienced enforcement problems than those 
meeting more frequently. Those groups meeting monthly had a significantly higher average 
pot size (209 CFA 000’s) than those meeting more frequently (73 CFA 000’s) and the 
correlation between the two variables is quite high (0.40). Monthly Meetings remains 
significant following the exclusion of the pot size control.22 
 
Conjecture 5: ROSCAs with written rules are less likely to experience enforcement 
problems. 
 
The variable Rules is a dummy taking the value of 1 if groups had written rules. This 
variable is one of the most strongly related to the likelihood of having experienced 
enforcement problems. Across specifications, the coefficient is consistently around -0.2 
and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the likelihood of enforcement problems 
occurring in those groups with rules was around 20% lower, on average, than those without.   
 
Conjecture 6: In addition to the threat of social sanctions, those groups imposing other 
sanctions upon delinquent members will be less likely to see enforcement problems.   
 
Column 8 of table 2.2 introduce a control for the sanctions imposed upon delinquent 
members. These sanctions are known by group members and in the vast majority of cases 
included in the written rules of a group. Specifically, this variable is a dummy taking the 
                                                 
21 The breakdown for the frequency of meeting is as follows: monthly (36 groups); twice per month (8); every 
ten days (3); weekly (34); every 5 days (12); twice per week (2); every 2 days (1) and daily (1). 
22 This result is not shown for the sake of brevity.  
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value 1 if the group imposed severe sanctions on a delinquent member.23 The results 
suggest that those groups threatening more severe sanctions on a potential delinquent were 
around 13% less likely to have experienced enforcement problems on average.  
 
Conjecture 7: ROSCAs that screen new entrants are less likely to experience enforcement 
problems.  
 
In columns 1-7 of table 2.3, attention turns to the screening roles performed by ROSCAs 
observed in the sample. Taking groups where the entire membership decides as a reference, 
a dummy variable is included, taking the value of one when the president or committee 
makes the decision over whether to allow new entrants (Denoted by the variable 
President/Committee decides), however this is not statistically significant. There is also no 
statistically significant relationship when this is interacted with the ‘paid’ variable (column 
2). Columns 3-7 include the variables Known, Survey and Other Conditions (as defined in 
section 2.2 above). Again, however there appears to be no statistically significant 
relationship with the likelihood of enforcement problems occurring, although for the most 
part these variables do appear to have the expected sign. Thus, at least in the Beninese 
context, there is little evidence that the screening measures performed on new entrants act 
as an effective deterrent to potential delinquents.24 
 
2.4.2 Social Capital  
 
Conjecture 8: Where a higher level of social capital exists amongst members, there is a 
lower likelihood that the ROSCA will experience enforcement problems.  
I next examine the pre-existing social connections between ROSCA members. Table 2.1 
highlighted that groups in the sample are most frequently started amongst friends, but can 
also be formed with neighbours, family, members of the same trade, or members of another 
group. Dummy variables are included in column 8 for n-1 of these categories, taking Started 
amongst family as the reference group, as such groups are likely to have the highest level 
of pre-existing social capital.25  
 
                                                 
23 Those definition of sanctions as ‘severe’ is outlined in section 2.2 above.  
24 A Wald test, not shown, suggested that the screening variables are also jointly insignificant. 
25A counter argument here is that groups containing many members of the same family might see the 
sanctioning / enforcement mechanisms undermined due to a reluctance to punish each other. (Sharma and 
Zeller, 1997). 
 38 
Table 2.3 Probit estimation 
Dependent Variable =1 if ROSCA experienced enforcement problems between 2004 and 2006 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Membership size -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Number of Cycles 
Completed 
-0.014 -0.012 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.012*** -0.012** -0.013* 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
President -0.279*** -0.267*** -0.288*** -0.277*** -0.306*** -0.282*** -0.290*** -0.263*** 
 (0.090) (0.086) (0.093) (0.090) (0.094) (0.088) (0.091) (0.098) 
Random 0.004 -0.017 0.014 0.003 0.022 0.005 0.014 -0.011 
 (0.077) (0.074) (0.077) (0.076) (0.075) (0.077) (0.075) (0.078) 
Need -0.494*** -0.430*** -0.487*** -0.494*** -0.501*** -0.479*** -0.475*** -0.474*** 
 (0.109) (0.092) (0.108) (0.109) (0.107) (0.103) (0.103) (0.126) 
Written Rules -0.243*** -0.232*** -0.241*** -0.243*** -0.236*** -0.250*** -0.248*** -0.201** 
 (0.073) (0.068) (0.072) (0.073) (0.074) (0.078) (0.078) (0.083) 
Survived Past 
Problems 
0.768*** 0.712*** 0.785*** 0.770*** 0.781*** 0.752*** 0.769*** 0.783*** 
(0.112) (0.093) (0.122) (0.116) (0.118) (0.099) (0.116) (0.131) 
Pot size (CFA 000’s) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Monthly Meetings -0.157** -0.183*** -0.170** -0.159** -0.149** -0.158** -0.170** -0.197*** 
 (0.072) (0.069) (0.075) (0.073) (0.072) (0.072) (0.076) (0.072) 
Single Ethnicity 0.056 0.020 0.043 0.055 0.057 0.051 0.040 0.111 
 (0.073) (0.069) (0.077) (0.074) (0.071) (0.074) (0.078) (0.083) 
Only Men  -0.230** -0.170** -0.240** -0.228** -0.267*** -0.228** -0.240** -0.276*** 
 (0.095) (0.084) (0.094) (0.096) (0.098) (0.094) (0.094) (0.101 
Only Women -0.029 0.023 -0.032 -0.028 -0.042 -0.021 -0.025 -0.068 
 (0.085) (0.074) (0.085) (0.084) (0.082) (0.084) (0.083) (0.078) 
Group Started Amongst…     
Friends        0.239*** 
        (0.079) 
Members of same 
trade 
       0.280** 
       (0.126) 
Neighbours        0.175 
        (0.120) 
Other        0.141 
        (0.116) 
Members of another 
group 
       0.207* 
       (0.117) 
President/Committee 
Decides 
0.083 0.134** 0.080 0.084 0.064 0.079 0.077  
(0.067) (0.061) (0.067) (0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.069)  
President/Committee 
Paid 
 0.974       
 (0.659)       
President/Committee   -1.029       
Paid *Decides  (0.676)       
Survey   -0.052    -0.050  
   (0.087)    (0.087)  
Known    0.006   -0.001  
    (0.059)   (0.059)  
Survey * Known     -0.069    
     (0.067)    
Other Conditions       0.030 0.026  
      (0.072) (0.074)  
Pseudo-R2 0.56 0.59 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.56 0.57 0.59 
Observations 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Average marginal effects shown. Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
 
In column 8, the positive and significant coefficient attached to Started amongst friends 
and Started amongst members of the same trade suggests that such ROSCAs were more 
likely to have experienced enforcement problems than those started amongst family 
members. A group started amongst friends was 28-35% more likely to experience 
enforcement problems than one started with family members. A similar result emerges with 
groups started amongst members of the same trade and, to an extent, ROSCAs started 
amongst members of another group. This result seems to suggest that where strong social 
ties exist, at least between the founding members of a group, (and as such there is a higher 
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level of existing social capital) there is a smaller likelihood of enforcement problems 
occurring. 
 
The variable Number of cycles completed captures how many cycles each ROSCA had 
successfully completed before the 2004 survey. One would expect the likelihood of 
enforcement problems occurring to be lower in groups that have completed more cycles 
due to familiarity and trust between members having been built up over many rounds of 
previous interactions. The results present some evidence to suggest that duration of 
existence has a role to play; the variable is often negative and significant at the 1% level: 
completing a further cycle might reduce the likelihood of enforcement problems occurring 
by around 1-1.5%. However, this result is not robust to the inclusion of all other controls. 
An alternative variable to include here might be the duration of existence – some groups 
had existed for almost 40 years, whilst some were only recently formed in 2004. Results 
were similar to that of the number of cycles.26 In section 2.5 below, further inquiry is made 
with regard to the role of group age, asking whether or not repeated interactions and 
completing more cycles can help to overcome the odds of experiencing enforcement 
problems. 
 
The estimations also suggest that those groups that had experienced and survived problems 
before 2004 were more likely to see a recurrence; it appears common that a group which 
has experienced enforcement problems already will do so again, adding weight to the 
picture of instability and riskiness associated with investing one’s savings in a ROSCA. 
However, this also suggests that many groups are resilient to such an occurrence.  
 
Further controls are included for groups whose membership was restricted to the same 
ethnicity or gender by including three dummies (Same Ethnicity, Only Men and Only 
Women; the reference categories are thus groups allowing members of any ethnicity or 
gender respectively to join). The results suggest that those ROSCAs composed purely of 
men (23 of 97) seemed to have a lower likelihood of experiencing enforcement problems 
than mixed groups. Anecdotal evidence from several members of different groups indicated 
that mixed-gender groups can be more difficult to manage. According to some women 
interviewed, “men can often take too much space” and adultery issues have marred some 
groups.27 Spouses in Benin have also been observed to be secretive about their incomes and 
                                                 
26 Not shown.  
27 This is why, in order to avoid potential disputes concerning mainly adultery issues, around 40% of groups 
allowing female membership require husbands’ approval for new female members. 
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have disconnected financial spheres (LeMay-Boucher and Dagnelie, 2014); this provides 
some indication as to why single gender groups appear to be more sustainable.  
 
Conjecture 9: Enforcement problems are more likely to occur in larger groups due to 
higher monitoring costs and a lower level of social capital, on average, between members.  
 
The discussion of size above highlighted various relationships between the number of 
members and the likelihood of experiencing enforcement problems. Tables 2.2, and 2.3 
show that there is a negative relationship between size and enforcement problems; that is, 
in larger groups the likelihood of experiencing problems is actually lower. The magnitude 
of this impact is relatively small compared to others discussed above (i.e. written rules). 
This result might go some way to corroborating the argument that larger groups are better 
at dealing with a member who cannot make his or her payment, either because the 
contribution itself is small, or purely because there are a higher number of others who could 
potentially step in to help or monitor. Another factor that might explain this result is that 
social sanctions (notably loss of reputation) are likely to be greater in larger groups in case 
of default. 
2.4.3 Robustness checks  
 
The surveys in Cotonou did not investigate the root cause of each enforcement problem in 
detail; a group might, of course, be tightly knit, well designed, and effectively screen new 
members, but there is always the chance that ROSCAs experience problems or collapse due 
to one or more members falling into financial hardship or facing an unexpected income 
shock. It was shown above that groups which allocated funds based on members’ need were 
significantly less likely to experience problems, however the majority of groups did not 
carry out this function and as noted, this variable might represent those members requiring 
the collective savings at set intervals to cover regular lumpy expenditures. Whilst it is not 
easy to control for the likelihood of an income shock, information at the individual level 
allows us to make some attempt to control for the personal circumstances of the 
membership. 
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Table 2.4 Robustness Checks; Dependent Variable =1 if ROSCA experienced 
enforcement problems between 2004 and 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Average marginal effects shown.  
Robust Standard errors in parentheses 
 
Column 1 of table 2.4 replicates the basic specification of table 2.2, including controls for 
the personal characteristics of the member(s) of each group observed. The variable 
Interviewee(s) held job for > 2 years is a dummy equal to 1 if the member(s) surveyed had 
held their current job for at least 24 months (in 2004); Contributions’ share of total 
expenditure is the share of an individuals’ total expenditure taken up by ROSCA 
contributions for the average member in each group. The first is included as it might 
reasonably be expected to capture the stability of an individuals’ income and thus the 
likelihood that they will face an income shock, reducing their ability to make ROSCA 
contributions. The second acts as a measure of how important contributions are in an 
individuals’ budget. In the face of an income shock, ROSCA contributions might not be a 
priority to an individual, especially if they take up a large portion of their income.28 The 
majority of groups in this study were observed only once (i.e. only one member of each 
group was interviewed), however 20 of the 97 were observed two or more times. Where 
there is information on more than one member, an average is taken. The inclusion of these 
                                                 
28 As a further robustness check, other individual characteristics (age, education level, etc.) were added to the 
model. Results not shown confirmed that none of these additional variables had any impact on the results 
presented above. 
 1 2 3 4 
Membership size -0.009*** -0.008*** 0.008 0.009 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.010) (0.011) 
Membership size 2   -0.000* -0.000* 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
No. of Cycles Completed -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.013*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
President -0.276*** -0.280*** -0.274*** -0.295*** 
 (0.085) (0.099) (0.091) (0.098) 
Random -0.020 -0.011 -0.036 -0.038 
 (0.076) (0.082) (0.077) (0.083) 
Need -0.502*** -0.663*** -0.610*** -0.658*** 
 (0.114) (0.225) (0.192) (0.208) 
Rules -0.227*** -0.266*** -0.259*** -0.279*** 
 (0.070) (0.078) (0.075) (0.081) 
Experienced Past Problems 0.762*** 0.932*** 0.872*** 0.940*** 
 (0.105) (0.219) (0.179) (0.193) 
Pot size (CFA 000’s) 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Monthly Meetings -0.167** -0.151* -0.136* -0.146* 
 (0.067) (0.080) (0.074) (0.080) 
Single Ethnicity 0.030 0.046 0.083 0.090 
 (0.072) (0.078) (0.075) (0.081) 
Only Men -0.232** -0.255** -0.228** -0.246** 
 (0.094) (0.105) (0.097) (0.105) 
Only Women -0.018 -0.035 0.002 0.002 
 (0.082) (0.089) (0.080) (0.086) 
Interviewee(s) held 
job for > 2 years 
0.011    
(0.087)    
Contributions’ share  -0.074    
of total expenditure (0.068)    
Pseudo-R2 0.57 0.53 0.57 0.55 
Observations 95 90 97 90 
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variables is based on the assumption of homogeneity of membership: a feature of ROSCAs 
emphasised in the literature. They are often formed amongst people from ‘…the same 
office’ (e.g. Besley et al, 1993; Handa and Kirton, 1999), with ‘similar occupations and 
income’ (Ambech and Treich, 2007) or ‘the same community’ (Anderson and Baland, 
2002). Table 2.2 highlighted that around 19 per cent of groups in the sample were started 
by individuals from the same neighbourhood; 43 per cent amongst friends and 14 per cent 
amongst members of same trade. All of the previously discussed results are robust to the 
inclusion of these controls, but they do not carry any explanatory power.29 
 
Returning to the issue of group size, the left hand panels of figure 2.2 display the 
distribution of membership sizes according to whether or not the group experienced 
enforcement problems. Whilst there is quite a large distribution of group sizes, the majority 
of these are clustered between zero and 75 members; indeed, it appears that there are some 
clear outlying groups with very large membership sizes. Crucially, none of these groups 
had experienced problems in the years between our surveys, but we cannot rule out the 
possibility that these larger groups are causing a bias on the coefficient for membership 
size. The right hand panels of figure 2.2 show the distribution, having trimmed the dataset 
to remove the largest groups. These histograms suggest that the distribution of group size 
between those experiencing enforcement problems and those not is quite similar. Column 
2 of table 2.4, replicates the basic specification in column 1 using a trimmed dataset: all of 
the previous results hold.30  
 
                                                 
29 These variables were also included in all previous specifications (not shown) but the results remained 
unchanged. The sample is reduced to 95 observations here due to missing data on two members. A test for 
equivalence of means between those groups that did and did not experience problems showed no significant 
differences in these two variables.  
30 The sample was just trimmed in an ad-hoc manner by eyeballing the distribution of group sizes. 
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Figure 2.2 Membership size and Enforcement Problems 
 
I also investigate the possibility of nonlinearity between size and the dependent by 
including the square of membership size (column 3). The results do not provide much 
evidence of a quadratic relationship. When including the square of size, trimming the 
dataset to 90 observations has no discernible effect (column 4).31 It is also possible to take 
account of outliers in the discrete series by specifying them in natural log form; all of the 
previously discussed results remain robust.32 
 
One further potential limitation of the above analysis is that it is not possible to control for 
the fact that individuals self-select into groups, leading to a kind of endogenous group 
formation; most often they are free to choose which they join and in some cases might even 
have control over the institutional design of the group before commencing making 
payments. With this in mind, it is perhaps likely that individuals who know that they are 
reliable and do not plan to default may select a group with, for example, a president, written 
rules, or one with no history of problems; conversely, any member with ideas of defaulting 
                                                 
31 These results are robust to different ad hoc trimming rules where, for example, a similar (5-10; instead of 
7) number of ROSCAs were identified as outliers. 
32 Results not shown but available on request. I prefer not to impose the logarithmic transformation to simply 
take account of outliers; furthermore, the pseudo-R2 was larger when specifying these variables in their linear 
form.  
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for his or her own profit might choose a group with a less formal structure. However, such 
concerns are not likely to be of great importance, for a number of reasons. Firstly, 60 % of 
the interviewees data stated that, given the choice, they preferred to receive the pot towards 
the end of the cycle, whilst fewer than one in four preferred to receive the pot at the 
beginning. Dagnelie and LeMay-Boucher (2012), using the related Beninese household 
sample, show that ROSCA participation is most often used as a commitment device – thus 
the majority of individuals have some reason to want to save and commit to the ROSCA 
arrangement. The preference for commitment is not correlated with duration of ROSCA 
membership and thus unlikely to be the effect of some learning process. Secondly, it is 
unlikely that individuals have perfect knowledge of the reliability of different groups (and 
the effect of group design on this). As a result, they are more likely to simply join the group 
most convenient to their own situation, considering the size of contributions, place and 
regularity of meetings or whether or not they know a current group member. It is, however, 
difficult to interpret the results here as causal. Without very detailed information on every 
member of every group, it is not possible to say whether groups experienced enforcement 
problems due to the composition of the group (i.e. characteristics of the individuals) or due 
to the incentives created by the group design. Whilst controls for individual characteristics 
of a representative member are included above as a check, it is unlikely that these capture 
all information on individuals’ circumstances.33 Thus, the results can only confidently be 
interpreted as correlations. Future research might wish to improve on the design presented 
herein by examining the individual characteristics of more, if not all, members of each 
group over time and inquiring further as to the exact cause of each case of non – payment. 
Detailed information such as this would assist in shedding light on the exact role that the 
institutional design and sociocultural makeup of ROSCAs plays in helping to avoid default.  
 
2.5. Further analyses 
2.5.1 Given a certain institutional design, can repeated interactions lower the likelihood 
of experiencing enforcement problems? 
 
                                                 
33 Further evidence in this regard comes from Kedir and Ibrahim (2011), who found that the characteristics 
of a ROSCA (e.g. group size, frequency of draw) were not significantly related to the size of contribution. To 
the extent that the size of members’ contributions reflects the type of group, or the intentions of members (i.e. 
those contributing larger sums to a group might be more motivated to ensure that their savings are protected), 
then these results suggest that the institutional design of groups is not correlated with the motivations of 
members to make payments or not. 
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In all previous results, the average marginal effects were shown. However it is possible to 
compute marginal effects of covariates of interest at set levels of one of the other 
independent variables.34 Of particular interest is how the effects of some of the institutional 
features might change as ROSCAs complete more cycles (or get “older”).  That is, as 
opposed to asking “What is the average effect on the likelihood of enforcement problems 
of having a president (as opposed to a committee)?” one can ask, “What is the effect on 
the likelihood of enforcement problems of having a president (…) for a group that has 
completed X cycles?”  
 
Figure 2.3 Marginal Effects of Institutional Features measured at different stages in the 
ROSCA life cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The plot in figure 2.3 displays the marginal effects of three different institutional features 
on the probability of experiencing enforcement problems, measured at 5 cycle intervals. 
The features chosen are having written rules, ruling structure and monthly meetings. These 
three features were selected as they were all (i) institutional design features that can be 
chosen by a ROSCA and (ii) significantly related to the likelihood of enforcement problems 
occurring in the main regression results. The plot shows that for ‘young’ groups, having a 
president is the most important institutional feature of the three (followed by having less 
frequent meetings and having written rules) for deterring enforcement problems. However 
interestingly, after having completed around 20 cycles (which is the case for 6 groups in 
                                                 
34 The Stata commands margins and marginsplot are used here. 
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our sample), it appears that having written rules actually acts as a stronger deterrent to 
enforcement problems than having infrequent meetings.35 Key here, however, is that the 
importance of all three features declines as groups get ‘older’; the marginal effect of all 
three declines to between -4 and -8% after around 30 cycles have been completed.36 This 
suggests a diminishing importance of institutional features as groups get older, and support 
for the theory that repeated interactions amongst members can strengthen the bonds of trust 
and reciprocity within the group.  
 
Figure 2.4 Marginal effects of interactions of Institutional Features measured at different 
stages in the ROSCA life cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 plots the predictive margins of interaction terms between the three variables and 
as such allows for an examination of those combinations of features that might be more or 
less likely to lead to enforcement problems. It is clear that having a committee (i.e. 
President = 0), no written rules and meeting more than once a month left groups most 
susceptible to problems; the marginal effects suggest that, at between 0 and 5 completed 
cycles, these groups were around 70-75% more likely to experience enforcement problems 
                                                 
35 The average cycle length lasts for 13 months. The variable ‘number of cycles’ varies between less than 1 
and over 130, with a mean of 8.6. 
36 The marginal effects of ‘monthly meetings’ remains significant up to 50 cycles. The marginal effect of 
‘written rules’ is significant up to about 35 cycles. The marginal effect of ‘president’ is only significant up to 
around 20 cycles.  
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than one with any other combination of the three features. However, again it appears that 
groups facing this initial disadvantage can, to an extent, overcome it if they survive the 
early cycles. After having completed 20 cycles, the marginal effect suggests that these 
groups were 47% more likely to have experienced enforcement problems, representing an 
improvement in their chances of not doing so, compared to some other structure, of over a 
third. Of course, it is true that for all combinations of the aforementioned features, 
increasing the duration of the group decreases the likelihood of experiencing enforcement 
problems (all of the plots slope downwards). But at, say, 50 completed cycles, the 
importance of institutional features appears greatly reduced (as does the difference between 
having different combinations of features), with even those groups facing the greatest initial 
disadvantage able to enjoy much greater odds of not experiencing enforcement problems.  
 
2.5.2 What influences the likelihood that a group, having experienced enforcement 
problems, will collapse? 
 
The above analysis has considered the influence of various factors on the likelihood of 
experiencing enforcement problems. Table 2.5 presents results from a test of equivalence 
of means between groups that survived (10) and those that collapsed (23) following an 
enforcement problem.37 Immediately apparent is that there are few significant differences 
– only having written rules appears to be significantly higher amongst those groups that 
survived. On average, those groups that survived were slightly larger (29 v 23), had 
completed more cycles (3.5 v 3), and were less likely to have a president. The remainder 
of the variables, whilst not displaying statistically significant differences, seem to paint a 
similar picture as above. Groups that survived enforcement problems had, on average, more 
members, completed more cycles, and written rules. This might be tentatively interpreted 
as a sign that the same characteristics that help to minimise the likelihood of enforcement 
problems occurring also help groups to survive in the face of such problems, should they 
nevertheless occur. Only half of those that collapsed had survived enforcement problems 
in the past, whilst seven out of the ten surviving had done so, suggesting that some groups 
are used to non-payment and have devised means with which to deal with it.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Both Probit and Heckman analyses were also attempted for this subsample, but neither yielded any 
meaningful results due to the small sample size. 
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Table 2.5. Equivalence of means; Groups that experienced enforcement problems – 
survived v collapsed  
2.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented the first evidence on the sustainability of ROSCAs over time. 
The empirical investigation tests some of the intuitions outlined in the related literature. 
Knowledge of the norms in ROSCAs, along with how the groups survive over time, is of 
high importance if we wish to fully understand how these groups function and advise 
policymakers, MFIs, NGOs or formal banks on the future of savings and credit mobilisation 
in developing countries. 
Whilst ROSCAs are often cited for their remarkable stability in the face of clear incentives 
for members to default, the evidence presented here suggests that this is not necessarily 
always the case: one in three groups in the sample from urban Benin experienced 
enforcement problems within a two-year period; around a quarter of the sample collapsed 
in the same time. The empirical investigation sought to highlight the institutional design of 
those groups that were more or less likely to have experienced enforcement problems and 
a number of interesting insights emerge. The results suggest that those groups run by a 
president, those with written rules and those that fixed the allocation of the fund according 
to member’s need were less likely to have experienced enforcement problems between 
Variables Collapsed Survived  Difference 
  Mean  S.E. Mean S.E.  
Membership size 23.044 (2.63) 29 (4.137) -5.957 
Number of complete cycles 3.040 (0.587) 3.528 (0.512) -0.489 
Duration of Existence (months) 38.91 (11.97) 57.4 (13.42) 0.369 
Only President 0.348 (0.102) 0.100 (0.100) 0.248 
President/Committee paid 0.174 (0.081) 0 (0.000) 0.174 
Random  0.609 (0.104) 0.700 (0.153) -0.091 
Need 0.087 (0.060) 0 (0.000) 0.087 
Other Fixed 0.304 (0.098) 0.300 (0.153) 0.981 
Written Rules 0.348 (0.102) 0.700 (0.153) -0.352* 
Monthly meetings 0.348 (0.102) 0.300 (0.153) 0.048 
More severe sanctions on delinquent member 0.652 (0.102) 0.900 (0.100) -0.248 
Pot size (1000's of CFAF) 98.165 (21.211) 122.3 (31.664) -24.135 
Single ethnicity 0.304 (0.098) 0.200 (0.133) 0.104 
Only men 0.304 (0.098) 0.100 (0.100) 0.204 
Only woman 0.174 (0.081) 0.100 (0.100) 0.074 
Survived Past Problems 0.391 (0.104) 0.700 (0.153) -0.309 
Started amongst…           
Family 0.043 (0.043) 0.010 (0.100) -0.057 
Friends 0.522 (0.107) 0.800 (0.133) -0.278  
Members of same trade 0.174 (0.081) 0 (0.000) 0.174 
Neighbours 0.174 (0.081) 0.100 (0.100) 0.074 
Other 0.044 (0.044) 0 (0.000) 0.044 
Members of anther group 0.044 (0.044) 0 (0.000) 0.044 
President/Committee decides 0.652 (0.102) 0.700 (0.153) -0.048 
Survey on New members 0.739 (0.094) 0.700 (0.153) 0.039 
New members must be known 0.522 (0.107) 0.800 (0.133) -0.278 
Other conditions 0.783 (0.088) (0.900) (0.100) -0.118 
N = 97 N=23 N=10   
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2004 and 2006. This latter result – on the order of pot reception- suggests that pragmatism 
may be key: responding to the financial needs of members, rather than allocating the pot 
according to a random draw or some other fixed process, appears to foster stability within 
ROSCAs. The results fail to provide support for the theory outlined in Anderson et al. 
(2009), which suggested that random allocation ROSCAs have more severe enforcement 
problems than fixed ROSCAs. It might also be seen a reflection of the importance of the 
commitment motive for membership, as outlined in Dagnelie and LeMay-Boucher (2012). 
Furthermore, evidence is presented that groups meeting less frequently, or those that were 
larger, were less likely to experience enforcement problems, corroborating some of the 
predictions of the model in Besley et al. (1993). However, I find only weak evidence that 
groups with a larger pot were more likely to have sustainability problems. With regard to 
the importance of social capital and how this can promote cohesion amongst group 
members, results suggest that groups started with family members are less likely to have 
experienced problems compared to those started with friends or colleagues. This 
corroborates the notion that groups with stronger existing ties will be closer-knit and 
therefore less likely to experience enforcement problems. The results here are also 
comparable to those in, for example, Karlan (2007), which investigated the impact of social 
connections on repayment rates in village banks in Peru, finding that those groups with 
higher levels of social capital performed better. However, little evidence is found that 
formal screening arrangements reduce the likelihood of enforcement problems occurring. 
An analysis of the importance of institutional design over time highlights that groups facing 
an initial disadvantage can, by successfully completing more and more cycles, lower their 
likelihood of facing default. Repeated interactions can help to reinforce group stability.
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Chapter 3: Exploring Regional and Gender Disparities in Beninese 
Primary School Attendance: A multilevel approach 
3.1 Introduction  
 
Benin has seen almost unparalleled improvements in primary school attendance since 1990, 
yet remains virtually ignored in the literature surveying education outcomes in developing 
countries. Gross Enrolment Rates (GERs), defined as the number of students attending 
school as a percentage of the school age population, have soared from around 50% in 1990 
to well over 100% in 2012.38 The Net Enrolment Rate (NER), defined as the percentage of 
school age students attending school, stood at 95% in 2012 (UIS, 2105) whilst the average 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) was just 77%. However, despite these impressive increases 
in enrolment, severe geographical and gender disparities remain present in Benin’s primary 
school attendance rates. According to the most recent DHS data, there are still communes 
where less than one third of children attend.39 Of course, the reasons why attendance is 
likely to be lower in rural areas, or for girls, are well understood: lower perceived benefits 
coupled with higher costs (or opportunity costs) of attendance mean that parents in rural 
areas, or parents of daughters, are often less likely to send their offspring to school. 
 
This study complements individual- and household-level data from the Beninese 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) with detailed commune-level schooling data from 
the Beninese Institute for Statistics (INSAE) in order to assess the importance of demand- 
(i.e. on the part of the student, or their family) and supply-side factors (i.e. availability of 
school facilities) on school attendance rates. Results from a logistic regression model 
suggest that household wealth, religion, parental education and the supply of schools all 
predict the likelihood of a child attending school. Results also indicate that as average 
distance to school increased, the likelihood that boys who work in the field would attend 
school decreased, to a greater extent than those who did not work. This echoes the findings 
of, for example, Lincove (2012) or Huisman and Smits (2009) and also presents evidence 
that distance to school acts as a useful proxy for the opportunity cost of attending, which is 
greater when time travelling to school replaces potentially-income generating work. 
                                                 
38 Impressive GERs, however, cannot be taken at face value. By definition, a value greater than 100 might 
point to a system playing catch-up, or a large number of students entering late or repeating grades. Both are 
likely to apply in the Beninese context. 
39 Benin is subdivided into 12 departments and 77 communes.  
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Whilst much of the existing research on primary school attendance (e.g. Huisman and 
Smits, 2009) has acknowledged that factors at the community, district or national level play 
an important role in explaining school attendance, few have sought to explicitly model this 
econometrically. As a result, estimations fail to account for cluster-level interdependence. 
This study also employs a multilevel logistic model, which accounts for unobserved 
heterogeneity between higher level clusters (i.e. at the household and commune level), in 
order to assess the level at which most variation in school attendance rates is seen. A three-
level random intercepts model shows that there are a large number of communes with a 
significantly lower than average primary attendance rate. However, only around 11% of 
this variation is attributable to factors at the commune level. After controlling for the 
number of schools and average distance to school, less than 5% of the variation in 
attendance is due to commune-level factors, suggesting that the majority of the between-
commune variation in attendance rates is attributable to factors at the household level. 
These results are important from a policy context: it is useful for policymakers to be able 
to pinpoint those levels at which most variation in attendance rates exists and as such those 
areas where interventions might be most effective (i.e. at the household, community, or 
commune level). Following Delprato and Sabetes (2015), a random slopes model is also 
estimated, where the wealth coefficient is allowed to vary between communes. This 
pinpoints those communes where attendance is below average, but the effect of household 
wealth on school attendance is above average. Policymakers could, for example, use such 
results in order to target those areas where interventions that raised household wealth (or 
lowered the cost of schooling) might be most effective in increasing school attendance 
rates. 
 
This study also investigates the inherent problems with measurement of school enrolment 
or attendance; where public officials such as school teachers or principals have an incentive 
(due to top-down funding replacing school fees, as was the case in Benin ten years ago) to 
report higher enrolment rates, then official statistics might inflate the true number of 
attendees. Indeed, evidence is presented that enrolment figures from the Beninese DHS are 
somewhat lower than those from UIS (UNESCO Institute for Statistics), or INSAE. 
 
The broad contributions to the related literature are therefore threefold: Firstly, evidence is 
presented on the determinants of primary school attendance for Benin, a context that has 
not previously been considered in the empirical literature surrounding primary schooling. 
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Secondly, the use of a multilevel model helps to provide additional insights on regional 
disparities that many similar studies, from other countries, neglect to consider. Finally, the 
comparison between official statistics and household survey data provides further detailed 
evidence of the problems with using official statistics, noted in a number of other studies.  
 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides a discussion regarding 
the disparities in enrolment statistics from different sources, before considering the 
Beninese context in detail. Section 3.3 discusses the theoretical predictions and empirical 
results surrounding school attendance in developing countries, with an emphasis on not 
only the economic rationale, but also the sociocultural factors that might dictate whether or 
not a child is sent to school. In particular, results from similar studies in Sub Saharan Africa 
(SSA) are surveyed. Section 3.4 presents the variables and methodology chosen for this 
chapter. Results for the single-level logistic model are presented in section 3.5, whilst the 
multilevel strategy is outlined and presented in section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes.   
3.2 Measuring Attendance: The Beninese Context 
3.2.1 Data considerations  
 
The various sources reporting enrolment or attendance statistics for the period in question 
in Benin appear to tell a somewhat different story. Table 3.1 illustrates that official 
enrolment statistics, from UIS or INSAE are consistently higher than those from the DHS. 
 
 Table 3.1 Differences in enrolment statistics by source.  
 
However, there are a number of reasons why statistics from the DHS might not only differ 
from those supplied by the government (INSAE, UIS41), but might also be a more reliable 
and useful indicator of school attendance. Over-reporting on the part of public officials can 
lead to upward bias in enrolment statistics (Glewwe and Kremer, 2006; Sandefur and 
                                                 
40 INSAE does not report NER and the data for GER 2012 is missing.  
41 Whilst not identical, the UIS and INSAE statistics track each other very closely.  
Source Indicator 
 NER (%) 2006 NER (%) 2012 GER (%) 2006 GER (%) 2012 
DHS  57.01 71.05 86.16 96.41 
UIS 82.58 94.86 98.79 122.77 
INSAE40 - - 99.59 - 
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Glassman, 2015). Sandefur and Glassman (2015) investigated such a bias toward over-
reporting enrolment statistics in a panel of 46 surveys in 21 African countries, finding this 
bias to be prevalent in cases where low-level public servants (in this case, teachers or school 
principals) had incentives to misreport official statistics. This was particularly true in 
countries such as Kenya or Rwanda, where pupil fees had been replaced by top-down per 
pupil grants – exactly the case in Benin during the period in question here. These authors, 
and also fhi360 (2013), point out that part of the discrepancy between enrolment, which is 
reported in official statistics and attendance, which is measured by the DHS, might also 
arise from children that enrol in school but rarely attend. Indeed, the fact that enrolment is 
now free in Benin might lead some to enrol with little intention of ever attending. Thus, 
due to the potential question marks raised over the validity of official statistics, this study 
will rely on the DHS data where possible, as these are widely used, understood and accepted 
as representative. The respondents are unlikely to answer strategically, compared to public 
officials that might have incentives to over-report the number of children enrolled in order 
to maximise funding for their own schools. Moreover, an indicator of attendance is perhaps 
a more useful indicator than enrolment in the sense that it captures the number of children 
who actually attend school, rather than those merely registered to attend. Unfortunately, 
however, the DHS surveys do not investigate the frequency of attendance at school, asking 
only whether a child attended or not. 
3.2.2 The Beninese Context 
 
Benin provides an intriguing case study in education and development. Along with an 
economic crisis that forced the closure of teacher training colleges and large scale cuts to 
the civil service in the 1980’s, the socialist regime’s failed attempts at reform (see Allen, 
1989) left Benin ranking amongst the worst performing countries in the world with regards 
GERs and gender parity; fewer than 50 per cent of all children and less than one in three 
girls were attending school in 1990; the ODI (2011:4) describes the education system at 
this time as “deeply dysfunctional and inequitable”. However, the democratically elected 
government prioritised education in 1990 and as a result of systemic reform, Benin has seen 
almost unparalleled (at least in SSA) progress in terms of enrolment rates.42 Between 1990 
and 2010, average adult years of education (Barro and Lee, 2013) increased from 2.13 to 
4.35 (only Mali saw a greater increase in the same period), gross and net enrollment soared 
and the gender gap was virtually eliminated in many regions. In 2006, primary education 
                                                 
42 For a more detailed account of the backdrop to the 1990 reforms, see ODI (2011) 
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was made free for all. Figure 3.1 plots Benin’s progress in net enrolment rates against the 
average for SSA, developing countries and the world – despite missing data for many years, 
the trend is clear: NERs rose from around 40% (52% male, 27% female) in 1990 to 94% 
(99% male, 88% female) in 2012.43  
 
Figure 3.1 Net Enrolment Ratios 1990-2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gross enrolment rose from 51% to 123% in the same period. Progress in increasing 
enrolment of girls in school has been particularly impressive: the Gender Parity Index (GPI) 
rose from 0.50 in 1990 to 0.89 in 2012 – only Guinea matched this progress in SSA.44  
 
Yet these figures do not tell the whole story in Benin, as large regional disparities persist 
at both the department and commune level. Figure 3.2 shows the primary attendance (male 
and female combined) by administrative department in 2006. The data in this case comes 
from the 2006 wave of the DHS. Given the discussion above regarding statistics from the 
DHS, these numbers might best be defined as Net Attendance Rates; i.e. the percentage of 
primary school age children whose parents reported that they were attending primary 
school in 2006. 
 
                                                 
43 I rely here on the UIS data as it allows for comparisons with world and regional averages 
44 The GPI is calculated as female gross enrolment divided by male gross enrolment. Thus this statistic equals 
1 when gender parity is achieved. 
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Figure 3.2 Net Primary Attendance by department, 2006.  
Source: Author’s own calculations from the 2006 DHS. (NB. Mean = 57%) 
 
In 2006, some regions were still struggling with net attendance rates of as little as 29% 
(department average), whilst others saw rates of over 75%. The national average was 
57%.45 It is more interesting still to examine the differences at the communal level. Take 
the department of Borgou in figure 3.3, for example. Net attendance rates in 2006 ranged 
from just 23% (Kalale) to almost 80% (Parakou). Whilst the Beninese government has 
continued to prioritise access to education, regional disparities such as those outlined above 
persist. Indeed, by 2011-12 many communes had net attendance close to 90%, but some 
still lagged behind in the 20 – 30% range.46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 NB. This number differs somewhat to that reported in figure 1, due to reasons outlined in section 4 below. 
46 Unfortunately, INSAE has not made available its school supply statistics for 2011-12, so the main analysis 
here focuses on the 2005-06 round of the DHS, where complimentary statistics from INSAE are available.  
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Figure 3.3 Net Enrollment Rates by commune, Borgou department, 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations from the 2006 DHS. (NB. Mean = 50.68%) 
 
Whilst the NER (or in this case, the net attendance rate) represents a significantly more 
useful indicator than gross enrolment, it still does not tell the whole story; the official 
definition (UNESCO, 2012) is 
 
“The number of children of official primary school age who are enrolled in primary 
education as a percentage of the total children of the official school age population.” 
 
It therefore pays no attention to what grade a child is in; an 11 year-old, who is, strictly 
speaking, of school age, having just entered the first grade is counted as enrolled – yet they 
have arrived in primary school some 5 years late. Whilst the empirical analysis here does 
not specifically consider on-time-enrolment, a look at the age distribution of those attending 
primary school is nonetheless interesting. Figure 3.4 uses data from two waves of the DHS 
in order to highlight changes in the age distribution of primary enrolment in Benin between 
the 2005-06 and the 2011-12 school year. In 2011-12, the mode age of primary school 
attendees was 9 years old, at which over 75 percent of children were attending primary 
school – this compares to 10 years old in 2005-06. 
 
Indeed, the ages containing the highest percentage of children in school are 6,7,8,9,10 and 
11 – pertaining to the six official years of school. In 2005-06, the ages with the highest 
percentages of children in school were 8,9,10,11, 12 and 13. Given that official school age 
in Benin is 6 – 11 years old, this might reasonably be taken as indication that by 2011-12, 
more children were attending and completing school earlier, if not still strictly on time. 
Some of the biggest improvements come when looking to older children: the earlier survey 
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showed that, for example, around 17% of sixteen year olds were still in primary school. By 
2011 that number had fallen to just 7%. 
 
Figure 3.4 Primary attendance age distribution: 2005-06 vs. 2011-12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 goes further, comparing the age distribution of school-age students in each 
primary grade, in 2005-06 and 2011-12. There is a clear trend toward earlier, or on time 
enrolment of students: The ‘official age’ for grades 1 to 6 is 6 to 11 years old. The 2005-
06 data shows that many students were either entering school late, or playing catch up by 
repeating grades, with the result that the mode age for each grade was often higher than it 
should have been. By 2011-12, dramatic improvements have been seen in this regard: with 
the exception of the 4th grade, the most common age of children in each grade was as 
expected. Whilst figure 3.5 restricts the sample to those of school age, the conclusions (with 
regard to the mode age in each grade) are unaltered when accounting for older students, 
though the spread of the distribution is somewhat wider. 47 
 
                                                 
47 Not shown.  
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Figure 3.5 Age of children by grade, 2005-06 and 2011-12.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own calculations from the 2006 & 2012 Beninese DHS 
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3.3. Theoretical Predictions and Empirical Evidence 
3.3.1 Demand Side 
 
Becker (1975:45) argues that “The most important single determinant of the amount 
invested in human capital may well be its profitability or rate of return.” In other words it 
makes sense to invest in human capital, or in this case send a child to school, if the expected 
benefits outweigh the costs incurred.48 Costs, of course, are measured in both direct and 
indirect terms – the former constitute items such as school fees, books, transport or 
uniforms, and the latter the opportunity cost of attending (Becker, 1975). The opportunity 
cost of attending school is often higher in developing countries than elsewhere: children 
are expected to work in order to contribute to total household income, particularly so in 
rural areas. Often times, children enrolled at the start of the school year are pulled out of 
school and required to help with the harvest in autumn (Colclough et al., 2000). Children 
might make a direct contribution to household income, whereby the child works on the 
farm or in the marketplace, or an indirect contribution, where their help around the home 
or family business frees up the time of adults to earn more money (Colclough et al., 2000). 
Empirical work often proxies cost of schooling with a measure of distance to school; time 
spent travelling to school could be used, for example, to work on the family farm, or help 
with household chores. Studies such as Lincove (2012) or Huisman and Smits (2009) found 
distance to school to be inversely related with the likelihood of attendance; Delprato and 
Sabates (2015) however found no effects on the likelihood of late entry in Nigeria.49 
 
Turning to the benefits of attending primary school, these might not be immediately clear 
to parents or students in a developing country context. If there is a lack of job market 
opportunities in an area, then there will be a limited expected return to education. Even if 
opportunities were to arise in the future, parents might not reasonably be able to foresee 
this happening. If a child is expected to, for example, work on a family plot of land, then 
numeracy and literacy skills might well be of limited value, at least compared to the 
physical strength that he or she could have been building, which may prove of more use for 
his or her future work. More generally, the majority of jobs in an area might not require a 
                                                 
48 This is in a household production function framework, where parents are deemed to make investment 
decisions on the part of all household members 
49 Often times it is not possible to have a precise measure of distance between house and school, so 
approximations based on population and area of a state must be made (e.g. Huisman and Smits, 2009). When 
even this data is missing, a simple rural or urban dummy might be included in estimations and, within reason, 
pick up some of the same effect.  
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formal education, or the education offered at schools may be deemed inappropriate for the 
predominant type of employment in the area. Similarly, Colclough et al. (2000) highlight 
that in contexts where gender discrimination exists and the gender balance in labour 
markets is skewed in favour of males, that the benefits of education will be lower for girls. 
Thus, even with equitable access to schooling, there may still be significant challenges to 
convince parents of the benefits of sending their daughters to school. 
 
Weighing up the costs and benefits of sending a child to school requires a full knowledge 
of future benefits. In developing countries, it is by no means guaranteed that parents will 
be able to accurately measure or estimate such benefits. If information on job market 
opportunities is unavailable, education is deemed unnecessary for rural farm labour, or if 
families live in a community where very few adults are educated, then parents (especially 
those who have not attended school themselves) are likely to undervalue the benefits. In a 
context where either the future benefits of education are unknown, or where parents display 
time inconsistent preferences (i.e. hyperbolic discounters who undervalue future benefits), 
the benefits of education will be undervalued and it is less likely that parents will send their 
children to school. The costs, whether direct or indirect, are more easily observable. 
 
A formal approach to estimating investment in human capital is outlined in Glewwe and 
Kremer (2006:965), who consider that each household will maximise a lifetime utility 
function, and that years of schooling for children will be arguments therein, i.e. 
 
S  = f (Q,C,H,P)           [3] 
 
Where S is years of schooling, Q is a vector of school or teacher characteristics, C is a 
vector of child characteristics, such as innate ability, H is a vector of household 
characteristics and P represents costs or prices related to schooling.  
 
The authors note some caveats to any empirical work that attempts to estimate this equation 
using retrospective data: it is inherently difficult to observe innate ability, teachers’ 
motivation, parents’ ability or willingness to assist with homework etc. which will lead to 
biased Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression estimates in the absence of suitable 
instruments.50 Yet it is important to note that whilst this conceptual framework is very 
useful, it is precisely these shortcomings that have dictated the focus of recent relevant 
                                                 
50 For a fuller discussion, see Pp.968 of the aforementioned article.  
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empirical studies. Many do not try to explain variation in years of schooling, instead 
focusing simply on enrolment or attendance rates. In terms of empirical estimation, there 
are some important differences. Consider the unobservable of innate ability: A less capable 
or unfocused child might not complete a full course of schooling (or at least complete 4 
years, which Glewwe and Kremer (2006:951) deem the “most appropriate for assessing 
whether universal primary education has been achieved”). However, he or she may still (i) 
attend school but have to repeat grades or eventually fail, or (ii) be enrolled at school, but 
not attend with any degree of regularity. The key point is that any regression where 
enrolment or attendance rates are the dependent variable will not suffer from the bias 
outlined above. Enrolment ratios or attendance rates merely capture the number of children 
on a school’s register – whether or not they persist or succeed at school is, by definition, 
not considered. 
 
Costs and benefits must also be weighed in terms of household wealth, income or 
expenditures. If the costs of education are small in relation to either of these measures, then 
it is more likely that parents can afford to send their children to school. It is commonplace 
for household surveys to stratify households into wealth quintiles (the DHS, for example, 
does this via a principal components analysis); empirical results often find that the 
likelihood of attending school increases from the lowest quintile to the highest (see, for 
example Kazeem et al., 2010, Huisman and Smits, 2009), although this is not necessarily 
always the case. Lincove (2012), for example, found no direct effect of household wealth 
on school attendance in Uganda, but did find that the effects of other explanatory variables 
varied in magnitude according to wealth quintile. Delprato and Sabates’ (2015) multilevel 
analysis of late entry to schooling in Nigeria highlighted that community- or state-level 
wealth effects were greater than those at the household level. 
 
The economic rationale for sending a child to school is, however, just one side of the story: 
there are various sociocultural differences with respect to religion, caste, tradition or tribe 
that might interlink with economic decisions to dictate the norms followed by parents with 
regard to education. Indeed, it is probable that these factors might be driven more by norms 
at the community or state level, than at the individual household level (Delprato and 
Sabates, 2015). In societies where patriarchal norms persist, parents may place a higher 
value on the education of boys over girls. This often stems from the lack of social security 
or pension system, meaning that male children are expected to provide for their parents in 
old age; concurrently, it is common that daughters join their husband’s family at marriage 
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(Colclough et al., 2000; Huisman and Smits, 2009), and thus their own parents will realise 
no financial reward to their education. However, the findings of Eloundou-Enyegye and 
Calvès (2006) provide a challenge to this traditional viewpoint: their study suggests that in 
some contexts, married women often remitted to their own families (e.g. in Cameroon) and 
that their capacity to do so actually increased, the more educated they were. Thus a potential 
paradox exists – parents may be unwilling to educate their more educated daughters in the 
first place, but more educated daughters might actually remit more money. Their study also 
notes the significant control that women in West Africa, and Benin in particular, have over 
their own earnings, a finding corroborated by field surveys cited in LeMay-Boucher and 
Dagnelie (2014), which confirm the existence of disconnected financial spheres between 
husband and wife in Benin. A further disadvantage for girls is if the nearest school is quite 
far away; it might be that they are not allowed to attend until they are slightly older, due to 
the perceived dangers of walking alone, or the physical effort of walking a long distance.51 
Religion also plays a significant role in the likelihood of children, specifically girls, being 
sent to school. Csapo (1981) cites the distrust of Western education by Muslims or the more 
traditional Islamic views on the education of women, as outlined in the Qur’an, as potential 
barriers to education for girls in Nigeria. Lincove (2015) found that Muslim children in 
Nigeria were, on average, 23% less likely to attend school – but the effect was more than 
double for girls (31%) than for boys (15%), a finding echoed by Kazeem et al. (2010) who 
found the same result for Nigeria, although the order of magnitude is dramatically larger – 
their regressions suggest that Muslim children were five times less likely to attend school 
than Christians. Lincove (2012), however, found no effect of being a Muslim on school 
attendance in Uganda and Buchmann (2000)’s regression results found that Muslim 
children were no less likely to attend school than their Christian counterparts in Kenya. So, 
whilst theory predicts that different religions or traditions might place different importance 
on schooling, the empirical evidence for SSA is mixed. It may well be the case that in many 
countries, parents of all religion are increasingly willing to educate both their sons and 
daughters.  
 
The education level of parents is also an important consideration: it is highly probable that 
if parents have attended school themselves, and benefitted from the education received, that 
they would be more likely to send their own children to school. In terms of the economic 
rationale, this might allow the parent to better appreciate and estimate the benefits of 
                                                 
51 See Colclough et al. (2000) for a thorough discussion of the barriers that face many girls in SSA. 
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education for their own child; this may be particularly true for girls if their mother has 
attained a certain level of education. Lincove (2015), for example, found that mothers’ 
years of education was a significant determinant of school attendance for both girls and 
boys in Nigeria and Uganda. Huisman and Smits (2009) also uncovered positive effects of 
both parents’ education level of school attendance; the effect of mothers having at least 
some primary education was stronger for girls’ than boys’ likelihood of being in school.52 
 
Various household or family level factors such as household size, birth order, whether or 
not a child is adopted, etc. might also be considered as explanatory factors with regards a 
child’s likelihood of attending school. In terms of economic rationale, a larger number of 
children increases competition for limited household resources (Lincove, 2015). As a 
result, it might be that children with more siblings cannot attend school as they are required 
to complete more tasks at home in order to contribute to household income and the direct 
costs of sending many children to school are obviously higher. At the same time however, 
a larger number of children might well increase the likelihood that they can attend school 
as there are more hands to work and contribute to overall household income. Thus the 
direction of this effect, if it exists, is unclear. Colclough et al. (2000) presents evidence that 
in Ethiopia, the average number of children in a household was higher for school attendees 
than for dropouts; Glick and Sahn (2006) found that as the number of children in a 
household increased, there was no impact on the likelihood that a child would attend a 
public primary school in Madagascar, although it did decrease the likelihood of a child 
attending private school. Similarly, Lincove (2015) found no effect of the number of 
children in a household in Uganda and only marginally significant effects for girls in 
Nigeria. Where the number of children is large, it might be that only older (or younger) 
children are allowed to attend school – as a result, a number of studies have considered the 
effects of birth order. Huisman and Smits’ (2009) regressions for a sample of 30 developing 
countries indicate that later-born girls were more likely to attend school than first-born girls 
and Kazeem et al. (2010) found evidence that having at least one older brother or more than 
two older sisters increased the odds of attending school in Nigeria. Chernichovsky’s results 
(1985) suggest that an increase in the number of children aged 7 – 14 increased the 
likelihood that a child was in school in Botswana.  
                                                 
52 Parental level of education is a common explanatory factor of the likelihood of being in school. Other 
studies finding positive effects of said are, for example, Buchmann (2000), Deininger (2003), Delprato and 
Sabates (2015), Glick and Sahn (2006), Kazeem et al. (2010) and Lavy (1996). 
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3.3.2 Supply Side 
 
The above discussion has highlighted that numerous factors interlink to dictate whether or 
not a child will be sent to school by his or her parents. However, to consider only factors 
on the demand side ignores many of the considerations that a parent might take into 
account. Including estimates of the supply of schooling, and quality of that supply, is crucial 
to avoid omitted variable bias in the estimates obtained in empirical analyses. Often, 
however, institutional data for the total number of schools, pupil teacher ratios (PTR) etc., 
is only available at the national or regional level, making consolidation with survey data at 
the community or village very level difficult. As a result, many studies fail to accurately 
account for the supply of schooling.53 A measure of distance to school might be considered 
as a proxy for the supply of schooling. School quality is often measured by the PTR, 
although this variable is clearly endogenous in regressions where the dependent variable is 
school attendance rates. Huisman and Smits (2009) employ an estimate of the number of 
teachers per 1000 children (‘Teacher Child ratio’), finding a positive and significant effect 
on school enrolment. This avoids the endogeneity problem, as the denominator is total 
number of children of school age in the population, rather than total number of students.54 
Other variables that have been used to represent school quality include the percentage of 
teachers who are qualified (e.g. Lavy, 1996; Huisman and Smits, 2009), percentage of 
teachers who are female (often considered key in explaining girls’ participation in 
education e.g. Glick, 2008; Huisman and Smits, 2009) the use of multi-grade teaching 
(Glick and Sahn, 2006) and the condition of classrooms etc. However, the effect of these 
variables on enrolment or attendance is mixed and it is not unreasonable to argue that some 
of these measures might matter more for explaining school achievement than attendance. 
3.4 Data, Variables and Methodology  
3.4.1 Data and Variables 
 
The dependent variable of interest in the empirical analysis is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if a child of primary school age was attending primary school in 2005-2006. With this 
particular round of the DHS, the date at which the survey was carried out is important; the 
2006 wave for Benin took place between the 3rd of August and 18th November 2006. 
                                                 
53 Handa (2002) is a notable exception; His study considered a range of factors related to school enrolment 
in Mozambique on both the demand and supply side 
54 Although there may be a greater degree of measurement error here, as population ratios are usually based 
on estimates.  
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However, the Beninese government completed the elimination of primary school fees for 
all in 2006. Specifically, this announcement was made on October 14th 2006, which not 
only falls in the middle of the survey period, but also happens to be after the school year 
had already started.55 As a result, there may be children surveyed in August or September 
that were not attending primary school, that might have done so in the absence of fees.56 
Unfortunately, it is not possible at this stage to pinpoint whether or not this policy was 
implemented immediately, or indeed was put in place for the following academic year. 
Nonetheless, in order to avoid any potential effects of this policy change, the dependent 
variable used is a dummy equal to 1 if a child was attending primary school during the 
previous (October 2005 - July 2006) school year.57 Even then, there may thus be some 
confusion on the part of respondents: if they were surveyed in August (and perhaps even 
September), they may understand the ‘current year’ to mean that just past, as opposed to 
that which was about to begin in October. Controls for the month in which the survey took 
place are included in order to attempt to correct for any misunderstanding on the part of the 
respondent in later survey months. 
 
The DHS data is stratified as follows: 
Benin (1) 

Departments (12) 
 
Communes (77) 
 
“Clusters” (Primary Sampling Unit [PSU]) (750) 
 
Households (17,511) 

Individuals (90,650) 
 
                    Not School Age (73,556)       School Age (17,094) 
 
 
Of the 90,650 individuals, 17,094 were of school age. Of these, 57% were attending 
primary school. Control variables are included at the individual, household and commune 
level; table 3.2 presents summary statistics of these. 
At the individual level, controls are included for a child’s gender, whether (s)he was 
                                                 
55 The school year runs from October to July in Benin 
56Information regarding the cost of primary school fees is unfortunately unavailable at either the national or 
regional level. 
57 The DHS surveys ask not only “Did [the household member] attend school during the current year?” but 
also “Did [the household member] attend school during the previous year?” Responses to the latter question 
are used here.  
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adopted and whether or not (s)he worked alongside studying. Just under half of the sample 
was female (48%), 3.5% were adopted and it appears common that children of school age 
also work; some 73% did so. 
Turning to the household level, a set of dummy variables is included in order to control for 
the household head’s religion, the DHS wealth index (a composite index constructed using 
principal components analysis ranking households from 1 [‘Poorest’] to 5 [‘Richest’]) and 
the education level of the household head (a set of dummy variables for none, primary, 
secondary or tertiary).59  
 
Table 3.2 Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
58 ‘Other’ includes categories such as Construction or Auto Mechanic. 
59 See DHS (2004) for a detailed report on the construction of the wealth index.  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
‘Net Attendance 2005-06 0.570 0.495 0 1 
Individual Level     
Gender (=1 if female) 0.475 0.499 0 1 
Adopted 0.035 0.183 0 1 
Worked 0.729 0.444 0 1 
     Worked in the field 0.318 0.444 0 1 
     Domestic Work 0.367      0.482 0 1 
     Other58 0.044 0.206   0 1 
     
Household Level         
Household Religion    
    Catholic 0.254 0.435 0 1 
Protestant 0.057 0.232 0 1 
Other Christian 0.070 0.255 0 1 
Celeste 0.051 0.221 0 1 
Islam 0.256 0.437 0 1 
Vodoun 0.212 0.408 0 1 
Other Traditional 0.033 0.179 0 1 
Other Religion 0.013 0.115 0 1 
No Religion 0.054 0.227 0 1 
Household Wealth        
    Poorest 0.222 0.416 0 1 
Poorer 0.220 0.414 0 1 
Middle 0.205 0.404 0 1 
Richer 0.193 0.395 0 1 
Richest 0.160 0.366 0 1 
Household Head Education Level    
     Primary 0.214 0.410 0 1 
     Secondary 0.130 0.337 0 1 
 Higher 0.018 0.132 0 1 
School considered essential? 0.790 0.407 0 1 
Household Size 8.174 4.104 2 36 
Rural 0.639 .480 0 1 
     
Commune Level     
Distance to School 1.279 0.971 0.134 5.399 
(log) Schools per 5- 14 year olds -5.977 0.238 -6.577 -5.471 
         
Observations: 17,094     
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One quarter of households were Catholic, 26% Islamic and 21% Vodoun. Around 65% of 
household heads had no formal education whatsoever; of the remainder that did attend 
school, 21% had primary, 13% had secondary and the remaining 2% had a university 
education. Whilst ideally the child’s mother or father’s education level would be included 
in the analysis here (as the head is not always the parent of the children included in the 
sample), it was not possible to identify the parent of each child from the 2006 Beninese 
DHS due to missing data. School Essential is a dummy variable taking the value equal to 
one if the respondent answered yes to the survey question “Do you need to be able to send 
children to school”.60 This variable might reasonably be expected to capture household 
stated preferences for education – some 79% of households considered school to be 
essential. The average household size was just over 8 and this ranged from 2 to 36. Also 
included is a dummy variable equal to one if the child resided in a rural area (64% did so). 
At the commune level, controls are included for the average distance to school and the (log) 
number of schools per school-age children in each commune.61 To construct a measure of 
average distance to school, I follow Huisman and Smits (2009) as follows 
𝐴𝑣𝑔 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 =  
√
𝑘𝑚2
𝑁𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑠
𝜋
               [4] 
 
One unavoidable weakness of this approach lies with those children who reside close to the 
border of one commune, but might attend a school situated in another. However, this is 
perhaps the best approximation available, given the data on hand.62  
3.4.2 Methodology 
 
Whilst geographical variation in attendance rates is explored in detail below in the form of 
a multilevel model, a simple logistic regression is presented first. The advantage of doing 
this lies in the ability to compute average marginal effects which allow us to gain an 
understanding of the relative magnitudes of the covariates considered. The single level 
logistic regression estimated takes the following form 
                                                 
60 The set of possible answers was ‘No’, ‘Yes, essential’ or ‘Yes, more or less necessary’ 
61 Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain population estimates for the age range of 6-11, the official 
primary school age. Thus the number of schools per children aged 5 – 14 is shown.   
62 There are sometimes concerns surrounding endogeneity of distance-to-school variables: for example, the 
endogenous placement of schools, in areas where enrolment is low. However, this is unlikely to be a concern 
here: Firstly, the data is cross-sectional and therefore only measures the number of schools at one point in 
time – any phenomenon where more schools were being built as a result of initially low attendance would 
not be captured here. Secondly, the dependent variable is measured at the individual level and the distance 
variable at the commune level, so reverse causality is not likely to be an issue.  
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𝑙𝑛 [
𝑝𝑖
1−𝑝𝑖
] =  𝛽0𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑺𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑯𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑪𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖                                                                    [5] 
 
where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if child i was of official school age 
and attended school during the 2005-06 school year. S is the vector of student-level 
characteristics; H the vector of household level characteristics and the vector C contains 
commune-level characteristics. 
3.5 Results 
 
Table 3.3 presents benchmark results for equation [5]. In all following tables, the dependent 
variable is as outlined above. It can be considered a close approximation to the NER, 
although is again perhaps best defined as a net attendance rate. Average marginal effects 
are shown.63 Column 1 includes the entire sample, whilst columns 2 and 3 perform the same 
regression for boys and girls respectively. Looking first at the individual level factors, the 
likelihood of being enrolled in primary school is significantly lower for girls (Gender =1 if 
the child was female) than it is for boys: this is in line with expectations, given the 
considerable gender disparities that exist(ed) in enrolment at primary school for Benin’s 
young girls.  
 
Specifically, the results suggest that girls aged 6-11 were around 9% less likely to attend 
primary school than are boys. Age and its square suggest a non-linear relationship with the 
dependent variable, reflecting the pattern outlined in figure 3.4 above. The results also 
suggest that adopted children are less likely to attend school than those related to the family; 
in a context where income might be low it is understandable that households might give 
preference to the education of biological children. Interestingly, however, column three 
highlights that the significance of this variable comes entirely from girls who are around 
20% less likely to be enrolled in school than a biological daughter; adopted sons appear to 
face no such disadvantage compared to biological ones. Further inquiry showed that of four 
types of child (biological son, biological daughter, adopted son and adopted daughter), 
adopted daughters were the least likely of any to attend school, even when compared to 
adopted sons.64 An alternative way to frame this inquiry is to include an interaction term 
(gender * adopted) in the full sample. When tested, this yielded an identical result, with a 
similar marginal effect (0.19). Lincove (2012) found a similar result in Uganda, however 
                                                 
63 The same argument applies here as in chapter 2. The large no. of dummy variables means that it is most 
appropriate to present AMEs. See Bartus (2005) for further explanation.   
64 Results not shown, but available upon request 
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her results actually showed a larger impact for fostered boys than fostered girls – the 
opposite of what is presented here, whilst Huisman and Smits (2009) found an overall 
negative effect on the likelihood of foster children attending school in their panel of 30 
developing countries. Worked is a dummy variable equal to 1 if children in the sample 
carried out any kind of work alongside studying. Again, girls appear to be at a disadvantage 
compared to boys, with the likelihood of being in school 5% lower for those girls who 
worked, compared to those who did not. This is explored in more detail below.  
Table 3.3 Results for full sample and by gender 
 All Male Female 
 1 2 3 
Individual level Characteristics    
Gender -0.0879***   
 (0.0114)   
Age 0.481*** 0.490*** 0.469*** 
 (0.0240) (0.0265) (0.0360) 
Age2 -0.0252*** -0.0253*** -0.0249*** 
 (0.00150) (0.00157) (0.00227) 
Adopted -0.134*** -0.0160 -0.203*** 
 (0.0368) (0.0330) (0.0456) 
Worked -0.0232 0.00301 -0.0477** 
 (0.0157) (0.0168) (0.0186) 
Household level Characteristics    
Household size -0.00288** -0.00328** -0.00260 
 (0.00123) (0.00137) (0.00172) 
Religion    
Christian - - - 
    
Islam -0.0728*** -0.0888*** -0.0567** 
 (0.0196) (0.0216) (0.0228) 
Traditional / Other -0.0404*** -0.0457*** -0.0379** 
 (0.0106) (0.0130) (0.0152) 
Household Wealth level    
Poorest -0.287*** -0.316*** -0.283*** 
 (0.0187) (0.0232) (0.0250) 
Poorer -0.197*** -0.247*** -0.171*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0218) (0.0201) 
Middle -0.107*** -0.169*** -0.0671*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0216) (0.0187) 
Richer -0.0314* -0.0922*** 0.00461 
 (0.0164) (0.0217) (0.0191) 
Richest - - - 
    
Household head’s education    
None - - - 
    
Primary 0.0733*** 0.0639*** 0.0798*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0156) (0.0159) 
Secondary 0.130*** 0.125*** 0.136*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0168) (0.0177) 
Tertiary 0.0705* 0.170*** 0.0431 
 (0.0410) (0.0356) (0.0572) 
School Considered essential? 0.00772 0.00398 0.0127 
 (0.0149) (0.0158) (0.0202) 
Rural -0.0205 -0.0297** -0.0139 
 (0.0127) (0.0144) (0.0158) 
Commune level Characteristics    
Distance to School  -0.0163 -0.0322*** 0.00153 
 (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0131) 
(ln) Schools per 5-14 year olds 0.159*** 0.152*** 0.165*** 
 (0.0443) (0.0413) (0.0561) 
    
Observations 17,094 8,969 8,125 
Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Average Marginal Effects shown.  
Controls for the survey month included but not shown. 
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Turning to the household’s religion, the results suggest that children of Islamic households 
were around 7% less likely to be sent to school than those from Christian homes (the 
reference category).65 Those of parents following traditional / other religion were about 
4% less likely to attend. The DHS surveys also inquired as to the ethnicity of individuals, 
however this was often closely correlated to religion and did not provide any additional 
insights when tested in the model (not shown). 
 
It is clear that as household wealth increases, so too does the likelihood that children attend 
primary school. For instance, those in the lowest wealth quintile were some 29% less likely 
to attend school than those in the richest (the reference category). This echoes results in 
studies such as Huisman and Smits (2009), or Delprato and Sabetes (2015) (Nigeria), which 
also found an increasing likelihood of school attendance as household wealth level 
increased, although Lincove (2012) found no effects of household wealth on school 
attendance in Uganda. The effects of household wealth again suggest some difference by 
gender: girls from the poorest households face a slightly lower disadvantage to boys, 
compared to the upper quintile, perhaps a reflection of the higher value placed on boys’ 
work. This is explored in more detail below.  
 
Similarly, household heads that had attended primary or secondary school were more likely 
to send their own children to primary school than those with no education (the reference 
category); there is little difference here by gender. Obviously it might be the case that richer 
families are often more educated, or it might be the case that Christian families are more 
likely to be wealthier (happen to reside in rich regions, etc.). In order to investigate, tables 
3.4a and 3.4b display the predictive margins of being in a Christian home by wealth level 
and the predictive margins of having a more educated household head by wealth level 
respectively. 
 
It is clear that, holding wealth level constant, household religion and household head’s 
education still have an impact on the likelihood of a child attending school. In particular, 
children of Christian parents are consistently around 5-6 % more likely to attend school, 
regardless of household wealth level. Turning to table 3.4b, again it is clear that holding 
wealth constant, the likelihood that a child is sent to school is greater for those household 
heads with primary compared to no education and greater for those with secondary 
compared to primary education. Interestingly, holding wealth level fixed, the household 
                                                 
65 The ‘Christian’ category includes ‘Protestant’, ‘Catholic’, ‘Celsete’ & ‘Other Christian. 
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head having a tertiary education does not increase the probability that a child will attend 
school compared to a secondary level education. 
 
Table 3.4a Predictive margins of religion, by household wealth level.  
Wealth Level Christian 
Predictive 
Margin 
Poorest No 0.394 
Poorest Yes 0.455 
Poorer No 0.489 
Poorer Yes 0.551 
Middle No 0.585 
Middle Yes 0.644 
Richer No 0.655 
Richer Yes 0.710 
Richest No 0.675 
Richest Yes 0.728 
 
Table 3.4b Predictive margins of household head’s education, by household wealth level. 
Wealth Level 
Head 
Education 
Predictive 
Margin 
Poorest None 0.383 
Poorest Primary 0.464 
Poorest Secondary 0.528 
Poorest Tertiary 0.446 
Poorer None 0.478 
Poorer Primary 0.561 
Poorer Secondary 0.623 
Poorer Tertiary 0.543 
Middle None 0.575 
Middle Primary 0.655 
Middle Secondary 0.710 
Middle Tertiary 0.637 
Richer None 0.647 
Richer Primary 0.720 
Richer Secondary 0.769 
Richer Tertiary 0.704 
Richest None 0.667 
Richest Primary 0.738 
Richest Secondary 0.785 
Richest Tertiary 0.723 
 
Looking at the commune-averaged variables in table 3.3, male children in rural areas are 
less likely to be enrolled than males in urban areas; it also seems that distance to school 
matters only for boys. This result emerges in direct conflict to the theory that parents will 
be less likely to send their female children to school because of the long distance to walk, 
fear of attack etc. The supply of schools is however important – the variable Schools per 5-
14 year olds reflects the number of schools in a given commune, divided by the population 
 72 
aged 5 to 14 years.66 The positive and significant coefficient on this variable for children 
of both genders suggests that having controlled for demand-side factors, the number of 
schools also matters for attendance rates. However, these results warrant closer inspection; 
table 3.5 looks further at the role of school supply. Specifically, due to the relatively high 
correlation between average distance to school and number of schools (-0.57), the effects 
of these variables are examined in isolation.  
 
The results in table 3.5 suggest that for the complete, rural or urban sample, both distance 
and the number of schools appear to affect the likelihood that a child is enrolled. However, 
the magnitude and level of statistical significance depends on the exact specification. In an 
urban setting, distance is barely significant. This is not surprising; the average distance to 
school in urban areas would be shorter than in rural ones, so the usual arguments about the 
opportunity cost of the time travelling do not apply to the same extent as in rural areas. 
However, the number of schools per children aged 5-14 is a significant explanatory factor. 
In a rural setting, both distance and the number of schools are significant determinants of 
whether a child will attend school. 
 
Returning to the result in column 3, table 3.3, that suggested distance was not a significant 
explanatory factor for girls’ school attendance, the effects of both gender and location are 
investigated in table 3.6. Immediately clear is that the number of schools in a commune is 
a significant explanatory factor for all groups, although only at the 10% level for girls in 
urban areas. Again, it is confirmed that the distance to school is not a significant 
explanatory variable for girls in either rural or urban areas. However, it does seem to matter 
for boys. Distance has frequently been used as a proxy for school costs in enrolment / 
attendance studies: for example, Lincove (2012) [Uganda] and Handa (2002) 
[Mozambique] found negative effects of distance to school and travel time to school 
respectively on school attendance.  
 
 
                                                 
66 This age range was chosen as INSAE produce population estimates for ages 5-9 and 10-14. It was deemed 
preferable to use these figures as published, rather than construct an age range of 6-11, which would require 
use of arbitrary estimates for population growth.  
  
7
3
 
 
Table 3.5 School supply characteristics; Rural v Urban.    
Standard errors, clustered at the commune level, in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Controls for the survey month included but not shown 
 Full Sample Urban Rural 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Individual level Characteristics          
Gender -0.0879*** -0.0882*** -0.0877*** -0.0994*** -0.100*** -0.0992*** -0.0797*** -0.0797*** -0.0795*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0116) (0.0114) (0.0197) (0.0201) (0.0196) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0106) 
Age 0.481*** 0.484*** 0.481*** 0.514*** 0.515*** 0.513*** 0.472*** 0.476*** 0.472*** 
 (0.0240) (0.0242) (0.0237) (0.0371) (0.0384) (0.0369) (0.0289) (0.0288) (0.0290) 
Age2 -0.0252*** -0.0254*** -0.0252*** -0.0282*** -0.0283*** -0.0282*** -0.0241*** -0.0243*** -0.0241*** 
 (0.00150) (0.00152) (0.00148) (0.00245) (0.00254) (0.00244) (0.00168) (0.00167) (0.00168) 
Adopted -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.136*** -0.181*** -0.179*** -0.182*** -0.0920*** -0.0924*** -0.0934*** 
 (0.0368) (0.0373) (0.0361) (0.0496) (0.0512) (0.0476) (0.0277) (0.0279) (0.0276) 
Worked -0.0232 -0.0242 -0.0247 -0.0438** -0.0420** -0.0446** -0.00712 -0.0105 -0.00915 
 (0.0157) (0.0158) (0.0155) (0.0208) (0.0206) (0.0203) (0.0173) (0.0176) (0.0172) 
Household level Characteristics          
Household size -0.00288** -0.00336*** -0.00321** -0.00471** -0.00471** -0.00491** -0.00194 -0.00273* -0.00231 
 (0.00123) (0.00126) (0.00126) (0.00197) (0.00190) (0.00196) (0.00155) (0.00164) (0.00154) 
Religion          
Islam -0.0728*** -0.0776*** -0.0842*** -0.0522** -0.0547** -0.0562** -0.0830*** -0.0900*** -0.102*** 
 (0.0196) (0.0213) (0.0186) (0.0259) (0.0263) (0.0252) (0.0246) (0.0284) (0.0222) 
Traditional / Other -0.0404*** -0.0380*** -0.0371*** -0.000785 0.000264 0.000934 -0.0573*** -0.0540*** -0.0526*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0115) (0.0111) (0.0192) (0.0190) (0.0195) (0.0127) (0.0146) (0.0130) 
Household Wealth Level          
Poorest -0.287*** -0.288*** -0.298*** -0.289*** -0.288*** -0.297*** -0.315*** -0.322*** -0.321*** 
 (0.0187) (0.0190) (0.0183) (0.0267) (0.0263) (0.0254) (0.0262) (0.0276) (0.0260) 
Poorer -0.197*** -0.202*** -0.206*** -0.192*** -0.194*** -0.198*** -0.228*** -0.238*** -0.230*** 
 (0.0165) (0.0175) (0.0162) (0.0254) (0.0251) (0.0255) (0.0251) (0.0267) (0.0247) 
Middle -0.107*** -0.111*** -0.115*** -0.109*** -0.110*** -0.114*** -0.135*** -0.145*** -0.136*** 
 (0.0147) (0.0161) (0.0145) (0.0221) (0.0225) (0.0210) (0.0228) (0.0248) (0.0226) 
Richer -0.0314* -0.0340* -0.0362** -0.0179 -0.0173 -0.0207 -0.0749*** -0.0842*** -0.0744** 
 (0.0164) (0.0179) (0.0157) (0.0180) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0290) (0.0307) (0.0290) 
Household head’s education          
Primary 0.0733*** 0.0786*** 0.0742*** 0.0818*** 0.0831*** 0.0823*** 0.0645*** 0.0726*** 0.0656*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0109) (0.0114) (0.0161) (0.0157) (0.0163) (0.0143) (0.0141) (0.0142) 
Secondary  0.130*** 0.134*** 0.131*** 0.107*** 0.108*** 0.108*** 0.158*** 0.165*** 0.159*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0130) (0.0127) (0.0144) (0.0143) (0.0144) (0.0212) (0.0214) (0.0213) 
Tertiary 0.0705* 0.0722* 0.0729* 0.0581 0.0570 0.0591 0.277*** 0.292*** 0.276*** 
 (0.0410) (0.0400) (0.0410) (0.0429) (0.0426) (0.0421) (0.0800) (0.0752) (0.0805) 
School Essential? 0.00772 0.0168 0.00976 0.0126 0.0214 0.0119 0.00262 0.0112 0.00787 
 (0.0149) (0.0139) (0.0150) (0.0167) (0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0208) (0.0188) (0.0211) 
Rural -0.0205 -0.0235* -0.0205 - - - - - - 
 (0.0127) (0.0137) (0.0126)       
Commune -  level Characteristics          
Distance to School  -0.0163 -0.0341***  -0.00881 -0.0234*  -0.0230* -0.0413***  
 (0.0104) (0.0102)  (0.0152) (0.0129)  (0.0134) (0.0140)  
(ln) Schools per 5-14 year olds 0.159***  0.182*** 0.108*  0.126*** 0.183***  0.209*** 
 (0.0443)  (0.0394) (0.0561)  (0.0448) (0.0515)  (0.0479) 
Observations 17,094 17,094 17,094 6,171 6,171 6,171 10,923 10,923 10,923 
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      Table 3.6 School Supply Characteristics; Rural vs Urban by gender.  
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Standard errors, clustered at the commune level, in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Controls for the survey month included but not shown 
 
 Rural Urban 
 Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Individual level Characteristics         
Age 0.498*** 0.441*** 0.497*** 0.436*** 0.489*** 0.531*** 0.479*** 0.532*** 
 (0.0358) (0.0413) (0.0352) (0.0415) (0.0462) (0.0618) (0.0448) (0.0607) 
Age2 -0.0253*** -0.0226*** -0.0253*** -0.0223*** -0.0262*** -0.0298*** -0.0256*** -0.0298*** 
 (0.00209) (0.00239) (0.00206) (0.00241) (0.00285) (0.00400) (0.00275) (0.00394) 
Adopted -0.0260 -0.145*** -0.0282 -0.144*** 0.000112 -0.258*** -0.00952 -0.257*** 
 (0.0406) (0.0356) (0.0407) (0.0351) (0.0462) (0.0602) (0.0446) (0.0587) 
Worked 0.0105 -0.0337* 0.00957 -0.0311 -0.0139 -0.0621** -0.0156 -0.0642*** 
 (0.0198) (0.0198) (0.0193) (0.0198) (0.0251) (0.0256) (0.0243) (0.0248) 
Household level Characteristics         
Household Size -0.00255 -0.00280 -0.00280* -0.00184 -0.00529** -0.00445* -0.00612** -0.00400* 
 (0.00166) (0.00228) (0.00161) (0.00213) (0.00235) (0.00238) (0.00248) (0.00239) 
Religion         
Islam -0.110*** -0.0658** -0.131*** -0.0671** -0.0687** -0.0489* -0.0777** -0.0391 
 (0.0289) (0.0334) (0.0222) (0.0288) (0.0312) (0.0263) (0.0307) (0.0245) 
Traditional / Other -0.0539*** -0.0541*** -0.0509*** -0.0549*** -0.0204 0.0154 -0.0141 0.0105 
 (0.0170) (0.0198) (0.0163) (0.0174) (0.0225) (0.0252) (0.0244) (0.0244) 
Household Wealth Level         
Poorest -0.342*** -0.306*** -0.345*** -0.303*** -0.271*** -0.331*** -0.299*** -0.319*** 
 (0.0333) (0.0397) (0.0341) (0.0379) (0.0332) (0.0354) (0.0320) (0.0338) 
Poorer -0.274*** -0.206*** -0.267*** -0.197*** -0.208*** -0.202*** -0.228*** -0.186*** 
 (0.0332) (0.0380) (0.0338) (0.0358) (0.0321) (0.0305) (0.0324) (0.0310) 
Middle -0.187*** -0.108*** -0.181*** -0.0971*** -0.147*** -0.0844*** -0.167*** -0.0724*** 
 (0.0324) (0.0375) (0.0331) (0.0346) (0.0311) (0.0297) (0.0297) (0.0276) 
Richer -0.104*** -0.0666* -0.0970** -0.0556 -0.0790*** 0.0211 -0.0903*** 0.0273 
 (0.0391) (0.0404) (0.0393) (0.0373) (0.0258) (0.0211) (0.0252) (0.0197) 
Household head’s education         
Primary 0.0713*** 0.0740*** 0.0658*** 0.0655*** 0.0636*** 0.0980*** 0.0642** 0.0954*** 
 (0.0169) (0.0200) (0.0165) (0.0205) (0.0244) (0.0169) (0.0249) (0.0172) 
Secondary 0.148*** 0.183*** 0.142*** 0.177*** 0.105*** 0.109*** 0.104*** 0.108*** 
 (0.0274) (0.0298) (0.0266) (0.0305) (0.0216) (0.0168) (0.0215) (0.0170) 
Tertiary 0.273* 0.300*** 0.249 0.286*** 0.136*** 0.0374 0.140*** 0.0375 
 (0.159) (0.104) (0.171) (0.108) (0.0339) (0.0607) (0.0328) (0.0599) 
School Considered essential? 0.0123 0.0124 0.0110 0.00624 0.0106 0.0284 0.00186 0.0187 
 (0.0204) (0.0248) (0.0231) (0.0263) (0.0194) (0.0220) (0.0201) (0.0213) 
Commune level Characteristics         
Distance to School -0.0539*** -0.0262   -0.0430*** -0.00113   
 (0.0147) (0.0162)   (0.0133) (0.0159)   
(ln) Schools per 5-14 year olds   0.226*** 0.187***   0.151*** 0.102* 
   (0.0514) (0.0565)   (0.0489) (0.0564) 
Observations 5,792 5,131 5,792 5,131 3,177 2,994 3,177 2,994 
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As a further check on the role of distance to school, table 3.7 investigates the extent to 
which this variable can shed light on the opportunity cost of attendance by subdividing the 
sample by gender, whether or not children worked and the type of work carried out.67 
Again, there is no significant effect of distance on girls’ attendance if they worked (column 
6), however the result for boys presents strong evidence that the distance to school is a real 
concern for those that worked alongside studying (column 2). This supports the hypothesis 
that the opportunity cost of schooling has been taken into account when deciding whether 
or not to send a child to school. For those that did not work (column 1), distance is not a 
significant explanatory factor. A number of explanations for the differences observed 
between genders might be considered:  
 
Firstly, boys’ labour, or the nature of their labour, may contribute more to family income 
than girls’ and so the opportunity costs of travel time are more heavily felt. Secondly, the 
climate in Benin at that time of promoting enrolment for all might have seen parents under 
pressure to (be seen to) send daughters to school, so even those required to work were 
encouraged to attend to a greater extent than were sons.  
 
Columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 of table 3.7 examine the effect of distance, with the sample divided 
by the type of work carried out by boys and girls respectively.68 It is clear that those 
engaging in Work in the Field faced the greatest opportunity cost to attending school; an 
increase in average distance to school of 1km reduced the likelihood that boys would attend 
school by around 8% on average. Interestingly, it appears that girls who worked in the field 
also faced a higher opportunity cost to attending school, but this is around half of the 
magnitude of boys (~4.5%) and only statistically significant at the 5% level. Boys that 
undertook domestic work were around 4% less likely to attend school as the average 
distance increased by 1 km. No such effect is seen for girls.
                                                 
67 No significant differences were uncovered here when differentiating between rural and urban, or when 
including the ‘Number of Schools’ variable.  
68 These are the two main types of work carried out by school-age children; Other types included 
‘Construction’, ‘Auto Mechanic’ or ‘ subterraneous work’, however these categories only accounted for a 
small number of children; there were insufficient observations to run a similar logistic model.   
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        Table 3.7 Marginal effects of (commune) average distance to school, by gender and work status 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            Standard errors, clustered at the commune level, in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; Controls for the survey month included but not shown. ‘Other work’ not shown due to small sample size. 
 Boys Girls 
 Didn’t work Worked In field Domestic Didn’t work Worked In field Domestic 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Individual level Characteristics         
Age 0.525*** 0.445*** 0.430*** 0.370*** 0.551*** 0.424*** 0.353*** 0.450*** 
 (0.0453) (0.0324) (0.0572) (0.0565) (0.0738) (0.0394) (0.0703) (0.0546) 
Age2 -0.0265*** -0.0231*** -0.0215*** -0.0186*** -0.0295*** -0.0224*** -0.0176*** -0.0236*** 
 (0.00286) (0.00188) (0.00319) (0.00359) (0.00481) (0.00233) (0.00395) (0.00335) 
Adopted 0.0581 -0.0554 -0.0712 -0.0806 -0.214*** -0.194*** -0.127** -0.214*** 
 (0.0538) (0.0370) (0.0503) (0.0496) (0.0588) (0.0464) (0.0638) (0.0465) 
Household level Characteristics         
Household Size -0.00627*** -0.00229 -0.00179 -0.00149 -0.00846** -0.00186 -0.00342 0.000311 
 (0.00232) (0.00162) (0.00196) (0.00234) (0.00346) (0.00231) (0.00306) (0.00240) 
Household Religion         
Islam -0.0395 -0.119*** -0.120*** -0.0761** -0.0127 -0.0786*** -0.170*** -0.0753*** 
 (0.0333) (0.0251) (0.0284) (0.0309) (0.0332) (0.0290) (0.0550) (0.0261) 
Traditional / Other -0.0534** -0.0451** -0.0642*** -0.0462* -0.0691*** -0.0290 -0.109*** 0.0138 
 (0.0241) (0.0183) (0.0204) (0.0239) (0.0235) (0.0191) (0.0251) (0.0240) 
Household Wealth Level         
Poorest -0.279*** -0.327*** -0.393*** -0.245*** -0.263*** -0.280*** -0.551*** -0.279*** 
 (0.0453) (0.0354) (0.0660) (0.0434) (0.0416) (0.0262) (0.103) (0.0299) 
Poorer -0.233*** -0.259*** -0.330*** -0.179*** -0.208*** -0.159*** -0.433*** -0.163*** 
 (0.0419) (0.0350) (0.0648) (0.0378) (0.0385) (0.0248) (0.105) (0.0225) 
Middle -0.163*** -0.173*** -0.217*** -0.130*** -0.123*** -0.0531** -0.342*** -0.0381 
 (0.0376) (0.0351) (0.0603) (0.0381) (0.0369) (0.0229) (0.102) (0.0247) 
Richer -0.0700* -0.110*** -0.183*** -0.0703* -0.0393 0.0171 -0.308*** 0.0456* 
 (0.0366) (0.0354) (0.0619) (0.0386) (0.0289) (0.0247) (0.105) (0.0242) 
Household head education level         
Primary 0.0576** 0.0728*** 0.108*** 0.0116 0.0735*** 0.0908*** 0.0697** 0.0937*** 
 (0.0261) (0.0160) (0.0234) (0.0211) (0.0273) (0.0176) (0.0310) (0.0205) 
Secondary 0.121*** 0.137*** 0.188*** 0.0487 0.134*** 0.142*** 0.111* 0.127*** 
 (0.0271) (0.0277) (0.0390) (0.0322) (0.0280) (0.0229) (0.0668) (0.0262) 
Tertiary 0.219*** 0.124** - -0.00381 0.277*** -0.0714 - -0.0682 
 (0.0497) (0.0567)  (0.0528) (0.0540) (0.0468)  (0.0552) 
School Essential? 0.00477 0.0103 0.0161 0.00639 0.0226 0.0208 0.0135 -0.00475 
 (0.0239) (0.0206) (0.0248) (0.0247) (0.0273) (0.0225) (0.0421) (0.0203) 
Rural -0.0458* -0.0250 -0.0188 -0.0307 -0.0424** -0.00995 0.0169 -0.0140 
 (0.0235) (0.0178) (0.0201) (0.0221) (0.0213) (0.0204) (0.0362) (0.0212) 
Commune level Characteristics         
Distance to School -0.0123 -0.0615*** -0.0786*** -0.0442*** -0.00863 -0.0185 -0.0444** -0.0193 
 (0.0154) (0.0119) (0.0156) (0.0132) (0.0161) (0.0135) (0.0202) (0.0149) 
         
Observations 2,562 6,407 3,702 2,328 2,063 6,062 1,738 3,941 
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The fact that the average marginal effect of average distance to school for boys who work 
in the field is almost double that of girls (and more strongly significant) suggests that the 
opportunity cost of attending school is higher for them. We see no significant effects of 
distance for the subsample of boys and girls that did not work. This result echoes the 
findings of, for example, Colclough et al. (2000) who found that boys in both Guinea and 
Ethiopia that had dropped out of school did so primarily to earn money. However, 
Buchmann (2000) found that from a sample of 146 children who had dropped out of school 
in Kenya, only one did so for employment and one to help in the household. 
3.5.1 Testing an alternative dependent variable 
 
Whilst the dependent variable used above adheres closely to a measure of net enrolment in 
Benin, it is not a perfect barometer of primary school attendance. Figure 3.4 showed that 
many children in primary school in 2005-06 fell outside the official age category of 6-11. 
Furthermore, related studies in this field have imposed different criteria for classifying 
school attendance status: Huisman and Smits (2009) consider only those aged 8-11 in a 
panel of 30 countries; Lincove (2015), those aged 6-13 in Nigeria and Uganda (although 
crucially, omit any children that had already progressed to secondary school); Buchmann 
(2000) those aged 13-18 in Kenya; Lincove (2012), those aged 6-12 years old in Uganda. 
To the best of my knowledge, only Deininger (2003) provides estimates for a number of 
alternative age ranges [Uganda].  
 
Whilst some of this disparity in the dependent variable used naturally results from different 
official starting ages and length of school cycles in each country, it can hamper the 
comparability of results across studies and across countries. An appealing approach is 
outlined in fhi360 (2013), who argue in favour of classing the school age as between 7 and 
14 years old and abandoning the arbitrary definitions of ‘primary’ or ‘secondary’. These 
bounds are influenced by the fact that “…in all countries, compulsory education begins by 
age 7 or earlier” and “…the ILO minimum age convention establishes age 15 as the 
minimum legal age for entering any form of employment…” (fhi360, 2013:48). As a result, 
any child falling within this age bracket should be expected to be in school. To follow this 
definition for the Beninese sample would lead to the loss of those children aged 5 or 6 who 
are, by all accounts, of school age. However, by extending the upper age range of the 
sample to 14, the analysis can account for many more children attending, or who have 
completed, primary school. In the robustness checks included in Appendix C, the dependent 
variable is thus a dummy equal to 1 if (i) a child is aged between 5 and 14 and (ii) (s)he is 
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either in or has completed primary school.69 All of the previously reported results hold 
using this alternative dependent variable; the only differences arising are small changes in 
the magnitude of certain independent variables. For the sake of brevity, only a replication 
of table 3.3 is included. 
 
3.6 Toward a multilevel approach 
 
The results in section 3.5 have highlighted that factors on both the demand and supply side 
were important determinants of school attendance in Benin in the 2005-06 school year. As 
shown in section 3.2, stark regional disparities exist Benin with regards to attendance rates. 
Whilst a number of studies acknowledge that factors at the household, community or 
district level might impact on school attendance in SSA (for example Lavy (1996), Handa 
(2005) or Huisman and Smits (2009)), only Delprato and Sabetes (2015) have explicitly 
modelled this econometrically by taking account of unobserved heterogeneity between 
higher level clusters. The consequence for the econometric analysis of ignoring this is a 
violation of the assumption that observations are independent from one another; 
unobserved heterogeneity at higher levels leads to cluster-level interdependence between 
units (Skrondal & Rabe-Hesketh, 2004). The traditional approach to dealing with such data 
is to turn to a multilevel (or hierarchical) linear model (MLM) (HLM), the simplest of 
which is the random-intercepts or variance components model which estimates a random 
intercept for every higher level unit, such as commune or department etc. 
3.6.1 Random Intercepts Model 
 
After testing various multilevel structures, it turned out that whilst all performed better than 
the single level model above, a three-level model, as shown below, was preferred to a any 
two-level model.70 
 
The basic variance components model takes the form 
𝑙𝑛 [
𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙
1−𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑙
] = 𝛽0 + 𝜇𝑘 + 𝜑𝑗𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘                         [6] 
 
 
                                                 
69 Thus, children currently in secondary school and those who have completed primary school but not gone 
on to secondary education are also included.  
70 This judgement was made on the basis of LR-test statistics.  
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where                                   
𝜇𝑘~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜇
2)                                                                                                                    
𝜑𝑗𝑘~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜑
2)                                                                                                                   
𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀
2)                [7] 
    
ln [
𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘
1−𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘
] is the log-odds that child i in household j in commune k is attending school. 𝛽0 
is the intercept shared by all individuals, households and communes. 𝜇𝑘 is the effect of 
commune k, 𝜑𝑗𝑘 the effect of  household j and  𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘 is the child level residual error.  
 
The models here are computed using second-order penalized quasi-likelihood (PQL2) in 
MLwiN (Rabash et al., 2015) via the Stata module runmlwin (Leckie and Charlton, 2013). 
When selecting the appropriate means by which to estimate multilevel equations, it is 
necessary to choose a method that is both the most unbiased, but also computationally 
feasible. Simulations in Rodriguez and Goldman (2001) show that 2nd order Penalised 
Quasi Likelihood (PQL) estimation provided the closest approximation to maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE), out of the choice of 1st and 2nd order marginal quasi-
likelihood (MQL) and 1st and 2nd order PQL. Whilst, ideally, MLE would be used to obtain 
all the estimates, this is computationally very intensive for models beyond the null; Stata’s 
commands such as xtmelogit often take many hours or days to converge, if at all. Appendix 
D displays estimates of the variance of the random effects in equation [6] using MQL1, 
MQL2, PQL1, PQL2 and MLE; Whilst there is still a downward bias in the estimates of 
𝜎𝜇
2 and 𝜎𝜑
2 compared to MLE, PQL2 performs substantially better than the other quasi-
likelihood estimators. Given that MLE estimates for models beyond the null are 
computationally very difficult to obtain, PQL2 is the preferred method here. 
 
Column 1 of table 3.8 displays results from the random intercepts model, as per equation 
[6]. Odds ratios are displayed, as it is not possible to compute marginal effects for 
multilevel models. Thus, it is difficult to compare the magnitude of the covariates with the 
single level logistic regressions. The estimate of 𝛽0 suggests that the log-odds of a child of 
school age attending primary school in an ‘average’ household / commune is 0.32.  
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Table 3.8 Random Intercepts and random slopes model 
 
Odds ratios shown. Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05;***p<0.01 
 
In order to examine and interpret each of the variance components outlined above in [7], a 
variance partition coefficient (VPC) can be calculated which, for the unconditional model 
in column (1) of table 3.8, “…report[s] the proportion of the observed variance at each level 
of the model hierarchy” (Leckie, 2013:21) Thus the VPC provides an indication of those 
levels at which most residual variation in the likelihood of attending school exists. The 
discussion in section 3.2 has already highlighted the significant inter-commune disparity in 
 Random Intercepts Random Slopes 
  1 2 3 4 5 
       
Individual level Characteristics      
Gender  -0.538*** -0.582*** -0.582*** -0.578*** 
   (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
Age  3.171*** 3.183*** 3.182*** 3.163*** 
   (0.139) (0.140) (0.140) (0.139) 
Age2  -0.167*** -0.167*** -0.167*** -0.166 
   (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Adopted  -0.658*** -0.924*** -0.917*** -0.929*** 
   (0.117) (0.118) (0.118) (0.117) 
Worked  -0.297*** -0.167*** -0.156*** -0.137** 
   (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) 
Household level Characteristics      
Household size   -0.019*** -0.015** -0.015*** 
    (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Religion      
Christian  - - - - 
       
Islam   -0.386*** -0.311*** -0.327*** 
    (0.078) (0.079) (0.079) 
Traditional / Other   -0.401*** -0.414*** -0.413*** 
    (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) 
Grand mean - centred wealth level   0.507*** 0.497*** 0.498*** 
   (0.024) (0.024) (0.033) 
Household head’s education      
None   - - - 
       
Primary   0.460*** 0.447*** 0.329*** 
    (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) 
Secondary    0.714*** 0.701*** 0.696*** 
    (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) 
Tertiary   0.418** 0.368* 0.371* 
    (0.207) (0.206) (0.206) 
School Essential?   0.154** 0.134** 0.125*** 
    (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) 
Rural   -0.248***  -0.236*** 
    (0.062)  (0.062) 
Commune -  level Characteristics      
Distance to School     -0.165** -0.0210 
     (0.079) (0.077) 
(ln) Schools per 5-14 year olds    1.073*** 1.128 
     (0.303) (0.289) 
Intercept (β0) 0.322*** -13.528*** -13.544*** -6.646*** -6.422*** 
  (0.089) (0.577) (0.603) (1.842) (1.764) 
Random Effects      
Level 2: Household       
Intercept variance 1.223 1.800 1.418 1.422 1.373 
𝑉𝑃𝐶𝜑: 0.240 0.310 0.279 0.287 - 
ICC: 0.353 0.430 0.352 0.336 - 
Level 3: Commune       
Intercept variance 0.573 0.700 0.368 0.241 0.214 
𝑉𝑃𝐶𝜇: 0.113 0.120 0.073 0.049 - 
ICC: 0.113 0.120 0.073 0.049 - 
Wealth Slope Variance - - - - 0.037 
Intercept – Wealth Slope Covariance - - - - -0.043 
Observations: 17,094 17,094 17,094 17,094 17,094 
 81 
school attendance rates, so the expectation is that a significant amount of variation will 
exist at this level. The VPC’s are calculated for the commune and household respectively, 
as follows: 
 
𝑉𝑃𝐶𝜇 =
𝜎𝜇
2
𝜎𝜇
2+𝜎𝜑
2 +𝜎𝜀
2         [8] 
 
𝑉𝑃𝐶𝜑 =
𝜎𝜑
2
𝜎𝜇
2+𝜎𝜑
2 +𝜎𝜀
2         [9] 
 
In the case of a binary outcome, 𝜎𝜀
2 is fixed at 
𝜋2
3
≈ 3.29, the variance of the standard logistic 
distribution. For the null model, the VPC’s are 0.240 and 0.113 for the household and 
commune respectively. Thus for the null model considered in column 1, 24% of variation 
in school attendance rates is between households, but only 11.3% between communes. An 
alternative means by which to interpret variance components is the intra-class correlation 
coefficient (ICC), which measures correlation or similarity between observed responses 
within a given higher-level cluster unit. The ICC for the commune level, 𝜌𝜇, and the 
household level, 𝜌𝜑 is calculated as follows 
 
𝜌𝜇 =
𝜎𝜇
2
𝜎𝜇
2+𝜎𝜑
2 +𝜎𝜀
2        [10] 
 
𝜌𝜑 =
𝜎𝜇
2+𝜎𝜑
2
𝜎𝜇
2+𝜎𝜑
2 +𝜎𝜀
2         [11] 
 
Thus an ICC of 0.113 for the commune level represents the between-commune correlation 
in the odds that a child is attending school. An ICC of 0.353 shows that the between-
household within-commune correlation is much higher, suggesting a higher correlation in 
the odds that any two children from different households in the one commune are attending 
school, compared to any two children from different households in different communes. 
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Figure 3.6 Random intercept residuals by commune. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A caterpillar plot of the commune-level residuals, in figure 3.6, shows a significant number 
of communes where the 95% confidence interval does not overlap with zero, suggesting 
that attendance rates are significantly higher or lower than average in these communes. The 
significant between-commune-within-department variance, discussed in section two, is also 
confirmed here; figure 3.7 illustrates that whilst some departments, such as Alibori or 
Plateau, contain only communes with a negative random intercept residual, others such as 
Atacora, Borgou or Zou, contain communes where the random effect is both above and 
below the average.71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
71 NB. Initial diagnostics deemed that the computational complexity of adding a department level to the model 
in Table 9 led to little gain in model performance. As such it was not included, but the graphical insight here 
is nonetheless useful. 
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Figure 3.7 Between-commune within-department variation in random intercepts. 
 
In column 2 of table 3.8, covariates are included at the individual level. The VPC in 
columns 2 - 4, takes on a slightly different interpretation; in conditional models, it 
represents the degree of unexplained variance that exists at each higher level. Having 
controlled for individual level factors, we see that the 12% of residual variance in school 
attendance exists between communes and some 31% between households.  
 
When household-level variables are included in column 3 of table 3.8, the variance 
component attributable to the household level falls from 1.800 to 1.418, representing a 
reduction in between-household variance of 21%.72 Thus, the household covariates 
included (household wealth, religion, size and stated preferences for education) explain 
around a fifth of the the residual variation in attendance rates. The remaining household-
level variation is attributable to some unobserved factors not accounted for here. The VPC 
for the household and commune fall to 27.9% and 7.3% respectively. 
 
In column 4, commune-level variables are added to the model. Immediately clear is that 
the commune-level variance component falls from 0.355 to 0.241; the VPC for communes 
falls from 7% to 4.9%. Thus the inclusion of distance to school and number of schools in 
the model helps to explain around one third of the commune-level variation in primary 
                                                 
72 In the multilevel models here, mean-centred wealth is included rather than the individual wealth quintiles, 
allowing estimation of the random slopes model, below.  
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school attendance. This result suggests that the regional differences observed in Benin are 
down to other unobserved factors at the commune-level. These might be, for example, 
regional differences in labour markets, culture or traditions. The model has also shown that 
overall, relatively little of the regional variation in attendance rates displayed in Benin is 
attributable to commune-level factors: Only 4.9% of the total remaining variation is at the 
commune-level, whilst some 30% is due to factors at the household level. Thus the greatest 
improvements in attendance rates might be realized by focusing on raising household 
income, or changing attitudes toward educating daughters.  
3.6.2 Random Slopes Model 
 
The random-intercepts model of section 3.6.1 assumed that the effects of each of the 
independent variables was fixed across communes, and across households within 
communes. In order to test the validity of this assumption, it is possible to estimate a 
random slopes model, that allows both the intercept and the coefficient (slope) of 
explanatory variables to vary randomly across higher level units. The particular focus here 
is on commune-level effects of household wealth on school attendance. The model takes 
the form 
  
ln [
𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘
1−𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑘
] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1𝑖𝑗𝑘 … … + 𝜇0𝑘 + 𝜇1𝑘𝑥1𝑘 + 𝜑𝑗𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘                 [12] 
 
Column 5 of table 3.8 reports the results of equation [12], which allows the slope of mean-
centered wealth to vary across communes. The effect of wealth on the log-odds of attending 
school in commune k (i.e. the average effect of wealth) is given by 𝛽1̂ + 𝜇1?̂?, which in this 
case is estimated to be 0.498 +  𝜇1?̂?. The between-commune variance in the effects of 
wealth,  𝜇1?̂?, is estimated to be 0.037. 
 
The between-commune variance in attendance, 𝜇𝑘, falls from 0.241 to 0.214, which 
suggests that the distribution of wealth does indeed vary across communes (otherwise 
𝜇𝑘would have remained unchanged). The estimated commune intercept - wealth slope 
covariance is negative (-0.043) which shows that those communes with below average 
primary school attendance rates (i.e. where 𝜇0𝑘 < 0) also tend to have above average effects 
of wealth (i.e. where 𝜇1𝑘 > 0). Figure 3.8 plots 𝜇1𝑘 against 𝜇0𝑘.  
 
In terms of potential policies to increase school attendance, this exposition is useful. 
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Communes in the upper left quadrant represent those where the effect of wealth on 
attendance is above average, whilst school attendance itself lies below average. Therefore, 
these communes represent those areas where the greatest improvements in school 
attendance rates could be realized through policy interventions that either raise income or 
lower the cost of schooling. The analysis of section 3.5 suggests that by lowering average 
distance to school (by building more schools, improving the road network etc.), this might 
free up time for boys to work (and as such contribute to family income) alongside studying, 
thus lowering the opportunity cost of attending school. This provides a clear example of 
how supply and demand side considerations work hand-in-hand to determine whether a 
child is sent to school. 
 
Conversely, those communes lying in the lower left quadrant represent communes where 
attendance rates are below average, but the effect of wealth is also limited; increasing 
wealth levels here might have a limited impact on school attendance rates.  
 
Figure 3.8 Commune slopes vs commune intercepts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to shed light on the determinants of primary school attendance rates 
in Benin, a country that despite seeing almost unparalleled improvements in school 
attendance, gender parity and completion over the last two decades, has been practically 
ignored in the literature. The results presented here have presented numerous insights. 
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Firstly, the analysis of Beninese statistics has echoed the findings of, for example, Sandefur 
and Glassman (2015) who found that administrative statistics (in this case either from 
INSAE or UIS) overstated school enrolment compared to household surveys (DHS). For 
the school year 2005-06, DHS estimates of enrolment (attendance) were around 15 
percentage points lower than those from UIS or INSAE. Secondly, large regional disparities 
existed during the year of study (2005-06) and indeed, still do in the most recent DHS data. 
Analysis at the commune level has been made possible due to detailed education statistics 
made available by INSAE for the years 2003-2010. The empirical analysis has presented 
strong evidence that factors on both the demand and supply side are predictors of whether 
or not a child will be enrolled in school. Richer households, those following a Christian 
religion and those with more educated household heads were more likely to send their 
children to school. Despite the narrowing gender gap in Benin at the time, girls still faced 
a lower likelihood of attending school than boys; adopted girls seemed at the greatest 
disadvantage. Focusing on the role of child labour, the empirical results highlight that those 
boys that worked alongside studying faced a higher opportunity cost of travel time to 
school. In particular, a larger distance to school for boys that worked in the field decreased 
the likelihood that they would attend school, to a much greater extent than those not 
working. 
 
Whilst much of the literature investigating the determinants of school attendance or 
enrolment has acknowledged that factors at the community or state level might play a part 
in determining enrolment trends, many studies continue to ignore higher level clustering in 
the data. In an attempt to shed light on the large regional disparities that exist in Beninese 
primary school attendance, the present work has explicitly modelled higher level variation 
in school attendance by using a multilevel modelling strategy. A three-level random 
intercepts model, at the individual, household and commune level, highlighted that there 
were a number of communes where primary school attendance was significantly lower than 
average. After controlling for individual, household and commune-level factors, the model 
is able to explain a large portion of the between – commune variance in attendance rates. 
However, it also suggests that much of the residual variance in attendance between 
communes is actually due to factors at the household level. A random slopes model 
suggests a number of communes where average school attendance is below average and the 
effect of household wealth is above average. Such regions might stand to benefit most, in 
terms of school attendance rates, from government policy that raised household incomes, 
or reduced the costs of schooling. 
 87 
Chapter 4: Tax Structures, Economic Growth and Development 
4.1 Introduction 
The past five decades have seen development economists pore over the relationship 
between foreign aid and economic growth. However, today the majority of low or middle 
income countries actually receive significantly more revenue from domestic tax receipts 
than from aid. Figure 4.1 illustrates that the average Sub-Saharan African country has 
collected more from domestic tax receipts than from official development assistance 
(ODA) for almost 20 years now. Indeed, a commitment to “…strengthen[ing] domestic 
resource mobilisation” has been embodied in the Sustainable Development Goals 
(UNSTATS, 2016:35) as part of a growing focus on increasing domestic resource 
collection in developing countries.73 
 
Figure 4.1. ODA and Tax receipts in Sub-Saharan Africa 1990-2010 
 
 
Yet, we know comparatively little about the effects of increased tax collection, or changes 
in tax structure, on economic growth and development. In part, this has been due to the 
paucity of data. Aid data, for example, is recorded by donor countries or multilateral 
organisations, whilst tax revenues are handled by individual countries’ revenue authorities 
that often lack the administrative capacity to ensure that they are accurately recorded. The 
                                                 
73 The UN has ratified two official indicators for Goal 17.1 (Strengthen Domestic Resource Mobilisation… 
…to improve domestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection). (i) total government revenue (% of 
GDP) and (ii) the proportion of domestic budget funded by domestic taxes. 
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primary source for researchers interested in tax has traditionally been the IMF’s 
Government Finance Statistics (GFS), however a glance at these statistics show that they 
are of limited use for empirical analyses on developing countries due to, amongst other 
reasons, extensive missing data. Indeed, IMF researchers themselves have often seen fit to 
construct their own ad hoc datasets for empirical work (Prichard, 2016, provides examples). 
Crucially, these are often unavailable to researchers wishing to replicate or challenge their 
findings. One such study is that of Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012), which examined 
the relationship between tax structures and GDP growth rates, finding that revenue neutral 
shifts away from consumption and property taxes toward income taxes were harmful for 
growth in the long run. However, the study relies on a dataset that is not publically 
available.74 Furthermore, the aforementioned work claims to present results for ‘Low-‘ and 
‘Middle-Income’ countries, but without explicitly naming these countries, it is nigh on 
impossible to draw any policy conclusions whatsoever. Worryingly, the results of studies 
such as this have been cited in IMF policy documents that discuss the impact of tax 
structures on economic growth.75 
 
This study uses the ICTD-UNU WIDER Government Revenue Dataset (henceforth GRD) 
in order to extend, and also challenge, existing work on the effect of revenue neutral 
changes in tax structure on economic growth. In particular, the empirical estimations 
replicate the aforementioned work of Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012), before 
considering some extensions and robustness checks made possible due to the GRD, which 
presents a significant improvement in terms of availability of revenue data for developing 
countries, allowing for a range of new insights and policy-relevant analyses.76,77 
Specifically, we are able to gain an insight into the effects of trade liberalisation on 
economic growth in developing countries. The on-going trends of globalisation and IMF 
support for moves toward consumption taxes such as the value-added tax (VAT) have seen 
many developing countries’ reliance on trade taxes decrease, measured as either a share of 
total tax or as a percentage of GDP. However, little is known about the impact of such 
                                                 
74 When contacted, the authors were unwilling to share their dataset or their Stata .do files to assist with 
replication.  
75 See, for example, IMF (2011) or IMF (2015) 
76 In keeping with Clemens (2015), the empirical part is best described firstly as a replication, as I follow the 
same specification as the Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012) study. As the regressions contained herein 
contain a larger sample and consider some additional specifications, the work might also be described as an 
extension (which Clemens categorises as a kind of robustness test.) Unfortunately, it is not possible to classify 
the present work as a pure replication study as the authors of the original study were unwilling to share details 
on the countries included in their sample.  
77 Prichard (2016) provides an overview of the GRD, whilst Prichard et al. (2014) covers its construction in 
depth. 
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structural shifts in taxation. Baunsgaard and Keen (2010) highlight that revenue-recovery 
following the changes in many low-income countries has been poor; less still is known 
about the impacts on GDP growth rates. Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012) report that the 
majority of their findings did not hold for ‘low income’ countries, blaming the poor quality 
of data and crucially did not explore the effects of structural shifts away from trade taxes 
toward domestic consumption taxes.  
 
The econometric analysis in this study uses the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator 
(Pesaran, 1999) in order to estimate the effect of revenue-neutral changes in tax structure 
on economic growth rates. This primarily follows the approach taken in, for example, 
Arnold et al. (2011), Xing (2011) or Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012), but crucially 
extends the analysis to cover a number of developing countries. In a broad sense, the results 
find support for those in the aforementioned studies; revenue neutral (i.e. holding constant 
the tax ratio) shifts away from consumption or property taxes, toward income taxes, lead 
to lower long run GDP growth. However, no support is found for the findings of Arnold et 
al. (2011) that corporate income taxes (CIT) are the most harmful for growth. Nor is there 
broad support for the previously reported finding (Arnold et al. 2011; Xing, 2011; Acosta-
Ormaechea, 2012) that revenue neutral increases in property taxes are good for economic 
growth. Turning to the effects of trade liberalisation (as measured here by revenue-neutral 
shifts away from taxes on international trade), the results suggest that for lower-middle 
income countries, there have been positive effects on GDP growth rates, but that for low 
income countries, the effect is insignificant or potentially negative. Indeed, at times the 
results differ dramatically between income groups which highlights that there is no one size 
fits all relationship between tax structure and growth – this is perhaps the key contribution 
of the empirical estimations presented herein. Subsequently, I conclude that no one policy 
prescription can be advised to all developing countries; certainly, any policy advice given 
to low income countries, using evidence from studies based on high income countries, 
would appear to be somewhat misguided. 
 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides an overview of the 
economic theory linking taxation and economic growth, before reviewing the related 
empirical literature. Section 4.2 also provides a brief discussion of why tax policy and the 
tax mix differs in developing countries. Section 4.3 introduces the data used here and 
examines the trends in tax structures for the sample. The following section, 4.4, outlines 
the empirical approach and results of the PMG estimations along with extensions, 
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robustness checks and limitations, are presented in section 4.5. Section 4.6 provides a 
discussion and conclusion. 
4.2 Tax, Growth and development  
4.2.1 In theory 
 
This section provides a brief overview of the theoretical predictions surrounding the 
relationship between taxation and GDP growth.78 Considering first the tax ratio, it is not 
immediately clear whether a higher level of taxes will have a positive or negative effect on 
output or growth. Whilst higher tax rates distort the incentive for individuals and firms to 
engage in activities that contribute towards higher levels of output, higher revenue provides 
the government with a greater ability to enact policies that can increase the productive 
capacity of the economy (e.g. as investment in education and training or subsidies for 
research and development). Thus as Arnold et al. (2011: F59) note, the relationship 
between the levels of taxation and output is more likely to be driven by ‘societal choices as 
to the appropriate level of public spending’.  
 
The neoclassical growth model (inter alios Swan 1956; Solow 1956) does not provide 
scope for assessing the potential for fiscal policy to affect the long-run steady-state growth 
rate; in this model a change in the tax rate may lead to a shift in the steady-state growth 
path, but not in its slope. In order to find theoretical predictions of the effects of fiscal 
policy on output growth however, one must look to works such as Barro (1990), King and 
Rebelo (1990) or Mendoza et al. (1997). Specifically, these models consider changes in the 
marginal tax rate. King and Rebelo’s model (1990: 130) considers the effects of a rise in 
the rate of output tax ‘…applied equally to all sectoral activities’. The authors conclude 
that whilst ‘taxation may affect the growth rate in a quantitatively important way … the 
magnitude of this influence depends … on the production and tax structure’ (King and 
Rebelo 1990: 140). 
 
The endogenous growth model outlined in Mendoza et al. (1997) however goes further by 
considering the effects of marginal tax rates on physical capital, human capital and 
consumption. The model predicts that whilst all three affect the ‘net after-tax rate of return 
on physical capital’, consumption taxes will do so only indirectly through the labour-leisure 
                                                 
78 A comprehensive review can be found in Myles (2007). 
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choice, which in turn affects the ratio of capital to labour used in production. Higher 
consumption taxes increase the cost of consumer goods, in turn reducing the reward for 
working, thus impacting the labour supply (Arnold et al. 2011). Taxes on physical or human 
capital, however, influence growth through both direct effects on labour supply and indirect 
effects on the labour-leisure choice.79 Whilst the magnitude of these impacts is dependent 
on factors such as the elasticity of labour supply, the predictions of the model are clear: 
there are fewer channels through which consumption taxes can distort growth (as measured 
by the return on physical capital) than with the other two tax categories. Thus the take away 
message from the relevant theoretical models is that taxes on physical and human capital 
(i.e. corporate or personal income taxes) might be more harmful to economic growth than 
consumption taxes.  
4.2.2 Existing empirical work 
Following Easterly and Rebelo’s claim (1993:442) that “The evidence that tax rates matter 
for growth is disturbingly fragile”, the empirical growth literature has made great strides 
towards more accurately isolating the effects of tax policy. It certainly appears at this point 
that, contrary to Easterly and Rebelo’s claim, the evidence suggests that taxes do matter for 
growth; which taxes, where and by how much they affect growth are perhaps more 
stimulating, relevant, and due to the GRD, answerable questions.  
Early studies examining the relationship between tax and growth simply included tax 
receipts as a share of GDP as a regressor. Plosser (1992) and Easterly and Rebelo (1993) 
both found a negative relationship between income taxes and growth. Yet both authors 
advise caution in interpreting the results as causal. The former points to the problem of 
collinearity among explanatory variables, whilst Easterly and Rebelo (1993) warned that 
their result was heavily dependent on the other covariates included. There are various 
shortcomings with using tax receipts’ share of GDP as the fiscal variable of interest. 
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) recognise that this can only be interpreted as the marginal rate 
of, for example, income tax, if income taxes were proportional. Martinez-Mongay (2000) 
argues that the main problem with using this method is that GDP itself is determined by the 
income from labour and capital. Furthermore, he notes that disaggregating individual tax 
flows into their share of GDP is also a poor proxy as changes in these figures could be a 
result of either a change in the tax rate, or a change in the relevant tax base’s share of GDP, 
which might not necessarily be a result of tax law. 
                                                 
79 See Mendoza et al. (1997:102-106) for detailed derivations and results. 
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Kneller et al. (1999) claim that the majority of previous research ignores the fact that by 
focusing on just one side of the budget (i.e. on expenditure or taxation, but not both) results 
may be biased. Classifying taxation as ‘distortionary’ or ‘non-distortionary’, Kneller et al. 
(1999) predict that shifts towards the latter form of taxation (from distortionary) will have 
a positive effect on growth.80 The premise of this classification lies in their claim that the 
‘most relevant distortions’ come from the incentives to invest rather than the labour-leisure 
choice, which is the only facet affected by consumption taxes. Results suggest that 
distortionary taxes do indeed retard GDP growth. Estimates point to an increase in GDP 
growth of between 0.1 and 0.2 per cent following a 1 per cent decrease in distortionary 
taxation. These results hold after rigorous robustness checks in Bleaney et al. (2001). By 
and large, the result that increases in distortionary taxation, offset by decreases in non-
distortionary revenue, are harmful to GDP growth, is in line with the theoretical predictions 
of Barro (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) or Mendoza et al. (1997). 
 
More accurate estimates of the marginal tax rate, than can be provided by simply expressing 
revenue as a share of GDP, are difficult to achieve. In order to fully and accurately estimate 
the effects of tax rates on GDP, one would require information not only on each of the 
marginal rates but also on the income distribution, which, for a large sample of countries 
over many years, is difficult to obtain or accurately estimate. Attempts have however been 
made; Lee and Gordon (2005) use the top corporate tax rate, finding a negative and 
significant relationship with per capita GDP growth. Coefficient estimates point to around 
a 0.6 percentage point increase in growth arising from a 10 per cent cut in the top 
corporation tax rate. Mendoza et al. (1994) construct their own ‘effective tax rates’ for 
consumption, labour and capital, which are computed as the ratio of the difference between 
the pre- and post-tax value of (consumption, labour or capital) income to the value of these 
incomes at pre-tax prices.81 Using the effective tax rates, Mendoza et al. (1997) test the 
theoretical model outlined in the same study, finding that a 10 percentage point decrease in 
labour (capital) income taxes leads to an increase in the investment rate of 1.8 (1.0) per 
cent. However, no significant relationship was uncovered when using GDP growth as the 
dependent variable. Whilst these methods may be a closer fit to the relevant theoretical 
models, in the sense that they attempt to estimate the marginal tax rate, the data 
                                                 
80 They define distortionary taxes as taxes on income and profit, social security contributions, taxes on  
payroll and manpower and property taxes. Non-distortionary taxes are therefore taxes on consumption,  
including trade taxes. 
81 Lee and Gordon (2005) argue that the effective tax rates measure nothing more than an average tax on  
labour income, as opposed to the marginal rate. 
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requirements pose a severe limitation to applicability, especially across a large panel of 
countries. This perhaps goes some way to explaining why such an approach has not been 
regularly replicated in the empirical literature.  
An innovative approach that has been taken in more recent studies is to examine revenue-
neutral changes in the tax structure – that is, the effect on growth of changes in the tax 
structure, holding total tax receipts constant. By imposing the revenue-neutrality constraint, 
it is possible to ‘avoid the difficulty of taking account of how any changes in aggregate 
revenue might be reflected in changes in public expenditure’ (Arnold et al. 2011: F59). 
This approach is appealing in the sense that it allows the researcher to make use of datasets 
with rich information on the various components of taxation (i.e. the GRD) without 
requiring a similar level of coverage on the expenditure side. Arnold et al. (2011) find that 
a revenue-neutral increase in the share of income taxes (offset by a decrease in the share of 
consumption and property taxes) reduces GDP per capita in levels for a panel of OECD 
countries. Specifically, their results suggest that a one percentage point increase in the share 
of income tax revenue leads to a reduction in the long-term level of GDP of between 0.25 
and 1 per cent. Moreover, they find that corporate income taxes have a stronger negative 
effect on GDP than do personal income taxes and that property taxes are most growth 
friendly. Thus the authors find support for the theoretical predictions that consumption 
taxes are less distortive to growth than personal or corporate income taxes.  However, Xing 
(2011), using a similar sample, did not find evidence in support of the finding on the role 
of corporate income taxes. Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012) extend the analysis of 
Arnold et al. (2011) to a broader panel of countries, but consider per capita GDP growth as 
opposed to GDP in levels. Similar results are uncovered: revenue-neutral increases in 
income taxes, offset by decreases in consumption and property taxes, lead to slower long-
term economic growth rates to the tune of between 0.07 and 0.14 per cent for a 1 percentage 
point shift. 
Despite disparities over the variable used to proxy the marginal tax rate, it seems that results 
of studies in this field have reached similar conclusions. Kneller et al. (1999), Bleaney et 
al. (2001), Lee and Gordon (2005), Arnold et al. (2011) and Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo 
(2012) all present evidence, using a variety of different methods, that income taxes are 
more harmful for GDP or GDP growth than are consumption taxes. Specifically, some of 
these papers separate the effects of personal income taxes (PIT) and corporate income taxes 
(CIT), arguing that the latter are the most harmful for growth.  
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Returning to the questions posed at the start of this section, the existing evidence does 
suggest that taxes on corporate and personal income distort growth to a greater extent that 
those on consumption. By how much these taxes affect growth is wholly dependent on the 
proxy used as the tax variable in each case; the estimates discussed above however suggest 
only a modest impact of changes in tax rates or structure on economic growth. Turning to 
the question of where these effects have been seen, the vast majority of the aforementioned 
studies are consistent in that, to date, they have only considered OECD countries. The only 
papers to consider the effects amongst non-OECD (and specifically developing) countries 
have been those by Lee and Gordon (2005) and Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012). Whilst 
the former paper makes no attempt to distinguish between high- and low-income countries, 
Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012) found that their main results held for high- and middle- 
but not for low-income countries. Crucially, no indication is provided of the exact sample 
of countries included. However, given that their data is compiled form the IMF’s GFS, it is 
easy to see that the group of countries they call ‘Low Income’ might well, in truth, be 
middle-income.82 Many previous studies have likely confined analyses to OECD countries 
as a result of (for example) data availability. However, the GRD presents a first opportunity 
to carry out similar analysis on a panel of developing countries.  
4.2.3 Tax policy in developing countries  
This section provides a short overview of the features of developing, or low income, 
countries that explain the significant differences in the administration of fiscal policy 
compared to developed, or high income countries. Broadly speaking, Thirlwall (2006) 
notes that there are two main aims for fiscal policy with regards the financing of 
development. Firstly, to maximise the savings capacity of the economy by keeping as close 
to full employment as possible and secondly, to design a tax policy that can raise the 
marginal propensity to save as much as possible without introducing distortions or 
disincentives to work.83 
One crucial characteristic of fiscal policy in developing economies is the difference in tax 
structure and, in particular, the relatively heavy reliance on trade taxes such as import tariffs 
when compared to richer nations. Whilst this might be as a result of protectionist policies, 
                                                 
82 There are few, if any, cases where the GFS contains a series of sufficient length for any low income country 
to carry out the analysis described in their paper. Furthermore, those countries labelled ‘low-’ and ‘middle-’ 
income are done so not according to, for example, the World Bank’s income classification, but according to  
an ad-hoc procedure, based only on the income levels of those countries in their dataset. 
83 For a concise discussion of the ‘sensitive’ role that taxes must play in developing countries see, for example, 
Tanzi and Zee (2000). 
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it is also the case that border taxes are cheaper and easier to collect than income or 
consumption taxes: tariffs can be collected at ports or border crossings and thus the 
administration of such charges is easier organised and collected than that of say, an income 
tax on workers across the country. A number of works provide further insight into why tax 
structures differ: Riezman and Slemrod (1987) consider that the level of education amongst 
the workforce and population density influences the costliness of tax collection, arguing 
that collecting trade tariffs requires a much smaller number of educated civil servants 
compared to those required to collect an income or sales tax. The authors find the level of 
education and population density to be negatively correlated with trade tax’s share of total 
revenue, adding weight to their claim that both of these variables are suitable proxies for 
estimating the cost of collecting taxes. The level of education is of course important on both 
sides: those actually paying the taxes must also understand the system and be able to keep 
track of accounts. This point is echoed by Tanzi and Zee (2000), who also note that 
unreliable communication infrastructures (mail, telephone etc.) can further hinder the 
efficiency of tax administration. 
Thirlwall (2006) argues that income taxes might not be an effective means to raise revenue 
due to the fact that the majority of citizens might not actually earn enough to even be 
eligible to pay; he notes that only around 30 per cent of national income is taxable in 
developing countries, compared to some 70 per cent in developed nations. Yet too heavy a 
reliance on trade taxes has well-understood growth implications; the efficiency gains from 
exposure to international competition can greatly enhance the long run growth potential not 
only for specific industries, but the economy as a whole. Trade liberalisation does however 
place significant revenue constraints on many low-income countries, which might find 
limited scope to meet these needs by increasing standard consumption tax rates (IMF, 
2011).  
Another feature that helps to explain the tax structures of developing economies is the 
prevalence of the informal sector, from which tax revenues are not (usually) collected. 
According to the latest estimates from Schneider et al. (2010), the size of the average 
shadow economy in Sub-Saharan Africa was some 38.4% of GDP. This compares to an 
average of just 13.5% in high-income OECD countries.84 Where a large amount of 
economic activity occurs in the informal sector, not only does this reduce the government’s 
                                                 
84 The country in SSA with the largest informal sector in 2007 was Zimbabwe, at 62.7%, whilst the smallest 
in the OECD was Switzerland, at 8.1%.  
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Potential tax revenues but it might also have longer-term implications for economic 
growth.85 By remaining unregistered, firms forgo access to government public goods such 
as business courts, the chance to bid for government contracts, or access to formal credit 
markets that might enable them to expand production (Woodruff, 2013). Furthermore, 
Woodruff (2013) points out that by keeping their costs and revenues off the books (either 
through an unwillingness to pay taxes or an ineptitude with regards accounting procedures), 
small firms may not fully understand their own costs structures. This might result in either 
a loss of business in the case where goods are overpriced, or loss of revenues when under-
priced. In this sense, remaining a part of the informal sector has important implications not 
only for individual firms, but also for the economicy as a whole.86 
Yet it is often (prohibitively) costly to register a business in developing countries and as 
such, many informal sector firms are unlikely to do so unless coerced or forced. In Bolivia, 
for example, the cost of setting up a formal sector business can be as high as 260 per cent 
of GDP per capita, compared with an average of 34 per cent and a minimum of just 1.4 per 
cent in Canada (Djankov et al. (2002)). Alongside the fact that it is costly to administer 
taxes on income or profits (especially in light of the probable low profits made or incomes 
earned in small firms currently operating in the informal sector), this makes it unlikely that 
tax reform in developing countries would emphasise taxing the informal sector. The IMF 
(2011) strongly promotes the view that the greatest revenue improvements can be realised 
by tackling tax avoidance by high-earning individuals. This might, for example, take the 
form of legal loopholes, or the use of tax havens. It is clear that this problem is not specific 
to low-income countries, but better enforcement might lead to larger gains in such nations.  
As a result of such issues in developing countries, much of the reform that has taken place 
in over recent decades has seen introductions of domestic consumption taxes such as the 
VAT, as opposed to increases in income or profit taxes. Indeed, this is certainly a change 
that has been encouraged by the IMF (2011), who describe the VAT as ‘the standard policy 
prescription’ for countries battling the revenue challenges that come from trade 
liberalisation. Specifically, they note that the VAT is able to raise revenue in a way that is 
                                                 
85 Estimates for the size of the informal sector come from Schneider et al. (2010) and are only available for 
1999-2007. Pooled OLS regressions provide further evidence that the size of the informal sector is negatively 
and significantly related to the level of tax receipts (in per cent of GDP). Results not shown. 
86 Of course, whilst the incomes and profits from the informal sector remain untaxed, such activity is, by 
definition, also not counted in National Income figures. As such the existence of a large shadow economy is 
important in our context (i.e. relating fiscal policies to changes in national income) only in the sense that it 
dictates that the tax mix will be more heavily reliant on those activities that can be taxed, such as international 
trade.  
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less distortive to economic activity than alternatives, whilst also having the advantage of 
being simpler to administer and comply with than, for example, an income tax.87  
Tax structures in less developed countries are rather different from that of developed 
nations. Factors such as illiteracy, low population density, reliance on subsistence 
agriculture or the informal sector necessitate that policymakers are faced with very specific 
challenges in raising the revenue required to provide the necessary public goods that 
facilitate growth and development. Other issues (See IMF, 2011, for a full discussion) 
affecting tax collection might be the volatility of revenues from natural resource extraction 
(a particularly major concern in countries heavily reliant on exporting resources), or the 
damage caused to the tax base and administrations by conflict. Thus the succinct conclusion 
of Tanzi and Zee (2000:300) is quite fitting: 
“In developing countries, tax policy is often the art of the possible rather than the 
pursuit of the optimal.”  
4.3 Data & Trends 
4.3.1 The Government Revenue Dataset 
 
The tax revenue data for this chapter comes from the ICTD UNU-WIDER GRD. This 
dataset is the result of an effort to synthesise and combine data tax data from many sources, 
such as the IMF’s GFS, OECD Tax Statistics and IMF Article IV Country Reports. 
Depending on the country in question, each of these sources report data to varying degrees 
of disaggregation and for various periods of time. Take the case of Benin, for example: 
whilst not an extreme example of the disparities across different sources, a look at the tax 
ratio by source is nonetheless interesting.  
 
(Before discussing the data – an examination of the trend for Benin is insightful. The 
collapse of the socialist regime in the 1980s is accompanied with a large drop off of tax 
revenues, but these have been gradually improving since 1990 – in keeping with much of 
the continent.) 
 
                                                 
87 Specifically, the IMF (2011) advocate that a base-broadening of the VAT would bring more significant 
revenue effects than increasing existing rates.  
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Figure 4.2 Benin, Total Tax (% of GDP), by source 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: GRD: Government Revenue dataset. WDI: World Development Indicators.  
AEO: African Economic Outlook. GFS: Government Finance Statistics  
ART IV: IMF Article IV Country Reports. 
 
The line plots in figure 4.2 display the same series (total tax as a % of GDP) from 4 different 
sources, along with the GRD. There are a number of inherent issues with the picture 
presented here. Firstly, the most widely used source for revenue data, the GFS, only starts 
reporting tax revenue data for Benin in the year 2001. This is also the case for the WDI, 
whilst the AEO only has data from 2000 onward. Secondly, each of the sources report 
somewhat different figures. The disparity between sources can at times be close to 2% of 
GDP. Whilst this may not seem large, for a country only collecting government revenue 
amounting to around 15% of GDP, to under-measure by 2% is quite a sizable margin of 
error. One of the important reasons for this disparity, alongside the fact that different 
sources often report different revenue figures, is that they often use different underlying 
GDP figures. Indeed, a look at the underlying figures in local currency units (LCU) show 
that the WDI and GFS actually report identical figures for Benin, but when expressed as a 
percentage of GPD, the tax ratio differs wildly. The GRD, however, overcomes this 
problem by taking data from each source in LCU and dividing it by a common GDP series, 
namely the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO). Thus, in cases where different sources 
may report data for different time periods, it is often possible to merge these to form one 
series. For Benin, for example, the GRD uses data from IMF Art IV reports between 1980 
and 1999, before switching to the GFS in the year 2000. The result is that for a large number 
of countries, the GRD is able to provide a long, consistent series which achieves large gains 
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in both analytical accuracy and completeness over any other one source. The GRD does 
not, however, make any attempt to alter the underlying numbers. The choice of source for 
each country depends on a number of factors but, generally speaking, the GRD will include 
revenue data that (i) can account for taxes accruing from resource extraction, (ii) provides 
a long and consistent series with high levels of disaggregation and (iii) extracts social 
contributions from tax. 88 
 
4.3.2 Examining Trends in the Data 
 
The most recent release of the ICTD UNU-WIDER GRD contains some 6390 observations 
for 196 countries over the period 1980-2012/13. However, the econometric analysis here 
must rely on a smaller subsample of this data for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is crucial 
that a consistent time series is present for each country included. So, for example, if there 
was data for a country spanning 1980-1995 and 1996-2012, it would be dropped from the 
analysis. There are a number of countries where this is the case. The sample is also 
restricted to those countries with at least 20 years of consecutive observations, so that the t 
dimension is of sufficient length to carry out the PMG regressions. Thirdly, the GRD 
includes a number of ‘flags’ identifying potentially problematic data. Those observations 
flagged as ‘Problem 1: Data not Credible’ or ‘Treat With Caution: Data of Somewhat 
Questionable Quality’ are also excluded. Finally, the analysis is also restricted by the 
availability of some other covariates – specifically the measure of human capital (average 
years of schooling). The final sample for the baseline econometric analysis comprises 2657 
observations for 100 countries.89 The figures below, however, include more data where 
available, including for countries that are not included in the regression analysis. 
 
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics for all variables included in the analysis for the 
sample as a whole, and also by income group (according to the latest available 
classifications from the World Bank). All tax variables come from the ICTD UNU-WIDER 
GRD. GDP growth is the change in (log) GDP per capita, taken from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (WDI). Physical Capital, also from the WDI, is (log) fixed 
capital formation expressed as a share of GDP. The variable Human Capital is the average 
                                                 
88 A full account of the construction of the GRD can be found in Prichard et al. (2014). 
89 A list of these countries, by income group, is included in Appendix E. 
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics 
Variable   Obsv. Avg. 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
 
Variable   Obsv. Avg. 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
Per capita GDP Growth All 2753 0.018 0.042 -0.649 0.316  Social Contributions  All 2499 0.137 0.143 0.000 0.476 
  HI 1236 0.020 0.033 -0.149 0.171  (share of total tax) HI 1225 0.211 0.141 0.000 0.476 
  UMI 722 0.018 0.046 -0.216 0.168    UMI 722 0.104 0.117 0.000 0.413 
  LMI 392 0.022 0.031 -0.156 0.122    LMI 288 0.035 0.084 0.000 0.391 
  LI 402 0.009 0.062 -0.649 0.316    LI 264 0.003 0.009 0.000 0.036 
Physical Capital All 2753 0.216 0.067 0.000 0.748  Corporate Income Tax  All 2162 0.111 0.068 0.000 0.516 
  HI 1236 0.227 0.047 0.085 0.463  (share of total tax) HI 1117 0.092 0.059 0.000 0.484 
  UMI 722 0.222 0.069 0.000 0.484    UMI 493 0.139 0.079 0.000 0.516 
  LMI 392 0.227 0.089 0.055 0.748    LMI 288 0.133 0.069 0.030 0.391 
  LI 402 0.162 0.063 0.000 0.343    LI 264 0.112 0.051 0.017 0.258 
Human Capital All 2753 7.510 2.988 0.796 13.247  Consumption & Property Tax  All 2752 0.555 0.176 0.106 1.000 
  HI 1237 9.734 1.745 4.803 13.247  (share of total tax) HI 1236 0.424 0.12 0.106 1.000 
  UMI 722 7.186 1.824 2.836 11.289    UMI 722 0.613 0.146 0.201 0.872 
  LMI 392 5.605 2.257 1.571 11.147    LMI 392 0.687 0.125 0.315 0.912 
  LI 402 3.104 1.581 0.797 7.865    LI 402 0.73 0.099 0.365 0.956 
Population Growth Rate All 2753 0.018 0.014 -0.033 0.139  Consumption Tax  All 2690 0.528 0.194 0.100 1.000 
  HI 1237 0.010 0.012 -0.025 0.111  (Goods & Services + Trade) HI 1198 0.372 0.125 0.100 1.000 
  UMI 722 .023 0.012 -0.021 0.139  (share of total tax) UMI 702 0.599 0.152 0.157 0.870 
  LMI 392 0.023 0.009 -0.012 0.048    LMI 391 0.681 0.126 0.299 0.911 
  LI 402 0.028 0.013 -0.033 0.069    LI 399 0.721 0.097 0.365 0.953 
Tax/GDP All 2675 0.224 0.114 0.006 0.628  Tax on Goods and Services  All 2690 0.374 0.14 0.000 0.870 
  HI 1236 0.301 0.096 0.011 0.506  (Includes ‘Other Tax’) HI 1198 0.33 0.108 0.028 0.644 
  UMI 722 0.181 0.079 0.006 0.464  (share of total tax)  UMI 702 0.4 0.163 0.017 0.870 
  LMI 392 0.173 0.105 0.047 0.628    LMI 391 0.423 0.134 0.097 0.681 
  LI 402 0.11 0.045 0.018 0.326    LI 399 0.412 0.151 0.000 0.723 
Income Tax All 2752 0.444 0.177 0.000 0.894  Trade Tax  All 2691 0.154 0.176 0.000 0.888 
(share of total tax) HI 1236 0.576 0.120 0.000 0.894  (share of total tax) HI 1199 0.043 0.092 0.000 0.888 
  UMI 722 0.387 0.147 0.128 0.799    UMI 702 0.199 0.168 0.000 0.700 
  LMI 392 0.313 0.125 0.088 0.685    LMI 391 0.258 0.171 0.016 0.799 
  LI 402 0.270 0.100 0.044 0.635    LI 399 0.308 0.171 0.030 0.847 
Personal Income Tax  All 2162 0.205 0.124 0.000 0.787  Property Tax All 2745 0.03 0.035 0.000 0.176 
(Includes Payroll) HI 1117 0.266 0.126 0.000 0.787  (share of total tax) HI 1236 0.052 0.036 0.000 0.176 
(share of total tax)  UMI 493 0.130 0.091 0.000 0.440    UMI 715 0.018 0.022 0.000 0.086 
  LMI 288 0.142 0.068 0.000 0.412    LMI 392 0.006 0.013 0.000 0.072 
  LI 264 0.156 0.088 0.004 0.518    LI 402 0.009 0.017 0.000 0.094 
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years of schooling from Barro & Lee (2013).90  Population growth is the growth rate of the 
working age (15-64) population, calculated from the WDI. The average GDP growth rate 
for the whole sample is 1.8%. Investment in physical capital is on average 22% of GDP. 
The average years of schooling across the sample is 7.5 years, however this ranges from 
less than one to over 13 years. Average years of schooling in low income countries is just 
over 3, increasing to almost 10 years in the average high income country. The tax ratio is, 
on average, 22%. The trends in tax mix, and how these differ between income groups, are 
outlined in figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3 Tax Ratio & Structure by Income Group 
 
Figure 4.3 presents the average tax ratio and tax structure for each of the four World Bank 
income groups from 1980/81-2012. The tax subcategories shown are income (including 
personal income, corporate income and taxes on payroll and workforce), taxes on goods 
and services (including all domestic consumption taxes such as VAT, sales tax or excises; 
for simplicity, ‘Other’ taxes have been included in this category), trade, property and social 
contributions.  
                                                 
90 Given that this data is only available at 5-year intervals, I  use linear interpolation in order to gain a complete 
time series. This follows the approach taken in, for example, the Penn World Tables, whose human capital 
variable is highly correlated with the one used here (corr = 0.98). 
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The tax ratio in high income countries stands at between 25 and 30 % for the period in 
question; this is dramatically more than in low (10 – 15%) or middle income countries (15-
20%). The decade 2000-2010 has seen a notable increase in the tax ratio in low and middle 
income countries, whereas those classed as high income have seen their tax ratios remain 
fairly constant. The effects of the recent financial crisis are evident for high income 
countries in the late 2000s, where the average tax ratio dips by 2-3 percent, although no 
such effect is seen in low or middle income countries.  
 
Turning to the tax structure, immediately clear is the initially high reliance on taxes on 
international trade in low and middle income countries. Over the last three decades, this 
has declined, largely to be replaced by taxes on domestic goods and services and to an 
extent, income taxes.  The reliance on trade taxes in low income countries has more than 
halved, from around 40% of total tax receipts in 1980 to under 20% in 2012. There is a 
similar, if not so dramatic shift away from trade taxes in lower- and upper-middle income 
countries for the same time period. These trends undoubtedly reflect the on-going removal 
of many trade barriers and also the implementation of taxes on domestic consumption such 
as the VAT. The figure confirms that not only have trade taxes been falling in relative terms 
(i.e. as a share of total tax), but also in absolute terms (i.e. as a share of GDP).   
 
Figure 4.3 also highlights an increasing reliance on income taxes and social contributions 
in those countries classed as lower-middle income across the same period. High-income 
countries, perhaps as a result of more efficient tax collection and administration 
capabilities, are typically more reliant on income taxes or social contributions. The relative 
stability of the tax structure in high-income countries over this period is also noticeable. 
Many are members of free trade areas such as the European Union (EU) and as such the 
replacement of trade barriers with consumption taxes may well have occurred before the 
timeframe in question here. It is also clear that only high income countries collect a 
significant amount of revenue from property taxation, averaging around 4-5% of total 
revenue for the period in question.91  
                                                 
91 NB. The data for the majority of lower-middle or low income countries comes from IMF Article IV Staff 
Reports. Frustratingly, these vary in the level of disaggregation reported. Where information on property 
taxes was not included (i.e. either there were no property taxes either collected or recorder), this assumed 
zero for simplicity. 
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Figure 4.4 Tax Ratio and GDP per capita 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Turning to the relationship between tax and GDP per capita, figure 4.4 plots the average 
tax ratio against average log income per capita over the period 1980-2012. A few things 
are noticeable. Firstly, there is, overall a positive relationship between per capita income 
levels and the tax ratio. Secondly, the World Bank’s income groupings can roughly predict 
the level of a country’s tax ratio. i.e. the average tax ratio appears to increase with income 
group, but there are a number of outliers. A closer look at the outlying countries in figure 
4.5 is interesting.  
 
Figure 4.5 Tax Ratio and GDP per capita, labelled 
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Those countries circled with very low tax ratios, but high GDP growth are exclusively oil-
producing countries. Four others stand out as outliers, namely San Marino, Singapore, 
Hong Kong and the Bahamas. At the other end of the scale are almost exclusively former 
Soviet countries. Those circled, including Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Hungary, Poland, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia and Bulgaria all 
have tax ratios around 30-40 percent of GDP, but relatively low per capita income levels. 
Interestingly, this latter group of countries all have relatively high levels of social 
contributions (> 10% of GDP; performing the same analysis with taxes exclusive of social 
contributions entirely eliminates these outlying countries).  
 
These figures are informative as they underline the fact that, for most countries, higher per 
capita GDP is associated with a higher tax ratio. The improved coverage in the GRD has 
allowed for a more complete picture of this relationship, with data points for around 185 
countries included in the scatter plots.92 However, the econometric analysis below is 
concerned with the effects of tax structure on GDP growth. Figure 4.6 presents a first look 
at the relationship between average GDP growth over the period 1980-2012 and the average 
share of tax that countries collect from income, property, goods and services and trade. The 
green dashed line shows the average GDP growth rate for the period across countries; the 
red line is a line of best fit.   
 
There appears to be only a modest positive association between the share of taxes collected 
as income or property tax and the average GDP growth rate. However, the average share 
of taxes on goods and services appears to be positively associated with GDP growth rates, 
whilst the opposite is true for the average share of trade tax. 
 
                                                 
92 There are not 33 years of data (1980-2012) for every country in the sample. Indeed, data for, for example 
the former Soviet states, only appears from the early 1990s. However, the patterns displayed in figures 2 and 
3 remain if the sample is restricted to average tax and average income levels from 1991-2012 for all countries 
(not shown).  
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Figure 4.6 Average GDP growth and Tax Structure variables 
4.4 Econometric Model 
 
This section outlines the econometric model used to investigate the relationship between 
tax structure and economic growth. The approach follows that of, inter alios Arnold et al. 
(2011), Xing (2011) and Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012), by considering revenue-
neutral changes in the tax structure, whilst controlling for the overall level of tax as a 
proportion of GDP. Imposing the revenue neutrality constraint allows for the consideration 
of the effects of changes in tax policy on growth, without the need to take account for how 
changes in tax policy might result from changes in government expenditure (Arnold et al., 
2011). Thus it avoids the requirement of similar levels of data on public expenditure as on 
tax revenue. Furthermore, given limitations on the availability of data on tax rates, this 
approach represents the best available proxy for the marginal tax rate which is considered 
in the relevant theoretical models (e.g. Mendoza et al., 1997). 
 
The empirical model estimated is an Error Correction Model (ECM) taking the form 
∆𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = −𝜙(𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼2ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼3𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗 𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1) 
                   +𝛽1,𝑖∆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2,𝑖∆ℎ𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3,𝑖∆𝑛𝑖,𝑡+𝛽4,𝑖∆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗∆𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡       [13] 
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where 𝑔 is the growth rate of GDP per capita, I is the investment ratio (as measured by the 
share of fixed capital formation in GDP), h is a measure of human capital (average years 
of schooling), n is the growth rate of the working age population, T is the tax ratio and TC 
is a vector of tax composition variables, namely n-1 shares of different taxes in total tax. 𝜏 
is a set of time dummies and 𝜀 is the error term. 
 
The equation, estimated by Pooled Mean Group (Pesaran et al., 1999) allows for 
simultaneous estimation of the long run coefficients and short run dynamics. The PMG 
estimator constrains long run coefficients to be equal across groups (countries), but allows 
short run coefficients and error variances to vary between groups.93 The validity of this 
assumption is tested in section 6.1 below. 
4.5 Benchmark Results 
 
The full sample of 100 countries is included in table 4.2. The sample is restricted to 
countries where there are at least 18 consecutive years of observations for all variables, 
although on average, t = 27. All regressions contain short run dynamics as in [13], but only 
the long run coefficients are shown. The revenue neutrality constraint means that the 
interpretation of the coefficient on the included tax category’s (categories’) share in total 
tax is as follows: A percentage point increase in the share of tax revenue for the included 
tax component (components), implies a percentage point reduction in the share of total 
revenue from the omitted component (components). A summary of how taxes are 
subdivided is provided in Appendix F. In columns 1 and 2, the omitted category is the share 
of consumption and property taxes. The results suggest that revenue-neutral (RN) shifts 
away from consumption and property taxes toward income taxes have a negative effect on 
the long run GDP growth rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
93 The estimations are carried out using the xtpmg command in Stata (Blackburne and Frank, 2007). Newton-
Raphson iteration is used.  
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Table 4.2 PMG Results, Full Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard Errors in Parentheses. *P<0.1; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01 
 
Specifically, the coefficient estimate suggests that for a percentage point increase in income 
taxes, offset by a percentage point reduction in consumption and property taxes, the long 
run GDP growth rate decreases by 0.062 percentage points. Column 2 disaggregates 
income taxes into personal, social contributions and corporate. Here, the results suggest 
that a RN shift from consumption and property taxes toward personal income taxes or social 
contributions reduces long run GDP growth rates by 0.068 and 0.09 percentage points 
respectively. These findings echo those of Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012) although, 
notably, the coefficient estimates here are around 50% lower in magnitude than those 
reported in their study. In column 3, income taxes are omitted. It appears that RN shifts 
away from income and toward domestic taxes on goods and services have positive effects 
on long run GDP growth rates, but RN shifts toward trade or property taxes have no 
significant effects. In column 4, the omitted category is set to consumption taxes (goods 
and services + trade) and the results again suggest that, controlling for the share of income 
taxes in total tax, shifts away from consumption toward property taxes have no statistically 
significant effect on long growth rates. This result on the role of property taxes is in direct 
contrast to that of Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012) and Arnold et al. (2011), who found 
strong positive impacts of RN shifts toward property taxes on growth and income 
respectively.  
Dependent Variable: ∆(log) GDP per capita. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Physical Capital 0.013 0.009 0.058*** 0.047** 0.058*** 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Human Capital -0.030*** -0.051*** -0.033*** -0.029*** -0.033*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Population Growth -0.423*** -0.444*** -0.504*** -0.568*** -0.504*** 
 (0.133) (0.161) (0.152) (0.143) (0.152) 
Tax / GDP 0.061** 0.096*** 0.124*** 0.092*** 0.124*** 
 (0.029) (0.008) (0.032) (0.029) (0.032) 
Tax Structure Variables     
      
Income  -0.062***   -0.047** -0.034 
 (0.018)   (0.021) (0.022) 
     PIT  -0.068**    
  (0.030)    
     Social Contributions  -0.090***    
  (0.033)    
     CIT  0.045    
  (0.031)    
Consumption & Property      
    
     Goods & Services   0.069***  0.036*** 
   (0.021)  (0.012) 
     Trade    0.034   
   (0.022)   
     Property    0.058 -0.015 0.024 
   (0.076) (0.077) (0.076) 
Omitted Tax Variable Consumption & Property  Income Consumption  Trade 
Observations 2657 1802 2290 2296 2290 
Groups 100 68 84 84 84 
Stationarity:  I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) 
5-Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Column 5 omits trade taxes, seeking to elicit the effect of a RN shift away from trade toward 
either income, property or domestic consumption taxes. This coefficient of 0.036 on 
domestic goods and services suggests that RN shifts away from trade toward domestic 
consumption taxes have had modestly positive effects on GDP growth rates. This result is 
intriguing, especially in light of the patterns in tax structure observed and discussed above, 
that showed that for many countries, shifts away from trade toward domestic consumption 
taxes have been the major structural change over the last 30 years.  All specifications were 
tested for residual nonstationarity, by an Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test.94 As shown 
in table 2 , for all specifications the null of nonstationary residuals was rejected at the 5% 
level; in the majority of cases the null was also rejected at the 1% level.  
 
In table 4.3, the same specifications are run, but the sample is separated into high, upper-
middle, lower-middle and low income according to the World Bank’s 2016 income 
classification. Column 1 shows that there are statistically significant negative effects on 
growth rates form RN shifts toward income taxes in high-income countries – to the tune of 
around 0.1 percentage points for a 1 percentage point increase. Disaggregating into PIT, 
Social Contributions and CIT, it actually appears that RN shifts away from consumption 
and property, toward corporate income taxes, have positive effects on long run growth rates 
in high income countries. This result conflicts with both theory and some existing empirical 
evidence. Columns 3 and 4 suggest that there are positive effects on long run GDP growth 
rates of RN increases in property taxes: a RN percentage point shift away from either 
consumption or income taxes leads to an increase in GDP growth rates of around 0.3%. 
This result affirms that presented in Arnold et al. (2011) and Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo 
(2012), which found positive effects of RN shifts toward property taxes in OECD and ‘high 
income’ countries respectively. Whilst a 0.3% increase in long run GDP growth rates might 
sound quite high, it is worth noting that a revenue-neutral shift toward property taxes of 1 
percentage point would be extreme in any one year: the average change in property tax’s 
share of total tax for high income countries was just 0.02% of total tax revenue. There are 
no significant effects of RN shifts from trade taxes toward taxes on goods and services in 
high income countries. However, this result is not surprising; figure 2 highlighted that there 
has been little change in the share of taxes coming from trade toward goods and services in 
this group of high income countries. 
 
                                                 
94 This test was carried out using the pescadf routine in Stata (Lewandowski, 2007). Output not shown. 
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Turning to upper-middle income countries, the estimates in column 6 clearly suggest that 
a percentage point shift toward income taxes away from consumption taxes is harmful for 
long run growth rates, to the tune of around 0.15 percentage points. Disaggregating income 
taxes (column 7) shows that the negative effects from social contributions and personal 
income taxes are again stronger than those from corporate income taxes. Interestingly, 
shifts toward property taxes from either income or consumption taxes also appear to have 
negative effects on GDP growth rates. Column 10 also suggests that RN shifts away from 
trade toward income taxes are harmful for growth, but those toward taxes on domestic 
goods and services are neither positively or negatively related to growth rates. Interestingly, 
it appears that RN increases in property taxes are actually harmful for economic growth in 
upper-middle income countries. 
  
Columns 11-15 display the results for lower-middle income countries.95 Intriguingly, RN 
shifts in tax structure toward income taxes do not appear to have any significant negative 
effects on long run GDP growth in this subsample; indeed the results in column 15 suggest 
that RN increases in income taxes offset by reductions in trade taxes might have positive 
effects on long run growth rates. The results in columns 13-15 suggest that RN shifts away 
from either income or consumption taxes, toward property taxes, again have negative 
effects on GDP growth rates. Specifically, the coefficient estimate points to around a 0.8-
1.1% decrease in long run GDP growth rates for a percentage point increase in the share of 
taxes coming from property taxes. Column 15 shows that RN shifts toward domestic goods 
and services, offset by decreases in trade taxes, have positive effects on long run economic 
growth. Looking at the other country income groups, it would seem that this group of lower-
middle income was driving the result in column 5 of table 4.2.
                                                 
95 It was not possible to obtain results for the disaggregated income tax categories for low and lower-middle 
income countries. The majority of data in the GRD for these countries comes from IMF Article IV Country 
Reports, where the level of disaggregation reported can fluctuate wildly between countries and over time for 
the same country. Often there is only one ‘Income Tax’ figure reported.  
  
1
1
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   Table 4.3 PMG results, by income group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Standard errors in parentheses; *P<0.1; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01 
 
 
  High Income  Upper-Middle Income 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Physical Capital -0.082** -0.036 0.017 -0.021 0.017 -0.141** -0.158*** -0.091** -0.136*** -0.091** 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.049) (0.036) (0.039) (0.036) 
Human Capital -0.140*** -0.161*** -0.100*** -0.122*** -0.100 0.640** 0.030 0.067*** 0.072*** 0.067*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.030) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Population Growth -0.632*** -0.888*** -0.830*** -0.820*** -0.830*** 1.573*** 2.158*** 2.049*** 1.688*** 2.049*** 
 (0.190) (0.187) (0.212) (0.214) (0.212) (0.265) (0.286) (0.220) (0.255) (0.220) 
Tax / GDP 0.213** 0.198*** 0.195*** 0.203*** 0.195*** 0.142** 0.122* 0.239*** 0.180*** 0.239*** 
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.056) (0.072) (0.054) (0.059) (0.054) 
Tax Structure Variables           
           
Income  -0.101***   -0.024 -0.122* -0.154***   -0.170*** -0.142*** 
 (0.035)   (0.037) (0.068) (0.033)   (0.034) (0.036) 
     PIT  -0.113**     -0.348***    
  (0.048)     (0.079)    
     Social Contributions  -0.120**     -0.303***    
  (0.47)     (0.064)    
     CIT  0.163***     -0.056    
  (0.052)     (0.056)    
Consumption & Property           
          
     Goods & Services   0.023  -0.099   0.120***  -0.022 
   (0.036)  (0.064)   (0.036)  (0.034) 
     Trade Taxes   0.122*     0.142***   
   (0.068)     (0.036)   
     Property Taxes   0.293*** 0.327*** 0.171   -0.345* -0.630*** -0.487*** 
   (0.095) (0.100) (0.112)   (0.184) (0.184) (0.181) 
Omitted Tax Variable Consumption & Property Income Consumption Trade Consumption & Property Income Consumption Trade 
Observations 1202 1033 1121 1123 1121 695 377 663 663 663 
Groups 42 36 38 38 38 27 16 26 26 26 
5-Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
1
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   Table 4.3 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Standard errors in parentheses; *P<0.1; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01
 Lower-Middle Income Low Income 
 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Physical Capital 0.117*** - -0.016 0.115*** -0.016 0.152*** - 0.213*** 0.132*** 0.213*** 
 (0.027) - (0.016) (0.025) (0.016) (0.056) - (0.064) (0.057) (0.064) 
Human Capital -0.039*** - -0.004 -0.035 -0.004 0.044* - 0.043 0.047*** 0.043 
 (0.012) - (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.025) - (0.028) (0.025) (0.028) 
Population Growth -1.133*** - 0.421*** -1.091*** 0.421*** 0.049 - 0.421 0.298 0.421 
 (0.295) - (0.101) (0.272) (0.101) (0.303) - (0.346) (0.320) (0.346) 
Tax / GDP -0.024 - 0.071*** 0.002 0.071*** -0.241* - -0.313** -0.272** -0.313** 
 (0.041) - (0.020) (0.039) (0.020) (0.132) - (0.142) (0.130) (0.142) 
Tax Structure Variables           
           
Income  0.001   0.016 0.081*** -0.120**   -0.173*** -0.193*** 
 (0.030)   (0.030) (0.023) (0.052)   (0.060) (0.064) 
     PIT  -     -    
  -     -    
     Social Contributions  -     -    
  -     -    
     CIT  -     -    
  -     -    
Consumption & Property           
          
     Goods & Services   -0.041  0.040***   0.205***  0.011 
   (0.026)  (0.011)   (0.068)  (0.026) 
     Trade    -0.081***     0.193***   
   (0.023)     (0.064)   
     Property    -1.109*** -0.822*** -1.028***   -0.271 -0.490** -0.465* 
   (0.278) (0.242) (0.274)   (0.226) (0.235) (0.247) 
Omitted Tax Variable Consumption & Property Income Consumption Trade Consumption & Property Income Consumption Trade 
Observations 374 - 359 360 359 386 - 383 383 383 
Groups 16 - 15 15 15 15 - 15 15 15 
5-Year Dummies  Yes - Yes Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes Yes 
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Results for low income countries are shown in columns 16-20. The results here suggest that 
RN shifts away from consumption and toward income taxes again lead to lower long run 
GDP growth rates. RN shifts away from trade taxes, toward taxes on goods and services 
appear to have no statistically significant positive effect on GDP growth rates. This is, 
again, intriguing, considering that the data and graphs presented above suggest that the 
largest structural shifts away from trade toward taxes on goods and services occurred in 
those countries classed as low income. Revenue – neutral increases in property taxes, offset 
by decreases elsewhere, again appear to have negative effects on long run GDP growth 
rates.  
4.5.1 Formal tests of differences in coefficients between subsamples. 
 
The regression results above in Table 4.3 have shown that for different subsamples, the 
coefficients on key tax share variables have different magnitudes and occasionally different 
signs, depending on income group. This section presents a set of simple Wald tests to 
examine whether or not the differences between coefficients across income groups are 
statistically significant. It is, unfortunately, not possible to carry out this analysis using the 
PMG procedure as above; the approach followed involves adding dummy variables for 
each income group and interaction terms with the parameters of interest – dummy variables 
are, by nature, omitted from any panel data analyses and to include the additional 
parameters into a PMG specification causes the estimator to fail to converge. Thus I turn 
to a simple OLS regression.96  
 
Table 4.4 replicates table 4.2, including dummy variables for three of the four income 
groups and interactions with the tax structure variables of interest.   
 
A simple Wald test of the following null hypothesis is carried out: 
 
                         𝐻0: 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝛽4                [14] 
 
where 𝛽1 … … 𝛽4 refers to the coefficient on the interaction between the dummy and tax 
share variables for low, lower middle, upper middle and high income groups respectively.  
 
                                                 
96 It should be noted that when the regressions presented above are run via OLS, the majority of coefficients 
have the same sign and are of similar magnitude.  
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Table 4.4 Replication of Table 4.3, including tests for significant differences between 
estimated tax structure coefficients across income groups.  
Dependent Variable: ∆(log) GDP per capita. SR dynamics and time controls included but not shown. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Physical Capital 0.106*** 0.075*** 0.109*** 0.110*** 0.109*** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
Human Capital 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Population Growth -0.213 -0.166 -0.172 -0.233* -0.172 
 (0.154) (0.229) (0.156) (0.138) (0.156) 
Tax / GDP -0.007 0.015 0.001 -0.006 0.001 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
Income  -0.038***   -0.040*** -0.029 
 (0.010)   (0.010) (0.018) 
     PIT  -0.052***    
  (0.012)    
     Social Contributions  0.014    
  (0.010)    
     CIT  0.008    
  (0.020)    
Consumption & Property      
    
     Goods & Services   0.047***  0.018 
   (0.011)  (0.018) 
     Trade    0.029   
   (0.018)   
     Property    0.048 -0.003 0.019 
   (0.032) (0.028) (0.031) 
LI Dummy 0.016 0.019* -0.088*** 0.028** 0.023 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.027) (0.013) (0.022) 
LMI Dummy -0.017** -0.016** 0.034** -0.017** -0.012 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.018) 
UMI Dummy -0.017** -0.004 0.016 -0.018** -0.010 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.017) 
LI Dummy*Income -0.078**   -0.102*** -0.111*** 
 (0.033)   (0.037) (0.042) 
LMI Dummy*Income 0.048**   0.051*** 0.045* 
 (0.019)   (0.019) (0.024) 
UMI Dummy*Income 0.032**   0.028* 0.026 
 (0.015)   (0.015) (0.022) 
LI Dummy*PIT  -0.116**    
  (0.051)    
LMI Dummy*PIT  0.044**    
  (0.023)    
UMI Dummy*PIT  0.020    
  (0.020)    
LI Dummy*SC  -0.828**    
  (0.391)    
LMI Dummy*SC  0.025    
  (0.043)    
UMI Dummy*SC  -0.037*    
  (0.021)    
LI Dummy*CIT  -0.080    
  (0.077)    
LMI Dummy*CIT  0.073    
  (0.032)    
UMI Dummy*CIT  -0.041    
  (0.031)    
LI Dummy*G&S   0.134***  0.023 
   (0.040)  (0.025) 
LMI Dummy*G&S   -0.048**  -0.002 
   (0.022)  (0.023) 
UMI Dummy*G&S   -0.036**  -0.011 
   (0.017)  (0.021) 
LI Dummy*Trade   0.111***   
   (0.042)   
LMI Dummy*Trade   -0.045*   
   (0.024)   
UMI Dummy*Trade   -0.026    
   (0.021)   
LI Dummy*Property   -0.418 -0.500 -0.529 
   (0.377) (0.390) (0.397) 
LMI Dummy*Property   -0.171 -0.074 -0.126 
   (0.140) (0.140) (0.143) 
UMI Dummy*Property   0.056 0.118 0.081 
  (0.084) (0.075) (0.076) 
Omitted Tax Variable Consumption & Property  Income Consumption Trade 
Observations 2657 2063 2594 2650 2594 
Standard errors in parentheses. *P>0.1; **P>0.05 ;***P>0.01 
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The results of the Wald Test for each specification (denoted ‘Column 1’ – ‘Column 5’) are 
provided in Table 4.5. I fail to reject H0 in column 1, suggesting that the heterogeneous 
effects of revenue neutral increases in income tax across income groups are indeed 
statistically different from one another (this result also emerges in columns 4 and 5, where 
income taxes are included). When income taxes are disaggregated into PIT, social 
contributions and CIT in column 2, the coefficient estimates on CIT are statistically 
different from one another at the 1% level, whilst those on PIT and social contributions are 
statistically different at the 5% level. In column 3, the coefficients on taxes on goods and 
services are, again statistically different from one another. The same is true for taxes on 
trade. However, these tests suggest that the effects of property tax on GDP growth rates are 
not statistically different from one another across subsamples.  
 
Table 4.5 Results of Wald test 
Column Column 1  Significance 
1 (1)  Low income dummy * Income tax share = 0 
(2)  Lower middle income dummy * Income tax share = 0 
(3)  Upper middle income dummy * Income tax share = 0 
F (3, 2634) = 5.87 
Prob > F = 0.0005 
*** 
2 (1)  Low income dummy * Corporate income tax share = 0 
(2)  Lower middle income dummy * Corporate income tax share = 0 
(3)  Upper middle income dummy * Corporate income tax share = 0 
F (3, 2030) = 3.85 
Prob > F = 0.0092 
*** 
2 (1)  Low income dummy * Personal income tax share = 0 
(2)  Lower middle income dummy * Personal income tax share = 0 
(3)  Upper middle income dummy * Personal income tax share = 0 
F (3, 2030) = 3.06 
Prob > F = 0.0272 
** 
2 (1)  Low income dummy * Social Contributions share = 0 
(2)  Lower middle income dummy * Social Contributions share = 0 
(3)  Upper middle income dummy * Social Contributions share = 0 
F (3, 2030) =    2.62 
Prob > F = 0.0493 
** 
3 (1)  Low income dummy * Goods & Services share = 0 
(2)  Lower middle income dummy * Goods & Services share = 0 
(3)  Upper middle income dummy * Goods & Services share = 0 
F (3, 2561) = 7.11 
Prob > F = 0.0001 
*** 
3 (1)  Low income dummy * Trade share = 0  
(2)  Lower middle income dummy * Trade share = 0 
(3)  Upper middle income dummy * Trade share = 0 
F (3, 2561) = 5.70 
Prob > F = 0.0007 
*** 
3 (1)  Low income dummy * Property tax share = 0 
(2)  Lower middle income dummy * Property tax share = 0 
(3)  Upper middle income dummy * Property tax share = 0 
F (3, 2561) = 1.16 
Prob > F = 0.3236 
 
4 (1)  Low income dummy * Income tax share = 0 
(2)  Lower middle income dummy * Income tax share = 0 
(3)  Upper middle income dummy * Income tax share = 0 
F (3, 2622) = 6.23 
Prob > F = 0.0003 
*** 
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4 (1)  Low income dummy * Property tax share = 0 
(2)  Lower middle income dummy * Property tax share = 0 
(3)  Upper middle income dummy * Property tax share = 0 
F (3, 2622) = 1.50 
Prob > F = 0.2120 
 
5 (1)  Low income dummy * Income tax share = 0 
(2)  Lower middle income dummy * Income tax share = 0 
(3)  Upper middle income dummy * Income tax share = 0 
F (3, 2561) = 5.70 
Prob > F = 0.0007 
*** 
5 (1)  Low income dummy * Tax on Goods & Services share = 0 
(2)  Lower middle income dummy * Tax on Goods & Services share = 0 
(3)  Upper middle income dummy * Tax on Goods & Services share = 0 
F (3, 2561) = 0.93 
Prob > F = 0.4230 
 
5 (1)  Low income dummy * Property tax share = 0 
(2)  Lower middle income dummy * Property tax share = 0 
(3)  Upper middle income dummy * Property tax share = 0 
F (3, 2561) = 1.32 
Prob > F = 0.2676 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. *P>0.1; **P>0.05; ***P>0.01 
 
Thus, the Wald test results are indicative that the main differences in subsamples discussed 
above are in fact statistically significant, with the exception of property taxes. 
4.5.2 Testing validity of Parameter restrictions 
 
The PMG approach used to estimate equation [13] allows for heterogeneous short run 
effects across countries, but constrains the long run coefficients to be equal. That is, it 
assumes that the long run relationship between GDP growth and the independent variables 
is the same across countries. The assumption of long run parameter homogeneity (i.e. that 
all countries in the sample grow in a similar fashion over time) might be valid for similar 
groups of countries, such as OECD, or those that form a trading bloc etc. but may not hold 
across the sample as a whole. It is, however, possible to test the validity of this assumption 
using the Hausman test to compare the PMG estimates with alternative options. The Mean 
Group estimator (MG) allows for full parameter heterogeneity; that is, a separate regression 
is estimated for each group (country) and an average reported. At the other end of the scale, 
dynamic fixed effects estimation (DFE) constrains all short and long run coefficients to be 
equal across countries. The estimator employed here, PMG, lies between the two, allowing 
short run dynamics to vary across countries, whilst constraining the long run coefficients 
to be equal. Table 4.6 summarises: 
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Table 4.6 Parameter restrictions for different estimators 
Estimator SR Coefficients LR Coefficients 
Mean Group (MG) Heterogeneous Heterogeneous 
Pooled Mean Group (PMG) Heterogeneous Homogenous 
Dynamic Fixed Effects (DFE) Homogenous Homogenous 
 
Table 4.7 displays the coefficients of the tax share variables estimated via both PMG and 
MG (the different specifications here pertain to those in table 4.2) and the resulting 
Hausman test statistic. In all specifications, the results suggest that the PMG estimator is 
preferred over the MG. Thus the restriction of parameter homogeneity appears valid, with 
the PMG procedure producing estimates that are both efficient and consistent.97 
Furthermore, the coefficient estimates for some of tax share variables in the MG regressions 
seem implausibly high. When tested against the DFE estimator, the Hausman test suggested 
that the PMG estimator be preferred (for the sake of brevity these results are not shown.) 
Thus it appears that the assumptions underlying the PMG approach are satisfactory for all 
specifications.98  
 
Table 4.7 Hausman test: MG v PMG 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
97 One caveat that should be noted, however, is that the power of the Hausman Test in this case (i.e. comparing 
MG and PMG) is relatively low (Pesaran, 1999).  
98 An earlier version of this study (McNabb and LeMay-Boucher, 2014) employd the mean group estimator, 
however this choice was driven by data availability at the time. The latest version of the GRD contains a 
substantially more complete series for many countries, thus making estimation via PMG possible. 
  MG PMG 
Specification 1      
Income taxes -0.174 -0.062*** 
  (0.103) (0.018) 
Hausman Test: Chi2 (5): 1.08; P=0.956    
Specification 2      
PIT -0.393 -0.068** 
  (0.230) (0.03) 
SC -2.627 -0.090*** 
  (2.263) (0.033) 
CIT 0.297 0.045 
  (0.157) (0.031) 
Hausman Test: Chi2 (7):  2.16; P=0.950   
Specification 3     
GS 0.701 0.069*** 
  (0.486) (0.021) 
Trade 0.231 0.034 
  (0.417) (0.022) 
Property -12.977 0.058 
  (11.745) (0.076) 
Hausman Test: Chi2 (7): 0.054; P=0.999 
Specification 4     
Income -0.114 -0.047*** 
  (0.093) (0.021) 
Property -16.102 -0.015 
  (0.015) (0.077) 
Hausman Test: Chi2 (6): 0.76; P=0.993   
Specification 5     
Income -0.249 -0.034 
  (0.422) (0.022) 
GS 0.459 0.036*** 
  (0.676) (0.012) 
Property -13.025 0.024 
  (11.696) (0.076) 
Hausman Test: Chi2 (7): 3.59; P=0.825   
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4.5.3 Alternative time controls 
 
The benchmark results presented above include five year dummies as time controls, in 
order to capture the effects of the business cycle.99 Work by Xing (2011), which challenged 
the results presented in Arnold et al. (2011), suggested that results from the PMG estimator 
may be sensitive to how the time controls are specified. An alternative approach, taken by 
Acosta-Ormaechea & Yoo (2012) is to include country-specific linear time trends. A 
replication of table 4.2, using a linear time trend instead of 5-year dummies is included in 
Appendix G. The majority of results presented above are robust to this alternative time 
control, with most differences occurring only in the magnitude of coefficient. However, the 
results presented in tables 4.2 and 4.3 are strongly preferred; it is the standard approach, 
where growth is the dependent variable, to include some control for the business cycle – a 
linear trend cannot do this as effectively as the five-year dummy variables. 
4.5.4 Addressing Potential Endogeneity concerns  
 
The primary concern with regards endogeneity in this type of model results from the fact 
that changes in the tax level, or indeed the tax structure, might arise from changes in GDP 
growth rates. This study does not attempt to ascribe any interpretation on the tax ratio 
variable, for not only this reason, but also those outlined above in section 4.2. However, it 
is necessary to (attempt to) rule out the possibility that changes in the tax structure are 
driven by changes in GDP growth rates. Considering the regression framework here, 
simultaneity bias might not appear to be a large concern. The dependent variable is the 
growth rate of log GDP per capita, from t-1 to t; the independent variables are all measured 
at t-1. It is thus unclear how the rate of growth in a future period might drive the share of 
revenue from a certain tax in the previous year.  
 
A potential source of endogeneity arises from the fact that different taxes’ share of total 
revenue (i.e. the variables of interest here) may react to a change in the level of economic 
activity in different sectors, which result from some reason other than a change in the tax 
rate. For example, the share of taxes collected from trade may increase relative to other 
categories simply as a result of an increase in the volume of trade, regardless of the rate of 
the taxes levied on imports. In turn, this will also affect GDP growth. The volume of trade 
openness is included as an additional control in tables 4.8 & 4.9. This is calculated, 
                                                 
99 These are specified as 1980-84, 1985-89, … ..., 2010-2014. 
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following Arnold (2008), by obtaining the residuals from a regression of the volume of 
trade (the sum of the value of imports and exports, expressed as a percentage of GDP) on 
log population. This therefore represents the part of trade that is not simply explained by 
country size. For the sake of brevity, only the base specification where consumption and 
property taxes are excluded and that excluding trade taxes are shown (pertaining to columns 
1 and 5 of table 4.2).  
 
All of the aforementioned results hold, with any changes purely in the magnitude of the 
coefficients. Column 4 of table 4.8 suggests that RN increases in income taxes, offset by 
reductions in trade taxes are now statistically negatively related to long run GDP growth 
rates. Turning to table 4.9 column 4, the results now suggest that for high income countries, 
RN increases in domestic consumption, offset by decreases in trade taxes are harmful for 
growth. In upper middle income countries, the coefficient on property taxes becomes 
insignificant (column 8). 
 
 Table 4.8 Full sample, including openness to trade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses; *P<0.1; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ∆(log) GDP per capita. 
 1 2 3 4 
Physical Capital 0.013 0.009 0.058*** 0.078*** 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) 
Human Capital -0.030*** -0.048*** -0.033*** -0.036*** 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.013) 
Population Growth -0.423*** 0.467** -0.504*** 0.777*** 
 (0.133) (0.208) (0.152) (0.210) 
Tax / GDP 0.061** 0.070** 0.124*** 0.149*** 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.032) (0.028) 
Tax Structure Variables     
     
Income  -0.062*** -0.105*** -0.034 -0.075*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.0230 
     PIT     
     
     Social Contributions     
     
     CIT     
     
Consumption & Property     
   
     Goods & Services   0.036*** 0.032*** 
   (0.012) (0.012) 
     Trade      
     
     Property    0.024 0.096 
   (0.076) (0.077) 
Openness  0.002  -0.001 
  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Omitted Tax Variable Consumption & Property  Trade 
Observations 2657 2657 2290 2274 
Groups 100 100 84 83 
5-Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
 
1
1
9
 
    Table 4.9 Results by Income Group, including openness to trade.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Standard errors in parentheses; *P<0.1; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01 
 
 
 High Income Upper- Middle Income 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Physical Capital -0.082** -0.065* 0.017 0.044 -0.141** -0.051* -0.091** -0.003 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.027) (0.036) (0.032) 
Human Capital -0.140*** -0.080*** -0.100 -0.038 0.640** -0.024 0.067*** 0.094*** 
 (0.019) (0.025) (0.020) (0.026) (0.025) (0.033) (0.025) (0.035) 
Population Growth -0.632*** -0.097 -0.830*** 0.301*** 1.573*** 0.869*** 2.049*** 1.915*** 
 (0.190) (0.357) (0.212) (0.373) (0.265) (0.319) (0.220) (0.337) 
Tax / GDP 0.213** 0.174*** 0.195*** 0.150*** 0.142** -0.129*** 0.239*** 0.201*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.056) (0.048) (0.054) (0.050) 
Tax Structure Variables         
         
Income taxes -0.101*** -0.104*** -0.122* -0.135** -0.154*** -0.223*** -0.142*** -0.173** 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.068) (0.068) (0.033) (0.032) (0.036) (0.036) 
     PIT         
         
     Social Contributions         
         
     CIT         
         
Consumption & Property          
        
     Goods & Services   -0.099 -0.124**   -0.022 -0.007 
   (0.064) (0.063)   (0.034) (0.032) 
     Trade         
         
     Property   0.171 0.128   -0.487*** -0.269 
   (0.112) (0.114)   (0.181) (0.162) 
Openness  -0.007**  -0.005  -0.006  -0.739** 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.296)  (0.320) 
         
Omitted Tax Variable Consumption & Property  Trade Consumption & Property  Trade 
Observations 1202 1202 1121 1121 695 695 663 637 
Groups 42 42 38 38 27 27 26 24 
5-Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
 
1
2
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Table 4.9 (Continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses; *P<0.1; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01
 Lower-Middle Income Low Income 
 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Physical Capital 0.117*** 0.168*** -0.016 0.105*** 0.152*** 0.176*** 0.213*** 0.158** 
 (0.027) (0.029) (0.016) (0.028) (0.056) (0.061) (0.064) (0.037) 
Human Capital -0.039*** 0.020 -0.004 -0.052*** 0.044* -0.115*** 0.043 -0.130*** 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.006) (0.012) (0.025) (0.041) (0.028) (0.039) 
Population Growth -1.133*** -0.265 0.421*** -0.365 0.049 0.475 0.421 -3.010*** 
 (0.295) (0.428) (0.101) (0.253) (0.303) (0.579) (0.346) (0.447) 
Tax / GDP -0.024 0.050 0.071*** 0.119*** -0.241* -0.156 -0.313** 0.226** 
 (0.041) (0.050) (0.020) (0.041) (0.132) (0.127) (0.142) (0.111) 
Tax Structure Variables         
         
Income  0.001 0.029 0.081*** 0.062** -0.120** -0.138*** -0.193*** -0.258*** 
 (0.030) (0.027) (0.023) (0.025) (0.052) (0.049) (0.064) (0.032) 
     PIT         
         
     Social Contributions         
         
     CIT         
         
Consumption & Property          
        
     Goods & Services   0.040*** 0.050***   0.011 -0.051*** 
   (0.011) (0.010)   (0.026) (0.020) 
     Trade          
         
     Property    -1.028*** -0.865***   -0.465* -0.554*** 
   (0.274) (0.282)   (0.247) (0.222) 
Openness  -0.933***  0.001  1.203***  1.309 
  (0.244)  (0.002)  (0.345)  (0.231) 
         
Omitted Tax Variable Consumption & Property  Trade Consumption & Property Trade 
Observations 359 359 359 359 386 386 383 383 
Groups 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
5-Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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The regression framework employed here includes short run dynamics and 5-year 
dummies, both of which should aid in accounting for effects of the business cycle. 
However, a further way in which it is possible to test for the presence of endogeneity 
(outlined in Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012), which itself follows an approach outlined 
in Calderon et al. (2011)) is as follows. In order to test if the tax variables considered here 
are weakly exogenous, the following system of equations is estimated separately for each 
country, i, included in the specifications above.100  
 
∆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜙𝑖 (𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 − ?̂?1𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 − ?̂?2ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 − ?̂?3𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 − ?̂?4𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 − ∑ 𝛼?̂? 𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
∆𝐼𝑁𝐶 = 𝜙𝑖 (𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 − ?̂?1𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 − ?̂?2ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 − ?̂?3𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 − ?̂?4𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 − ∑ ?̂?𝑗 𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
∆𝐺𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜙𝑖 (𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 − ?̂?1𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 − ?̂?2ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 − ?̂?3𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 − ?̂?4𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 − ∑ ?̂?𝑗 𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
∆𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜙𝑖 (𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 − ?̂?1𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 − ?̂?2ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 − ?̂?3𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 − ?̂?4𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 − ∑ ?̂?𝑗 𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
∆𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜙𝑖 (𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 − ?̂?1𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 − ?̂?2ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 − ?̂?3𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 − ?̂?4𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 − ∑ ?̂?𝑗 𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
𝜙𝑖 represents the error correction component and each of the terms in parentheses are the 
long run equilibrium errors resulting from the estimation of equation [13]. This system of 
equations is estimated by Zellner’s (1962) seemingly unrelated regression equations 
(SURE) method, via the sureg command in Stata. For weak exogeneity to hold, it is 
required that the 𝜙𝑖 coefficients are not significantly different from zero. A Wald test is 
carried out following the SURE regression for each country. If the null hypothesis (that the 
coefficients on 𝜙𝑖 are jointly zero) is rejected at the 5% level, then this suggests that the 
tax variables under consideration (i.e. the left hand side variables in equation [15]) do in 
fact react to deviations from the long run relationship (Acosta Ormaechea and Yoo, 2012). 
As such the weak exogeneity condition is violated in these countries. Depending on the 
specification tested, between 17 and 24 countries violate the condition of weak exogeneity. 
Tables 4.10 and 4.11 replicate the results of tables 4.2 and 4.3 respectively, omitting those 
countries where the tax policy variables cannot be considered weakly exogenous. It was 
                                                 
100 The number of equations estimated depends on the exact specification of equation [13] being estimated. 
[15] 
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not possible to replicate all specifications by country group in table 4.11; due to the smaller 
N dimension, the PMG estimator did not always converge.  
 
The results in table 4.10 are largely in line with those in table 4.2, although some 
differences are notable. The coefficient on income taxes in column 1 is smaller in 
magnitude and no longer statistically significant. In column 2, the finding that RN increases 
in personal income taxes, offset by reductions in consumption or property taxes are 
statistically negatively associated with long run GDP growth rates remains. However, the 
coefficient on social contributions is no longer significant and interestingly, there again 
appears to be some evidence that RN increases in CIT actually have positive effects on 
long run growth rates.101 The result in column 5, that RN increases in domestic 
consumption taxes offset by decreases in trade taxes is good for growth, also holds 
following the exclusion of the potentially endogenous countries. However, the coefficient 
estimate is again lower.  
 
Turning to the high income countries in table 4.11, the results suggest that RN shifts toward 
income taxes are no longer significantly negatively related with long run GDP growth. The 
results that RN shifts toward property taxes, from either consumption or income taxes, are 
positively associated with LR growth rates, all remain.  
 
The findings for upper-middle income countries are very similar to those in table 4.3; again, 
RN shifts toward property taxes appear to be negatively related with long run GDP growth 
rates (column 7), although the coefficient is somewhat smaller. Columns 9-12 show that 
the results for lower-middle income countries also remain robust; the key finding, that RN 
increases in domestic consumption taxes offset by decreases in trade taxes are positively 
associated with long run GDP growth rates, still holds, though the coefficient estimate is 
now over twice that reported in table 4.3. There are no notable differences observed 
between table 3 and table 10 for low income countries, aside from small variations in some 
coefficient estimates and the significance level of some of the tax variables in column 14.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
101 However, this result does not hold following further checks where both (i) the potentially endogenous 
countries were excluded and (ii) the openness variable was included. Thus it is difficult to draw any concrete 
conclusions from this particular result. 
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Table 4.10 Replication of Table 4.2, excluding countries identified as potentially  
endogenous 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
     Standard errors in parentheses; *P<0.1; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ∆(log) GDP per capita. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Physical Capital 0.030 0.032 -0.012 0.050** 0.068*** 
 (0.020) (0.025) (0.017) (0.021) (0.022) 
Human Capital -0.041*** -0.025* 0.007 -0.031*** -0.041*** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) 
Population Growth -0.415** -0.163 0.425*** -0.628*** -0.602*** 
 (0.133) (0.193) (0.108) (0.165) (0.180) 
Tax / GDP 0.025 0.017 0.098*** 0.081*** 0.070** 
 (0.031) (0.036) (0.022) (0.031) (0.034) 
Tax Structure Variables      
      
Income  -0.020   -0.040* -0.031 
 (0.021)   (0.023) (0.026) 
     PIT  -0.086**    
  (0.037)    
     Social Contributions  -0.032    
  (0.042)    
     CIT  0.146***    
  (0.039)    
Consumption & Property       
     
     Goods & Services   0.012  0.026*** 
   (0.024)  (0.017) 
     Trade    -0.039   
   (0.024)   
Property    0.189* 0.114 0.164 
   (0.098) (0.092) (0.099) 
Omitted Tax Variable Consumption & Property  Income Consumption  Trade 
Observations 2001 1273 1719 1812 1745 
Groups 76 48 63 66 64 
5-Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
1
2
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     Table 4.11 Replication of Table 4.3, excluding countries identified as potentially endogenous 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Standard errors in parentheses; *P<0.1; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: ∆(log) GDP 
per capita. 
High Income Upper-Middle Income 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Physical Capital -0.060 0.039 -0.025 0.027 -0.132*** -0.003 -0.099** 0.003 
 (0.045) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.042) (0.042) (0.049) (0.042) 
Human Capital -0.118*** -0.085*** -0.121*** -0.089 0.057* 0.110** 0.074 0.110** 
 (0.025) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.030) (0.055) (0.046) (0.055) 
Population Growth -0.617** -0.937*** -0.897*** -0.923*** 1.801*** 2.248*** 2.069*** 2.248*** 
 (0.264) (0.240) (0.237) (0.244) (0.269) (0.205) (0.275) (0.205) 
Tax / GDP 0.142** 0.120** 0.184*** 0.109** 0.147** 0.308*** 0.191*** 0.308*** 
 (0.057) (0.054) (0.052) (0.054) (0.057) (0.065) (0.073) (0.065) 
Tax Structure Variables         
         
Income taxes -0.307  0.016 -0.028 -0.131***  -0.227*** -0.261*** 
 (0.040)  (0.040) (0.078) (0.036)  (0.061) (0.055) 
     PIT         
         
     Social Contributions         
         
     CIT         
         
Consumption & Property          
        
     Goods & Services  0.009  0.022  0.173***  -0.088* 
  (0.039)  (0.073)  (0.061)  (0.047) 
     Trade   0.059    0.261***   
  (0.076)    (0.055)   
    Property   0.393*** 0.471*** 0.442***  0.549** -0.149*** 0.288*** 
  (0.125) (0.124) (0.152)  (0.268) (0.227) (0.264) 
Omitted Tax Variable Consumption 
& Property 
Income Consumption Trade Consumption 
& Property 
Income Consumption Trade 
Observations 902 850 921 834 511 288 289 288 
Groups 32 29 31 29 20 11 11 11 
5-Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
1
2
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     Table 4.11 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Standard errors in parentheses; *P<0.1; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01 
Dependent Variable: ∆(log) 
GDP per capita. 
Lower-Middle Income Low Income 
 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Physical Capital 0.118*** -0.011 0.117*** -0.009 0.144** 0.282*** 0.156** 0.266*** 
 (0.027) (0.022) (0.026) (0.022) (0.062) (0.074) (0.066) (0.068) 
Human Capital -0.045*** -0.011 -0.025 -0.005 0.091*** 0.057 0.070** 0.026 
 (0.015) (0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.034) (0.039) (0.034) (0.028) 
Population Growth -1.511*** 0.379*** -1.642*** 0.416*** -0.141 0.287 0.356 0.706* 
 (0.355) (0.103) (0.351) (0.118) (0.477) (0.507) (0.469) (0.419) 
Tax / GDP -0.024 0.083*** 0.022 0.106*** -0.259 -0.241 -0.229 -0.225 
 (0.044) (0.026) (0.042) (0.028) (0.165) (0.181) (0.167) (0.152) 
Tax Structure Variables         
         
Income taxes 0.016  -0.018 0.104*** -0.170**  -0.126* -0.205*** 
 (0.036)  (0.030) (0.029) (0.068)  (0.071) (0.067) 
     PIT         
         
     Social Contributions         
         
     CIT         
         
Consumption and Property          
         
          Goods & Services  -0.070**  0.084***  0.156*  0.011 
  (0.026)  (0.024)  (0.084)  (0.026) 
          Trade   -0.131***    0.125   
  (0.027)    (0.080)   
          Property   -0.722*** -0.787*** -0.579**  0.623* 0.281 -0.485** 
  (0.279) (0.259) (0.289)  (0.312) (0.304) (0.247) 
Omitted Tax Variable Consumption 
& Property 
Income Consumption Trade Consumption 
& Property 
Income Consumption 
& Property 
Trade 
Observations 304 268 291 290 275 304 307 333 
Groups 13 11 12 12 11 12 12 13 
5-Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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4.5.5 Accounting for Cross Sectional Dependence  
 
A further source of bias that might arise in a macro panel such as that used here is via 
residual cross-section dependence (CSD). This occurs when unobserved common shocks 
affect all countries or a subset of countries in the dataset. In our context, such shocks might 
take the form of (e.g.) commodity price fluctuations or tax agreements where a number of 
countries agree to reduce tariffs on each others’ imports. As proposed by Pesaran (2006), 
a simple way to account for the existence of CSD is to augment the equation being 
estimated with cross-sectional averages of the dependent and independent variables, i.e.  
 
1
𝑁
∑ ∆𝑔𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1       &      
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑿𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1  
 
respectively, where 𝑿𝑖𝑡 is the vector of all explanatory variables. Given that the PMG 
estimator uses maximum likelihood, augmenting the estimated equation with k cross-
sectional averages can lead to difficulties in the estimation procedure (the estimator might 
fail to converge or the likelihood function become non-concave). Thus it was only possible 
to fully replicate the results of table 4.2 and indeed for many specifications the sample size 
is reduced as the estimator only converges when those countries with a sufficiently long t 
dimension are included in the analysis. These results are shown in table 4.12.  
 
The result in column 1 remains unchanged and the coefficient estimate on the income tax 
share is almost identical to that in table 4.2. It was not possible to repeat the estimations 
with income tax disaggregated into PIT, Social Contributions and CIT.  In column 2, the 
results show that RN shifts toward property taxes, away from income taxes, are most 
growth-friendly, followed by RN shifts toward trade taxes. The result in table 4.2, that RN 
shifts away from income toward taxes on goods and services led to higher growth rates is 
no longer statistically significant. Results in column 3 suggest that RN shifts toward 
income, and away from consumption, taxes have negative effects on GDP growth rates; 
notably however the coefficient estimate of -0.082 is somewhat larger than that reported in 
table 4.2 (-0.047). Finally, in column 4, RN shifts away from trade taxes toward domestic 
consumption taxes are no longer significantly positively related to GDP. However, RN 
increase in property taxes are.  
 
Thus, after attempting to control for cross-sectional averages, there are a couple of 
differences with the benchmark results. However, a potential issue with this set of results 
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is that the sample size is reduced for each estimation; it is therefore difficult to say whether 
the difference in results is due to the inclusion of the cross-sectional averages, or due to the 
smaller sample. It is hoped that in future work these results will become more clear via use 
of the dynamic common correlated effects estimator (Ditzen, 2016), which is to be released 
in the near future. This should avoid the issues with convergence experienced with xtpmg 
as it uses OLS in order to estimate pooled mean-group regressions, allowing for the effects 
of CSD to be investigated in the full panel of countries. 
 
Table 4.12. Replication of Table 4.2, after including cross-sectional averages of all 
variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Standard errors in parentheses; *P<0.1; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01 
 
4.5.6 Excluding resource-rich countries. 
 
As highlighted in figure 4.4, there are a number of resource-rich (specifically, oil-
producing) countries where the tax ratio is very low, but per capita income is high. Thus in 
order to ensure that the results reported previously are not biased by the inclusion of 
resource rich countries where growth (and also tax revenues) can fluctuate wildly based 
on, for example, commodity prices, the specifications above are re-run excluding resource-
rich countries. These were identified by eyeballing the data in the GRD for (i) countries 
reporting nontax revenues above 10% of GDP and (ii) countries reporting a high level of 
Dependent Variable: ∆(log) GDP per capita. 
 1 2 3 4 
Physical Capital -0.004 0.046*** 0.026 0.037* 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.018) (0.023) 
Human Capital -0.005 -0.088*** -0.092*** -0.077*** 
 (0.018) (0.024) (0.022) (0.025) 
Population Growth -0.297** -0.545*** 0.032 -0.707*** 
 (0.140) (0.186) (0.168) (0.184) 
Tax / GDP 0.138*** 0.066* 0.133*** 0.075** 
 (0.030) (0.039) (0.034) (0.038) 
Tax Structure Variables    
     
Income  -0.059***  -0.082*** -0.017 
 (0.017)  (0.018) (0.027) 
     PIT     
     
     Social Contributions     
     
     CIT     
     
Consumption & Property     
   
     Goods & Services  0.011  -0.020 
  (0.024)  (0.024) 
     Trade   0.056**   
  (0.028)   
     Property   0.247*** 0.006 0.190*** 
  (0.072) (0.067) (0.071) 
Omitted Tax Variable Income Consumption  Trade 
Observations 2388 1777 2040 1777 
Groups 85 58 70 58 
5-Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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resource tax revenues. Those dropped from the sample above are Algeria, Bahrain, 
Botswana, Egypt, Gabon, Morocco, Sudan, Trinidad and Tobago and Venezuela. Table 
4.13 reports the results for the full sample with these countries excluded. 
 
Table 4.13 Replication of Table 4.2, excluding resource-rich countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
Standard errors in parentheses; *P<0.1; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01 
  
All of the previously reported results hold, with similar coefficient estimates. Notably, 
however, the result in column 1 suggests a somewhat stronger effect of RN increases in 
income tax, offset by consumption and property taxes; a percentage point increase in 
income taxes leads to a 0.097 percent reduction in the long run growth rate.  
4.5.7 Further limitations  
 
There are a number of further limitations to a study of this nature. Firstly, it is inherently 
difficult to account for the fact that changes in tax policy are often announced some time 
in advance of implementation. Individuals and firms may therefore adjust their behaviour 
(which in turn influences the share of tax from any one component) before the tax rate itself 
has actually changed. A further challenge lies in the fact that it is difficult to account for 
(changes in) the efficiency of tax collection, which has clear implications for GDP growth: 
Dependent Variable: ∆(log) GDP per capita. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Physical Capital 0.022 0.030 -0.030* 0.039* 0.046*** 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.016) (0.021) (0.022) 
Human Capital -0.027*** -0.047*** 0.011** -0.028*** -0.031*** 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) 
Population Growth -0.493*** -0.538*** 0.371*** -0.600*** -0.441*** 
 (0.137) (0.160) (0.106) (0.148) (0.158) 
Tax / GDP 0.046 (0.019)** 0.100*** 0.095*** 0.135*** 
 (0.030) (0.008) (0.020) (0.031) (0.033) 
Tax Structure Variables     -0.070*** 
     (0.024) 
Income taxes -0.097***   -0.074***  
 (0.021)   (0.023)  
     PIT  -0.052*    
  (0.029)    
     Social Contributions  -0.092***    
  (0.033)    
     CIT  0.048    
  (0.030)    
Consumption & Property       
     
     Goods & Services   0.066***  0.042*** 
   (0.022)  (0.012) 
     Trade    0.015   
   (0.021)   
     Property    0.039 -0.019 0.003 
   (0.083) (0.080) (0.080) 
      
Omitted Tax Variable Consumption & Property  Income Consumption  Trade 
Observations 2413 1804 2134 2134 2134 
Groups 91 68 78 78 78 
5-Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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even a well-designed tax system might be undermined by poor administration. However, 
the human capital variable might go some way to capturing citizens’ ability to understand 
and comply with tax laws, and the inclusion of the tax level (as a share of GDP), to an 
extent, serves as a control for the ability of the government to administer the tax system.102 
Parallel to difficulty in accounting for the ability of a country to collect different taxes, it 
is also difficult to control for the cost of collecting different types of taxes. The above 
analysis, and related studies in the literature, assume that the costs of collecting different 
taxes are equal. This is, of course, unlikely to be true in practice. Similarly, studies of this 
nature assume that tax design does not matter for growth but again, it obviously does. IMF 
(2013) makes this clear, noting the difference between a corporate tax on rents and one on 
total returns; the former would not affect the marginal incentive to invest whilst the latter 
most certainly would. Whilst the assumption of revenue-neutrality makes possible this kind 
of empirical analysis, there may be limits to the insights presented; many tax authorities in 
developing countries may altar their tax mix in the hope that the tax ratio itself increases. 
Furthermore, the magnitudes of the coefficients are quite small, suggesting limited direct 
effects of any RN changes in the tax mix on long run GDP growth rates. Finally, the 
distinction between domestic taxes on goods and services and trade taxes is often somewhat 
blurry, especially in developing countries; whilst one country collecting VAT at the border 
might classify this as a trade tax, the next may count it as a tax on goods and services. Thus, 
the results that distinguish between domestic consumption and trade taxes should be 
interpreted with this in mind. It is hoped that future development of the GRD will seek to 
improve in this respect.  
4.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
It is clear from the results presented here that different revenue neutral changes in the tax 
mix seem to matter to a different extent in different countries. In short, this highlights the 
pitfalls of promoting a one size fits all policy recommendation. This finding is key; Prichard 
(2016) notes the message that increases in personal and corporate income taxes are bad for 
growth has become policy orthodoxy at the IMF. One need not look far to see evidence of 
this – IMF (2011) and IMF (2015) both make reference to the thinking that indirect taxes 
are more growth friendly than income taxes. But this thinking is based on studies that have 
been carried out only in high income, or OECD, countries. 
                                                 
102 That is, assuming that larger governments (as proxied by larger tax/GDP figures) are more able to   
collect taxes. Of course this says nothing about the efficiency of tax collection, but it is plausible that where  
more people are employed in the public sector, tax collection may be more sophisticated. 
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A knowledge of those taxes that are most growth friendly at different levels of income can 
aid policymakers in a way that results from a sample containing only high income countries 
cannot. Not only has GDP growth over the last 30 years been, on average, lower in high - 
income countries than in developing countries, but the tax structure has remained 
remarkably stable. Thus any growth effects of a change in tax structure are likely to be very 
small in magnitude. However, in low and middle income countries, the past 30 years have 
seen dramatic changes in the tax mix, with large scale shifts away from a reliance on trade 
taxes, toward taxes on domestic goods and services and to a lesser extent, income taxes. 
For many countries, this is likely to continue in the future. Thus the potential to affect long 
run growth rates with tax policy is much greater in such countries. The results presented 
here provide several new insights: 
 
Firstly, revenue - neutral reductions in trade taxes, offset by increases in domestic 
consumption taxes appear to be growth-friendly. Importantly, however, this result seems 
to be driven by the group of countries classed as lower-middle income. No such effect is 
found for low-income countries. Indeed, after controlling for the degree of openness to 
trade, the results suggest a significant negative effect of RN shifts toward taxes on goods 
and services. Thus one might tentatively conclude that trade liberalisation in the very 
poorest countries does not lead to higher economic growth, but at later levels of 
development, it can make a positive contribution to growth rates.  When viewed alongside 
the results of Baunsgaard and Keen (2010), who found revenue recovery to be extremely 
poor in low income countries that had removed trade barriers, the difficulties of promoting 
trade liberalisation in the very poorest of countries is further underlined. 
 
Secondly, the results presented here confirm that revenue – neutral shifts away from 
consumption and property taxes, toward income taxes, are harmful for GDP growth rates, 
as previously found by, for example, Arnold et al. (2011) or Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo 
(2012). However again, the magnitude of the effect differs at different levels of 
development, with the strongest negative effects seen in upper – middle income countries 
and no significant effects seen in lower-middle income countries. Personal income taxes 
and social contributions appear most harmful for long run GDP growth rates, but no 
evidence is found that increases in corporate income taxes are harmful for growth.  
 
Thirdly, the thinking that revenue neutral increases in property taxes are good for economic 
growth, as previously suggested in other studies, is called into question. The results suggest 
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that whilst this may be the case for high-income countries, revenue neutral increases in 
property taxes in low or middle income countries might have limited or indeed detrimental 
effects on long run GDP growth rates.  
 
As a result of the much improved data availability in the GRD, this study has been able to 
extend the existing research (especially in regard to developing countries) and potentially 
offer insight that is more relevant to developing countries. This is done in a more 
transparent manner – all of the data used here is publically available, unlike other recent 
work. If advice on the direction of fiscal policy or the structure of the tax mix is to be 
provided to developing countries, then at the very least this should be based on evidence of 
the experience of other developing countries. Given that domestic tax collection is now, on 
average, the largest form of revenue for developing countries, this work presents an 
important first step toward providing evidence of how changes in the tax mix might have 
the potential to affect GDP growth rates.  
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5. Conclusion 
This thesis has considered three facets of economic development, namely (i) the 
sustainability of informal savings, (ii) primary school attendance and (iii) the role of tax 
structure in explaining economic growth. It has, for the first two studies, considered data 
from Benin, a country that has not been studied in great detail in the related literatures. The 
thesis has also sought to use new, or better, data and methods where appropriate, in order 
to test existing beliefs and theories.  
 
The first study considered how ROSCAs can be designed in order to minimise the payoff 
to potential defaulters and thus help to sustain the groups. In a context where formal savings 
options are limited, often individuals must turn to informal arrangements such as a ROSCA 
in order to finance the purchase of durable goods, stock for a business, or even to just 
commit to a savings pattern. However, if the incentives for individuals to cheat on the 
arrangement outweigh those to remain true, then they are inherently risky and perhaps no 
more desirable than saving in autarky. Using a unique panel dataset collected in 2004 and 
2006 in Cotonou, Benin, the empirical analysis examined the likelihood that a ROSCA 
experienced a case of default between the two surveys. The group-level estimations present 
a first empirical test of the theories outlined in studies such as Besley et al. (1993) and 
Anderson et al. (2009). The main results highlight that there are certain features of 
ROSCAs that are associated with a lower likelihood of default. Specifically, those groups 
run by a president, that met less frequently, that had written rules or were started amongst 
family members were all significantly less likely to have experienced a case of default in 
the years between the surveys. Furthermore, the importance of these features diminished 
as groups successfully completed more cycles. These results are interesting as we look to 
the future of savings in developing countries; a knowledge of the ROSCA structure that 
will bring about the lowest likelihood of default is useful to policymakers, microfinance 
institutions or even formal banks. For example, El-Gamal et al. (2014) found that MFIs 
taking the form of a bank-insured ROSCA had higher repayment rates than those following 
a traditional Grameen style. Furthermore, Handa and Kirton (1999) note that the Worker’s 
Bank of Jamaica offers a ‘partner account’, the structure of which resembles a ROSCA. 
Thus in the future, more MFIs, NGOs, or even formal banks wishing to connect with new 
customers might initially offer products that resemble a ROSCA, with which many 
individuals will be familiar. If this is the case, then knowledge of the ROSCA design that 
sees higher repayment rates may be of key importance. However, a note of caution might 
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be urged when interpreting the results; a lack of information on (i) the exact circumstances 
surrounding each enforcement problem and (ii) each and every member present (usually 
only one or two representative members were interviewed) means that it is not possible to 
confidently interpret the results as causal. However, the points raised in section 4.2 give 
reason to be reasonably confident that the structure of the group is not related to the 
motivations of members. Future research might wish to take account of these issues.  
The analysis in chapter 3 considered the determinants of primary school enrolment in Benin 
for the 2005-06 school year. In particular, regional and gender disparities were studied in 
detail. The importance of education in development is well recognised; achieving universal 
primary education was one of the MDGs and ensuring that both boys and girls complete 
equitable primary education is embodied in the SDGs. In this respect, Benin provides a 
stimulating case study. Having recovered from some of the worst primary school enrolment 
rates in the world in 1990, the country is still faced with considerable regional differences 
in attendance rates. Furthermore, girls remain significantly less likely to attend school than 
boys. Chapter 3 highlights that the official statistics on school enrolment in Benin from 
INSAE or UIS might well suffer from over-reporting; this finding backs up what has 
previously been reported in other contexts (e.g. Sandefur and Glassman, 2015). Using data 
from the 2006 Demographic and Health Surveys along with school supply statistics from 
INSAE, the empirical analysis of chapter 3 firstly seeks to highlight those factors that are 
associated with the likelihood that a child attends primary school. Boys, birth children, 
those from richer households and those from Christian households were all significantly 
more likely to be attending school. An in-depth analysis of the role of the opportunity cost 
of attending reveals that as distance to school (which represents time spent travelling) 
increased, this reduced the likelihood that boys who worked in the field would attend to a 
greater extent than it did for those boys not working. This provides evidence that in a 
context where households might not be able to fully measure the costs and benefits of 
sending their children to school, they do in fact consider the opportunity cost. A three-level 
model is also estimated, which takes account of higher level clustering in the data. This 
showed that the supply of schools, or distance to school, explained only some of the inter-
communal differences in attendance rates, suggesting that regional differences in labour 
markets, culture or tradition might well provide more insight into the disparities in 
attendance rates observed. Moreover, the model showed that, after controlling for the 
observable factors, only 4.9% of the remaining variation in attendance rates was at the 
commune level, whilst some 30% was at the household level. As such, the largest 
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improvements in attendance rates might be realised by focusing on factors at the household 
level, such as raising income or tackling attitudes toward education of daughters. The 
random-slopes model helped to pinpoint those communes where school attendance rates 
were below average, but the impact of household wealth on attendance was above average. 
Were policymakers in Benin interested in reducing regional disparities in primary school 
attendance, then interventions that helped to raise household income (or lower the cost of 
schooling) in these communes might be most effective. 
The third study examined the relationship between tax structure and economic growth in a 
panel of low-, middle- and high – income countries. Recent work in this area (e.g. Arnold 
et al., 2011; Acosta - Ormaechea and Yoo, 2012) has found support for the theory that 
income taxes are more harmful to GDP growth than consumption, or property taxes. In 
turn, this evidence has been used to inform the knowledge base which serves to shape 
policy recommendations at, for example, the IMF. Crucially, the aforementioned studies 
focus their analysis on OECD or high income countries, whilst those countries most likely 
to reform their tax structure in the coming years are more likely to be low or middle income 
countries. Chapter 3 extends work in this field by considering the effects of revenue neutral 
changes in tax structure on a panel of 100 high, middle and low income countries. The 
analysis is made possible due to the increased availability of data on tax revenues in the 
ICTD – UNU-WIDER Government Revenue Dataset. The key finding is that previous 
results are not generalizable to countries at all income levels. Results suggest that revenue-
neutral increases in income taxes, offset by reductions in consumption or property taxes 
are indeed harmful for economic growth rates, but not across all income levels. This result 
appears to hold up after eliminating those countries where the tax policy variables were 
identified as potentially endogenous, accounting for residual cross-sectional dependence 
and controlling for the degree of openness to trade. The previously reported result (e.g. 
Arnold et al., 2011) that property taxes are most growth friendly would appear to be true 
for high income countries, but mixed evidence is reported elsewhere. There is also no 
evidence in the data used here that corporate income taxes are harmful for growth rates, as 
theory or some previous empirical work would suggest. Furthermore, for some countries it 
would appear that the ongoing replacement of trade tariffs with domestic consumption 
taxes has not has positive effects on GDP growth. Overall, these results highlight the 
importance of future work in this area paying attention to the heterogeneous effects of tax 
structure on growth at different stages of development. Whilst these results have called into 
question, and in some cases overturned, those of previous authors, future research in the 
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tax-growth domain might seek to pay further attention to the questions of endogeneity and 
cross sectional dependence. Additionally, future work may seek to relax the revenue-
neutrality constraint, which is perhaps unrealistic in reality; some taxes are, naturally, better 
revenue-raisers than others. Thus an interesting next step may be an attempt to disentangle 
whether increases in certain types of taxation raise more revenue (which may fuel faster 
economic growth rates), have direct impacts on economic growth, or a combination of the 
two.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Survey Methodology 
The survey was carried out in two of the poorest areas of the city of Cotonou, namely Vossa 
and Enagnon. Households were selected according to the following process: We obtained 
a map of Enagnon and performed a simple random selection of lots out of all those 
identified. In Vossa, a pseudo-random process was used by which every tenth lot according 
to a specific direction was picked. Starting points were selected to be equidistant from one 
another and so that they covered the whole district. In these two districts it is often the case 
that many households live on the same lot in semi-detached rooms. Enumerators selected 
one room per lot according to a clockwise selection, varying from lot to lot (for the first lot 
of the day they selected the first room clockwise, for the second one the second room 
clockwise and so on). Overall, only 3 households categorically refused to be surveyed and 
were replaced by other randomly selected households. Enumerators were asked to pass 
several times and at different times of the day, until contacts were established in such a 
way that none of the selected households were skipped. The most qualified of our 
enumerators also acted as a supervisor and visited many households already interviewed in 
order to check the accuracy of the responses. Other than that, we analysed every completed 
questionnaire closely. Several appointments were held with each team of enumerators and 
in cases of incoherence or lack of answers, we regularly sent them back on the field. Every 
household was compensated for their time with a donation of 1500 CFA (around USD 3).  
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Appendix B.  Test for equivalence of means between those groups sampled in both 2004 
and 2006 and those just in 2004 
 
Variable 2004 only Both 2004 and 2006 Diff 
  Mean s.e. Mean s.e.   
Membership size 28.980 2.787 33.175 3.445 -4.199 
No. of cycles completed 8.083 1.539 8.639 2.215 -0.555 
President 0.400 0.053 0.299 0.046 0.104 
Paid 0.341 0.052 0.227 0.043 0.114* 
President*Paid 0.094 0.032 0.062 0.025 0.032 
Random 0.588 0.054 0.680 0.048 -0.092 
Experienced problems pre-2004 0.118 0.035 0.206 0.041 -0.089 
Written Rules 0.647 0.052 0.598 0.050 0.049 
Monthly meetings 0.377 0.053 0.371 0.049 0.026 
More severe sanctions on delinquent member 0.694 0.050 0.536 0.051 0.158** 
Pot size (1000's of CFA) 124.681 13.452 123.288 16.919 1.394 
Single ethnicity 0.212 0.045 0.237 0.043 -0.025 
Only men 0.294 0.049 0.237 0.043 0.057 
Only woman 0.200 0.044 0.155 0.037 0.045 
Survived Past Problems 0.118 0.035 0.206 0.041 -0.089 
Started with           
Friends 0.471 0.055 0.433 0.051 0.038 
Family 0.059 0.026 0.082 0.028 -0.024 
Members of same trade 0.188 0.043 0.144 0.036 0.044 
Neighbours 0.224 0.046 0.186 0.040 0.038 
Members of another group 0.047 0.023 0.072 0.026 -0.025 
Other 0.012 0.012 0.072 0.026 -0.060** 
President/Committee decides 0.765 0.046 0.650 0.049 0.115* 
New members must be known 0.565 0.054 0.608 0.050 -0.044 
Survey on new members 0.871 0.037 0.794 0.041 0.077 
Other conditions? 0.835 0.041 0.856 0.036 -0.020 
N = 182 (full sample) N=85 N=97   
*p<0.1; **p<0.05;***p<0.01. Note: There are only 80 observations for the variable ‘No. of cycles 
completed’ in the ‘2004 only’ sample, due to missing data. 
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Appendix C: Replication of Table 3.3 with alternative dependent variable 
Depvar: Net attendance  (1) (2) (3) 
Individual level Characteristics    
Gender -0.0928***   
 (0.00962)   
Age 0.346*** 0.352*** 0.336*** 
 (0.00833) (0.0108) (0.0111) 
Age2 -0.0163*** -0.0163*** -0.0161*** 
 (0.000442) (0.000572) (0.000583) 
Adopted -0.158*** -0.0325 -0.235*** 
 (0.0407) (0.0229) (0.0524) 
Worked -0.0351** -0.0161 -0.0532*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0149) (0.0193) 
Household level Characteristics    
Household Size -0.00218** -0.00219** -0.00235 
 (0.00103) (0.00105) (0.00156) 
Religion    
Christian - - - 
    
Islam -0.0692*** -0.0826*** -0.0546*** 
 (0.0172) (0.0187) (0.0187) 
Other -0.0338*** -0.0374*** -0.0314** 
 (0.0113) (0.0122) (0.0145) 
Household Wealth Level    
Poorest -0.281*** -0.291*** -0.291*** 
 (0.0170) (0.0202) (0.0229) 
Poorer -0.193*** -0.221*** -0.181*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0181) (0.0170) 
Middle -0.114*** -0.155*** -0.0904*** 
 (0.0130) (0.0184) (0.0166) 
Richer -0.0557*** -0.0952*** -0.0354*** 
 (0.0115) (0.0184) (0.0131) 
Richest - - - 
    
Household head’s education level    
None - - - 
    
Primary 0.0644*** 0.0564*** 0.0724*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0121) (0.0139) 
Secondary 0.148*** 0.143*** 0.158*** 
 (0.0113) (0.0142) (0.0150) 
Tertiary 0.102*** 0.238*** 0.0610 
 (0.0279) (0.0252) (0.0424) 
School considered essential? 0.00755 0.00387 0.0128 
 (0.0127) (0.0133) (0.0170) 
Rural -0.0180 -0.0153 -0.0229 
 (0.0119) (0.0128) (0.0144) 
Commune level Characteristics    
Distance to school -0.0138 -0.0269** 0.00160 
 (0.0107) (0.0109) (0.0126) 
(ln) Schools per 5-14 year olds 0.145*** 0.155*** 0.133** 
 (0.0432) (0.0422) (0.0519) 
    
Observations 26,673 14,003 12,670 
   Standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.1; **p<0.05;***p<0.01 
 
 
 
Appendix D: Estimates of Random effects for Null model, by estimation method.  
Intercept variance estimate Estimation method used 
 MQL1 MQL2 PQL1 PQL2 MLE 
Commune 0.323 0.326 0.390 0.573 0.688 
Household 0.387 0.399 0.701 1.223 2.020 
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Appendix E. List of Countries Included 
Low Income (GNI per capita < $1,045) 
 
Burundi, Benin, Central African Republic, Gambia, Cambodia, Mali, Mozambique, 
Malawi, Niger, Nepal, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe. 
 
Lower-Middle Income ($1,045 < GNI per capita < $4,125) 
 
Bangladesh, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Lesotho, Morocco, 
Nicaragua, Philippines, Sudan, Senegal, El Salvador, Swaziland, Ukraine. 
 
Upper-Middle Income ($4,125 < GNI per capita < $12,736) 
 
Albania, Bulgaria, Belize, Brazil, Botswana, Congo, Republic, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Iran, Jordan, Mexico, Mongolia, 
Mauritius, Namibia, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, Thailand, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, 
South Africa. 
 
High Income (GNI per capita > $12,736) 
 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bahrain, Barbados, Canada, Chile, Chile, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Switzerland, Spain, Finland, France, United 
Kingdom, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, 
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, United States, 
Venezuela. 
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Appendix F. Summary of Disaggregated Tax shares. 
 
Total Taxes (including Social Contributions) = 
 
 Income Tax 
  Personal Income Tax (PIT) 
   NB Includes Taxes on Payroll and Workforce 
  Social Contributions (SC) 
  Corporate Income Tax (CIT) 
 Consumption and Property Taxes 
  Goods and Services 
   NB Includes ‘Other’ Tax 
  Trade 
  Property  
 
Where  
(i) Income Tax + Consumption and Property Taxes = Total Taxes 
(ii) PIT + SC + CIT = Income Tax 
(iii) Goods and Services + Trade + Property = Consumption and Property  
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Appendix G. PMG Estimation, full sample with alternative time controls 
  Standard errors in parentheses; *P<0.1; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01 
Dependent Variable: ∆(log) GDP per capita. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Physical Capital -0.003 0.007 0.001 0.004*** 0.003 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
Human Capital -0.017** -0.022** -0.020** -0.009 -0.028*** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
Population Growth -0.328*** -0.535*** -0.288*** -0.457*** -0.387*** 
 (0.097) (0.120) (0.103) (0.093) (0.107) 
Tax / GDP 0.030 0.031*** 0.117*** 0.068*** 0.119*** 
 (0.022) (0.006) (0.025) (0.022) (0.027 
Tax Structure Variables      
      
Income taxes -0.023   -0.025* -0.039** 
 (0.014)   (0.014) (0.017) 
     PIT  -0.064***    
  (0.021)    
     Social Contributions  -0.077***    
  (0.025)    
     CIT  0.012    
  (0.012)    
Consumption & Property       
      
     Goods & Services   0.074***  0.020* 
   (0.016)  (0.012) 
     Trade    0.042***   
   (0.016)   
     Property    -0.027 -0.046 -0.007 
   (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
Omitted Tax Variable Consumption & Property Income Consumption Trade 
Observations 2664 1811 2562 2562 2290 
Groups 100 68 96 96 84 
     Time Controls       
Country Specific Time Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
5-Year Dummies  No No No No No 
  1 
 
